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Abstract 
The relationship between the early New Zealand Labour Party and 
Socialism 
1900 - 1935 
by 
Quentin Findlay  
 
Abstract: The New Zealand Labour Party had a stated objective of the socialisation of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange or as popularly stated, socialism.  However, the definition of 
the term differed between individuals or groups due to the many variations of socialism. This thesis 
seeks to examine the relationship of socialism to the Labour party, by exploring its development and 
relationship with political labour and its later influence upon policy development in the NZLP after 
that party’s offical establishment in 1916 until it became Government in 1935.  
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Introduction: The Relationship between the NZLP and 
Socialism 
Labour’s Path to Socialism 
This thesis is about the relationship between socialism and the New Zealand Labour Party 
(NZLP).  While, it might appear that the relationship between both Labour and socialism are 
analogous, this point of view rests on a number of misconceptions about the nature of 
socialism and its relationship with the Party.  The history of the British Labour Party is replete 
with books and articles examining that Party’s philosophical and programmatical 
development from 1900 until the present. There are a number of books which deal with the 
British Labour Party’s relationship with socialism.  In contrast, literature on the development 
of the New Zealand Labour Party is sparse.  Most of the popular books dealing with the subject 
(Gustafston, Brown) were written in the 1960s and 70s.1  Snippets of information dealing with 
the party’s development are also contained within the various biographies of the major 
participants (Savage, Nash, Fraser, Lee etc).  Further, the official histories of the party and 
those details in the bibliographies tend to be narratives dealing with dates and events until 
Labour became Government in 1935.   
As a result, discussions about the Labour Party and its relationship to, and with, socialism are 
generalised.  It is simply taken at face value what is meant by socialism when Gufasfston 
declares in his book, Labour’s Path to Political Independence: 1900 – 1919 that the Labour 
Party was committed to an objective of socialisation at its formation;2 or when Peter Fraser 
announced to an audience in 1920 that the NZLP was as socialist as any other socialist party;3  
or, when Bruce Brown quotes Robert ‘Bob” Semple, who was the NZLP President at the Party’s 
1927 Conference as claiming; “Whilst policies may change and methods may differ, our goal 
– Socialism – is always the star to which we hitch our wagon”.4  While Labour’s commitment 
to socialism is beyond doubt, there is no indication given as to what the Party meant by the 
term or how socialism affected its programme.   
Even Labour’s own supporters and members tended to be vague as to what the Party stood 
for.  In his biography, An Outsider looks Back, Ormond Wilson, who was a backbench Labour 
MP from 1935 until 1938, remarks that; 
Consciously or unconsciously, Marxian dogma was a dominating 
influence underlying Labour’s policy in the thirties.  While we saw the 
pump priming function of injecting money into the economy by way 
of higher wages and guaranteed prices as the immediate priority, we 
shared a gut feeling that the basic task of a Labour government was 
to defend the workers against their exploiters.5 
                                                          
1 The two principle works are: B Gustafson, Labour’s Path to Political Independence. The Origins and 
Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party 1900 - 1919 (Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press, 
1980). and; B Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour. A History of the New Zealand Labour Party from 1916 - 
1919 (Wellington, New Zealand: Price Milburn, 1962). 
2 Gustafson, Labour’s Path to Political Independence. pg. 93.  
3 “New Zealand Labour Party. Mr Fraser Replies to His Critics,” Maoriland Worker, August 11, 1920. 
4B Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour. A History of the New Zealand Labour Party from 1916 - 1919 
(Wellington, New Zealand: Price Milburn, 1962). pg. 90.  
5 O Wilson, An Outsider Looks Back (Wellington, New Zealand: Port Nicholson Press, 1981). pg. 63. 
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Wilson’s comment is misrepresentative.  While Labour was certainly about “defending the 
workers against their exploiters,” when one examines the history of the New Zealand Labour 
Party (NZLP) it is evident that the nucleus of Labour’s socialist vision consisted of moral and 
ethical outrage against capitalist society rather than a stylised Marxian programme or 
strategy.   
The New Zealand Labour Party and its relationship to Socialism 
While there were Marxists within the NZLP, there were also a multitude of other party 
members who subscribed to a variety of socialist and progressive beliefs.  As Labour’s leader, 
Henry Edmund “Harry” Holland acknowledged during a debate in the House of 
Representatives in 1924 regarding Labour’s socialist philosophy; 
Of course many members of the Labour Party – I am not now referring 
to the members in Parliament, but to the general membership of the 
Party – accept the Marxist philosophy, and many of them do not.  
There are different schools of thought in the Labour Party. 6 
The NZLP attracted a number of different socialist and progressive proponents.  These ranged 
from those who subscribed to Marx, to others who were motivated to socialism as a 
consequence of their Christian upbringing.  The Christian socialists saw the socialist state as 
an extension of the teachings of Christ.  Other Labour supporters were merely looking for 
more radical and progressive versions of the programmes put in place by the Balance and 
Seddon Liberal administrations from 1891 – 1906.  Still others, particularly those in the trade 
union movement, merely wanted a society where workers were treated to a fairer deal.  
The Labour party needed to mould these distinctive beliefs together and it did so by preaching 
and practising what can best be described as ‘ethical socialism’.  Socialism for Labour was not 
a scientific philosophy, as it was envisaged by Marx and the Marxists, or a programme of 
graduated reform toward a paternalistic socialist state as envisaged by the Fabians, but an 
ethical crusade to transform society and make it fairer and more inclusive for workers.  
‘Ethical socialism’ brought together the diverse ideals and programmes of Labour’s 
supporters and provided them with an assurance that the Party would right the various 
wrongs of existing capitalist society. 
Paul Foote notes that while it is easy to mock the naiveté of ethical socialism, it nonetheless, 
provided Labour politicians with a rallying vision both in New Zealand and in the United 
Kingdom; 
Th[e] naiveté was important, because it was to reverberate in the 
hopes and aspirations of the labour movement.  Its conception of a 
society of healthy and happy families living in a New Jerusalem … [i]ts 
moralistic critique of the corruption and degradation of a competitive 
society was to be at the heart of British socialism.7  
                                                          
6 "Anti-Socialism in Parliament," The New Zealand Worker, August 20, 1924. 
7 G Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought - A History, vol. 2 (Beckenham, England: Croom Helm Limited, 
1986). pg. 37 
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Ethical socialism did not offer a definitive programme.  As Foote notes it provided incapable 
of providing an answer to mass unemployment, budget deficits or other practical problems.8 
As such it proved incapable of delivering the type of world that Labour’s representatives 
promised.  This failing became apparent as the 1920s progressed and the NZLP’s utopian 
message was found to be increasingly wanting in the face of political and economic realities.  
However, in the formative years of its existence it provided the Party with a vision by which 
Labour’s supporters could challenge the numerous injustices of capitalism.   
Socialism and the Socialisation Objective  
This ambiguity over the definition of socialism is particularly evident in the adoption of the 
socialisation objective in 1916.  The objective of the “socialisation of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange” should be seen less as a militant call to arms and more as a means 
of placating the various factions within the new Party.  The various issues between the 
“militants” and “moderates” or the left and the right of the political labour movement had 
caused considerable dissention in the past.  By 1916, it was determined that these should not 
cause dissention in the future.  
However, as we discussed previously, what socialism actually meant to the Party continued 
to raise debate among Labour’s representatives, its members and, even, its opponents.  The 
first Chairman of the Labour Party, Alfred Hindmarsh declared himself as a socialist, but for 
Hindmarsh socialism was an inclusive ideology which sought the cooperation of all classes.  
Economic and social injustice would be eliminated in Hindmarsh’s socialist society through 
wide spread public ownership.9  This socialist vision was at some variance with that of Holland.  
For Holland, socialism would be achieved only when the workers had complete control of the 
means of production and distribution and exchange.10 The argument about what constituted 
socialism was not limited to the New Zealand, it was wide spread and polarised the socialist 
movement, particularly after 1917.  The early American socialist, Jessie Wallace Hughan 
remarked that this divergence within socialism had given rise to “the saying that Socialists are 
of “57 varieties”.11 
Consequently, the inclusion by the NZLP of the socialisation objective should be seen less as 
a political victory by the left and more, like the party’s unofficial adoption of “ethical 
socialism,” as a means by which various and opposing socialist philosophies could be 
reconciled.  The British Labour Party adopted the ‘common ownership’ Clause IV in 1918 for 
much the same reason.  The Clause was a means of placating both the left and right of that 
Party.12  As Keith Laybourn remarks in his book on the centenary of the British Labour Party; 
…the vagueness of Clause IV allowed it to act as a unifying force within 
the Labour Party.  The various labour and socialist organisations which 
accreted to the Labour Party exhibited widely different views about 
socialism and war.  Some organisations favoured a type of workers’ 
                                                          
8 Ibid. pg. 37 
9 New Zealand Government, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 159 (Wellington, New Zealand: 
Government Printer, 1912). pg. 336. 
10 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 182. pg. 92.  
11 J Hughan, The Facts of Socialism (London, England: The Bodley Head, 1912). pg. 12. 
12 K Laybourn, A Century of Labour (Stroud, England: Sutton Publishing, 2000). pg. 32. 
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control while others wished for an extensive version of 
nationalization.13 
A similar situation existed in the NZLP.  An objective which defined socialism as workers’ 
control, which was a common objective in European Social Democratic parties, would have 
alienated the right.  Alternatively, a definition which excluded the concept of workers’ control 
would have alienated the left.  Therefore, an objective which promoted the vaguer concept 
of ‘socialisation’ allowed those NZLP members who believed in workers’ control to co-exist 
with those who perceived socialism as being merely an extension of state control and public 
ownership.  Far from being estranging, the socialisation objective was a panacea to the NZLP 
in its formative years. 
A Party of Ideological Contradictions 
While seemingly united, the NZLP was a party of ideological contradictions.  For some, the 
NZLP was a party of unionism and practical reform.  Yet, it was also a political organisation 
promoting a radical socialist ideology, which sought to fundamentally change the structure 
and nature of society.  As Holland informed the House of Representatives, the Party was 
seeking a society in which a “man’s worth would be proved by his work rather than by his 
wealth”.14  This contradiction is most evident when one examines what Party members 
thought that it should do to realize a socialist society once it had achieved Government.  
Among some socialists within the Party there appeared to be an idealised and fanciful belief 
that once Labour formed a Government it should immediately legislate against capitalism, 
thereby instantly resolving the situation.  To others, socialism would be achieved as a result 
of a systematic and gradual programme of policy changes which would take place over a 
number of years.  The result of these changes would be the subversion of capitalism and the 
establishment of a socialist society.  It is doubtful as to whether any of these strategies would 
have met with the approval of Karl Marx.  
Socialism through Constitutional and Educational Reform 
The NZLP was convinced that if it was to achieve its crusading aims it would be through the 
parliamentary process and via education and persuasion.  The defeats of industrial labour in 
1890 and then, again, in 1913 demonstrated to the majority of New Zealand’s socialists that 
the changes they sought would only be achieved through the use of the parliamentary process 
and democratic procedure rather than revolutionary action.15  The electoral successes of 
international Labour and Social Democratic parties further accentuated this perspective.  
With the establishment and growth of the Communists after 1918, Labour came to 
increasingly emphasize the parliamentary or democratic route to socialism (democratic 
socialism) as against the vanguardist or Soviet inspired version.   
                                                          
13 Ibid. pg. 32 
14 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 183(Wellington: Government Printer, 1919).pg. 92 
15 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 183. pg. 98. Holland was committed to parliamentarianism and the 
electoral process noting in his maiden speech that; “The fact remains that here in New Zealand, as in most other 
British-speaking countries, we have learned to use the political machine – we have learned to look upon the 
political method as the method of liberty, as a constitutional right fought for through long centuries and at last 
won by the people ... “. 
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Initially, Labour sought an increased role for workers in the economic and social spheres and 
radical electoral participation through a combination of direct and indirect democratic 
frameworks.  If Labour had been elected to Government in 1922, its socialist programme 
would have meant large scale public ownership and direct parliamentary control of industries.  
Although, stopping short of direct democracy, Labour championed the idea of radical 
electoral reform not only promoting Proportional Representation but, of electoral recall of 
MPs, and binding referenda.  Worker’s wages and social provision would be expanded and 
increased for people.16  
Labour separates from Socialism 
Yet, throughout the 1920s and 1930s socialism in any form lost its predominant role as a 
defining and guiding objective for the Party.  While, the Party retained its desire to achieve a 
more equal and fairer system remained, socialism was not necessarily the means by which 
this could be achieved.  As James McCombs observed Labour’s policies could be achieved 
without the overthrow of capitalism.17 Increasingly, Labour’s parliamentary spokespeople 
came to tout economic regulation and social security as being able to achieve desirable 
economic outcomes for workers without resorting to radical programmes.  When the NZLP 
did mention socialisation, which was rarely, the term was dictated by the party’s manifesto.  
Socialism did not define the NZLP, rather the party defined socialism.   
The redefinition of socialisation additionally meant that the NZLP could more effectively 
counter the accusations of capital that it was merely a fifth column for the Bolsheviks.  Since 
the 1917 Russian Revolution Labour had been prone to (sometimes hysterical) criticism from 
its political opponents that it sought to pursue a soviet style programme in Government.18  As 
the ideology emanating from the USSR increasingly dominated socialist thought and 
practices, the Party sought to distance and distinguish itself from soviet socialism and 
promote its own programme.  Although, socialisation remained the objective of the NZLP, the 
Party appeared to become embarrassed by the term.  By 1935, the phrase or any reference 
to socialism did not appear at all in the Party’s official literature.  When the Party did mention 
socialism, it came to emphasise the NZLP’s commitment to public ownership and regulation 
and increased social security and provision.  
Outline of Thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters and a final conclusion which deal with the development 
of the NZLP’s socialist thought, practice and programme until 1935.  The thesis examines the 
manner in which socialism developed prior to the establishment of the party.  It then 
examines the NZLP’s parliamentary road to socialism and how the socialist objective was 
advanced by the Party in its programme from its first election in 1919.   The latter chapters 
examine the retreat from a socialist prescription by the Party in the late 1920s and 1930s and 
its adoption of ‘enlightened capitalism’ as a guiding economic and social tenet.  
Chapter One: The Development of Progressive Politics in New Zealand 
                                                          
16 “The Labor Party Stands For,” Maoriland Worker, November 22, 1922. pg. 10 
17 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 213. pg. 861. 
18 Reform Party, “Will You Stand for This?,” The Auckland Star, October 19, 1925. pg. 13. 
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This chapter provides a brief examination of the political and economic development of New 
Zealand in the years up to first decade of the twentieth century in which the New Zealand 
Government and the nascent state apparatus played an increasingly central role as active 
participants.   
Chapter Two: Labour Strikes out Alone: The Establishment of Labour and Socialist Parties 
This chapter discusses the development of the various labour and socialist parties from the 
first decade of the twentieth century until the beginning of the First World War. It was during 
this period that ‘political’ labour broke away from the governing Liberal Party.  Labour’s 
independence was marked by hostility and antagonism with different groups competing for 
working class loyalty and votes.   
Chapter Three: The Journey to the Holy City 
This Chapter will examine the NZLP’s political theoretical relationship with socialism (or the 
variations of socialist thought immediately prior to, and after, World War One.  It will offer a 
brief precis of socialist thought and practice at that time and seek to locate New Zealand’s 
socialist tradition within that lineage.  
 
Chapter Four: The Formation of the Parliamentary Labour Caucus and the Labour Party 
This chapter will examine the formation of the new party and the composition of its new 
parliamentary caucus.  In comparison to the extra-parliamentary party, the NZLP caucus were 
not motivated by the desire to pursue a radical socialist alternative to capitalism.  They 
preferred a more moderate liberal-labour approach to the NZLP’s objective and policy. 
Chapter Four: Radicals and Moderates: Radicals, Syndicalists and the Labour party 
In the years after its formation, the NZLP was the object of the attention of various radicals 
and revolutionists.  A number of these individuals and groups were either involved directly in 
the Party as full fee paying members or they were involved in various labour organisations 
within the wider labour movement.  The philosophy of the groups tended to vary.  The radicals 
within the Party wanted the NZLP to be socialistic in its philosophy and methods, whilst those 
outside of the NZLP were critical of the Party’s commitment to parliamentarism and 
reformism.  This chapter provides a brief overview of the arguments and objectives of these 
organisations compared with the NZLP in the early 1920s.   
Chapter Five: Red Obstacles on the Parliamentary Road to Socialism.  
This chapter will examine the means by which the NZLP’s political opponents accentuated 
and manipulated the relationship between Labour and revolutionary socialism and the NZLP’s 
rejection of the Bolsheviks socialist brand and promote its own parliamentary socialism.   
Chapter Six: The Constitutional Road to Socialism: Electoral Reform and the NZLP 
Having rejected the revolutionary socialist ethos of the Bolsheviks, this chapter will examine 
how Labour used electoral and constitutional reform to achieve the parliamentary road to 
socialism.  The Party believed that electoral participation needed to be inclusive, participatory 
and representative.  This chapter will examine the four most notable of the Party’s 
constitutional planks by which it would achieve these ideals - the Recall, the Initiative, the 
Referenda and Proportional Representation (PR).  It will examine what success it had in 
13 
 
 
achieving these policies, whether the reforms were as socialist as the Party suggested, and 
what effect the success or failure of these policies had on the NZLP’s overall socialist 
programme and objective.  
Chapter Seven: The Sugar Kings: A Tale of Sugar, Trade and ‘Profiteering Brigands’ 
This chapter will examine the Colonial Sugar Refinery issue and the proposed imposition of a 
protective duty.  It will briefly examine the Labour Party’s arguments against the imposition 
of a duty and its arguments for the nationalisation (state ownership) of the refinery.  
Subsequently this example will be used to discuss how Labour’s proposed solutions and 
policies reflected the Party’s overall programmatic and ideological approach in this period 
and how they demonstrated a structural weakness in the NZLP’s policy and programme.   
Chapter Eight:  Enlightened Capitalism: Labour’s Economic Platform. 
This chapter examines the NZLP’s reaction to the changing political and economic 
circumstances which occurred during the late 1920s and early 1930s.  The 1930s proved to 
be the end of a period of political re-alignment for the NZLP.  During this time the Party had 
substantially modified its socialisation objective and its platform.  ‘Enlightened capitalism’ 
became associated with the economic practice of Keynesianism which was named after the 
British liberal economist. JM Keynes.  Keynesianism gave coherence and a purpose to the 
NZLP’s disparate policies, which only had in common a commitment to distributive justice.     
Chapter Nine: Conclusion: The Elusive Red Dawn. 
The thesis concludes that while the Labour Party had a number of platform planks and, 
although these became more complex throughout the 1920s, there was no overall strategy 
of how an economy could practically function under a Labour Government.  Labour’s vision 
of socialism never offered a practical programme as to how a socialist society might be 
constructed.   
Note on Terminology 
This thesis uses various different designations in relation to the New Zealand Labour Party.  
The word ‘labour’ is used in lower case to describe those independent labour MPs and their 
respective parties prior to the formation of the NZLP in 1916.  A lower case labour is also used 
in reference to the labour movement.  After 1916,  the words Labour, Labour Party and NZLP 
are used.  Additionally, until 1924 it was common to use the American spelling “Labor”.  After 
that date the Party and its publications, used the UK version, Labour.  I have tried to use the 
UK version except in those instances where there has been a direct quote used from a 
newspaper report or speech.  
Literature  
When I commenced this thesis it was assumed that I would have access to a wide variety of 
original papers and documents.  However, the opposite has proven to be true.  
Documentation and papers have been scant and when they do exist they have been used 
previously in other works on the NZLP. Correspondence with the New Zealand Labour Party 
showed that the Party did not hold any of its original books or papers from this period, aside 
from some NZLP Conference reports from the 1920s.  Most of the Party’s early 
documentation was held by the Alexander Turnbull Library and National Archives.  Some 
original documentation such as minute books which related to the NZLP and its 
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predecessors in Christchurch was held in the library of the Christchurch Trade Union Centre. 
Regrettably, the TUC and its library were victims to the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes.    
Where possible I used primary sources for information such as the remaining New Zealand 
Labour Party Parliamentary Caucus minutes and Minutes from the New Zealand Labour 
Executive and Conferences.  Also accessed were the various manuscripts housed in the 
Alistair Turnbull Library and National Archives belonging to HE Holland, MJ Savage, J 
McCombs, R Mason and W Nash.  The Hocken Library in Dunedin provided the JT Paul 
papers.   
Also used in the thesis were the generous notes and articles compiled by PJ O’Farrell for his 
research on H E Holland.  O’Farrell’s papers contained copies of NZLP minutes, conference 
reports and various pieces of correspondence.   
However, regrettably much of the information used in this thesis has been gleaned from 
secondary sources.  Notably, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), the Maoriland 
Worker (MW) from 1912 until 1924 and, the New Zealand Worker between 1924 and 1933 
and the various biographies of Savage, Fraser, Nash, Lee, Nordmeyer, Wilson, Coates and 
Ward.  Also used were the two principal works for NZLP history, Barry Gustafson’s 1981 
book, Labour’s Path to Political Independence and Bruce Brown’s, The Rise of New Zealand 
Labour.  Additionally, a range of general books, newspapers and pamphlets related to the 
topic has been referenced.  
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Chapter One: The Development of Progressive Politics in 
New Zealand 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief examination of the practical development of 
New Zealand in the years up to first decade of the twentieth century in which the New Zealand 
Government and the nascent state apparatus became an active participant.  I will argue that 
the use of the state as a means to develop New Zealand’s economic and industrial 
infrastructure and its role in alleviating social and industrial inequality led to it being accepted 
by both socialists and liberals as an enlightened force.  The increasing use by Government of 
the state to achieve practical reforms and programmes on behalf of labour had a significant 
and long term impact on the programmes and policies which were espoused by the New 
Zealand Liberal party and later by labour parties.  Practical policies and programmes were the 
basis of the philosophical and political development of independent socialist and labour 
organisations in New Zealand in the early twentieth century.  For labour, the state’s role in 
delivering better economic and social outcomes was not just an ideological abstraction, it was 
a practical reality.  Consequently, the state became a central philosophical and practical 
component of political labour’s programmes during this period. 
Colony into Dominion - The Increasing Role of the State in New Zealand‘s Economic and 
Industrial Development 
New Zealand Governments had started to experiment with state-led economic and industrial 
development in the 1850s and 60s.  However, while various public institutions such as the 
Government Life Insurance Office, the Post Office Savings Bank and the Department of Public 
Works had been created, New Zealand’s infrastructure remained largely embryonic until the 
1870s.19  This was due to a combination of factors but principally to a lack of capitalisation, 
competing private interests and the conflict between the different levels of Government.  As 
the conservative William Downie Stewart and the American academic, James Edward Le 
Rossignol commented in their 1910 book, State Socialism in New Zealand, the responsibility 
for the colony’s economic development in this period lay in the hands of private interests and 
outside of the domain of New Zealand’s central government.   
The Government was largely controlled by the squatters and, other 
well-to-do people and the various government undertakings were 
designed chiefly for their benefit and not primarily for the good of the 
poorer classes20 
Until 1876, New Zealand operated a semi-federal system of government.  The colony was 
administered by a combination of central and provincial governments.  While central 
government was located in Wellington, the provinces had their own local governments which 
were based in the various provincial centres.21  It was to provincial government that the 
                                                          
19 William Downie-Stewart and James Edward Le Rossignol, State Socialism in New Zealand (New York, United 
States of America: T.Y. Crowell & Company, 1910). pgs. 3-4. 
20 Ibid. pg. 5.  
21J O Wilson, New Zealand Parliamentary Record 1840 - 1984 (Wellington, New Zealand: Government Printer, 
1985). pg. 32 
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development of economic and social infrastructure largely fell.  Provincial governments 
administered roads, maintained schools and hospitals.  They even had their own police 
forces.22  The political constitution of the colony combined with the administration of various 
provincial institutions and infrastructure, meant that the provincial councils enacted their 
own legislation, although this was subject to the authority of central government.23   
However, as the colony developed, a feeling became to be more openly expressed by 
supporters of central government, (who were provided with the label Centralists) that the 
provincial governments (who were described as Provincialists or anti-Centralists) were largely 
involved in self-interested ‘pork barrel’ politics.24  The financial indebtedness of a number of 
the Provincial governments further impeded the central government’s ability to progress the 
country’s development.  Josiah Clinton Firth, the Member of Parliament for Auckland City, 
succinctly put forward this opinion in a letter to the New Zealand Herald in 1875: 
In the provinces destitute of land funds the system is dying of 
inanition.  In the provinces with large land funds it has developed into 
a wasteful Centralism of a very narrow and selfish type. Provincialism 
has fostered a mean provincial jealousy, greatly subversive of the true 
interests of the colonists. The presence of the Superintendents and 
their henchmen in the House has created a system of log-rolling and 
intrigue which, so long as the Provincial system continues, will render 
good government well-nigh impossible. 25   
The Centralists argued that as a result of these impediments it was impossible to construct a 
comprehensive and nationwide system of infrastructure, such as roads and railways, to 
improve the condition of the colony.  Firth, and a majority of his colleagues, asserted that only 
dramatic intervention by central Government would secure the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ of the colony.26 
Julius Vogel, the colony’s Treasurer and, later its Premier, was determined to foster industrial 
and economic development.  Vogel believed that centralised state investment would allow 
the colony to economically develop.27  So, in 1870 Vogel convinced the Fox administration, in 
which he was the Treasurer, and then Parliament to approve a £10 million loan to undertake 
massive public works.28  Aided by the newly created Department of Public Works, Vogel’s 
programme intended to develop roads, a national railway system and public works to nurture 
New Zealand’s fledging agricultural and industrial sectors.29  Yet, despite this programme, 
comprehensive infrastructural development remained difficult.  The establishment of a 
                                                          
22 Downie-Stewart and Le Rossignol, State Socialism in New Zealand. pg. 3. 
23 Ibid. pg. 3 
24 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 17. pg. 218 – 222. See also; J Hight and H Bamford, Constitutional 
History and Law of New Zealand (Christchurch, New Zealand: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1914). pg. 270. 
25J.C Firth, “Abolition,” New Zealand Herald, August 21, 1875. pg.1. 
26Ibid. pg.1. 
27 M King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books (NZ) Ltd, 2003). pg. 228. 
28 Ibid. pg. 229.  
29New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 17. pg. 131.  
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national rail network for instance, was deemed to be near to impossible as a consequence of 
various issues with private concerns and the provincial governments.30   
In 1876 provincial governments were abolished and central Government strengthened, 
removing this major obstacle to progress.  With public works now unencumbered by the 
provinces, infrastructural development was significantly expanded.31  Railways were a 
primarily example of the improvement brought about the new state of affairs.  Private rail 
owners, who had been opposed to the development of state railways succumbed as 
increasing costs made their railway lines uneconomic.  Eventually, all private railways were 
integrated into the government-run rail system. In 1908, New Zealand Prime Minister Joseph 
Ward moved that the last private railway in New Zealand, the Manawatu Railway, be taken 
into state ownership.  He was supported by the opposition Reform party leader, William 
Massey, who merely observed that “… it is quite time.”32 Thirty three years after Vogel’s 
Government, the state had achieved complete dominance over New Zealand’s rail 
infrastructure.33   
Industrial Development and Unions 
State infrastructural development allowed industrial development to occur and by the 1880s 
New Zealand had started to undergo significant industrialisation in its urban and rural sectors.  
Such industrialisation required employees and, as a consequence of the different form of 
employment relationship required in factories and workshops compared with those on the 
farm, an urban based mass industrial working class came into existence.34  However, along 
with industrialisation arose concerns about employment and social conditions in the growing 
colony’s factories and cities.  Industrial growth had led to allegations of labour being taken 
advantage of by unscrupulous employers.35  Increasingly, there were stories of workers being 
‘sweated’ in factories. The issue of sweated labour, or having workers, particularly women 
workers, employed in crowded, unsafe factories for little pay, was taken up by various 
newspapers, organisations and prominent campaigning individuals.36   
The radical Dunedin Reverend Rutherford Waddell was one such individual and he addressed 
a sermon to his parishioners entitled ‘The Sin of Cheapness’ about the poor conditions in the 
Dunedin garment industry.  Waddell accused the factory owners of profiting from their 
employees’ misery.37  Extracts from the sermon along with the findings of its own 
investigations into the matter, were published in the Otago Daily Times (ODT).38  The resulting 
                                                          
30 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 9. pg. 544. During a debate to announce the extension of railway 
lines in the South Island, Vogel was opposed by a small number of MPs.  He lamented their opposition remarking 
that it was clear to him that “…no Government will ever be able to satisfy the greediness-shall I call it, the 
impatience of honourable members.” 
31 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand. pg. 231. 
32 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 144. pg. 200. 
33 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 14. pg. 356.   
34W P Morrell and D O Hall, A History of New Zealand Life (Christchurch, New Zealand: Whitcombe and Tombs, 
1957). pg. 169 – 170. 
35 Ibid. pg. 170. 
36 W P Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, vol. 2, 2 vols. (London, England: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd, 1902). pg. 30.  
37 "The Sweating System," Otago Daily Times, October 20, 1888. pg. 3. 
38 Ibid. pg. 3. 
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public outcry was embarrassing for both the Government and employers and led to the 
establishment of a Royal Commission to investigate the various allegations of sweating.  The 
Commission issued its report in May 1890.  While the Commission found that the sweating 
system was not in operation in New Zealand, it did find serious deficiencies in the conditions 
within factories and recommended changes to legislation governing the condition of labour 
be made.39   
One of the outcomes of the appalling conditions within the garment industry was the 
establishment of the Dunedin Tailoresses’ Union (DTU).  Its establishment was a reflection of 
increased working class militancy in this period which saw the development of a number of 
other unions and working class organisations.40  Similar to the United Kingdom, skilled 
workers and tradesmen had already established their own specialised craft unions and 
associations.41  Now unskilled workers were forming unions in the factories, shops, the 
railways, in the mines and on the wharves to protect and further their conditions.   
New Zealand’s Political Development 
The alleviation of capitalist exploitation in industry also required a larger role to be played by 
the state.  Additional legislation and regulations were introduced to curb the excesses of 
employers and to ensure better working conditions and rights for workers.  Hand in hand with 
the positive influence of state development was a belief in the ability of parliament and 
governments to enact progressive legislative change.  Such a belief was partially a reflection 
of the country’s liberal electoral franchise.  By the end of the nineteenth century, New Zealand 
had developed a far more democratic and representative system than a number of other 
developed capitalist nations.42  Initially, New Zealand’s parliamentary and electoral system 
was similar to that of the United Kingdom.  The 1852 New Zealand Constitution Act had 
provided the colony with a two-tier parliamentary system (a lower House of Representatives 
and an unelected appointed Upper House or Executive Council). The Act also prescribed a 
voting system which was limited to males over the age of 21 who owned property worth £50 
or over. 43 However, substantive changes began to occur mere decades after its 
establishment.  
In 1867, during the New Zealand Wars, the Crown established the four Maori seats (Northern, 
Southern, Eastern and Western Maori) in which all Maori men were provided with the right 
to vote.44  In 1879, further improvements to electoral law saw all males over the age of 21 
                                                          
39 "The Sweating Commission. Publication of Report," New Zealand Herald, May 19, 1890. pg.11. 
40 Morrell and Hall, HNZL. pg. 169. 
41 Ibid. pg. 169 – 170.  
42 "Bills Passed," Evening Post, November 6, 1919. pg. 3. While women were able to vote after 1893, they were 
unable to stand for parliamentary office.  The Bill providing women with the right to stand for election for the 
Lower House (House or Representatives) was finally enacted in 1919.   
43 A H McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand (Wellington, New Zealand: Government Printer, 
1958). pg. 345.  McLintock provides the full version of the 1852 Constitution Act of New Zealand without any 
amendments in the Appendix to this book. pg. 419.  See also; New Zealand Government, “The Constitution and 
Government of New Zealand: Being a Compilation of Acts and Instruments” (Wellington, New Zealand: 
Government Printer, 1896). pg. 2.  This version is amended.  
44 W Badger, 1842 - 84. The Statues of New Zealand: Being the Whole Law of New Zealand Public and General, 
vol. 1 (Christchurch, New Zealand: Lyttelton Times Company, 1885). pg. 203 
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becoming eligible to vote, regardless of how much property they possessed.45  In 1893 women 
gained the vote,46 much to the personal chagrin of Prime Minister Richard “King Dick” 
Seddon.47  As a consequence, by 1900 the majority of New Zealand adults over the age of 21 
could vote.  Subsequently, the country was largely spared the unrest that erupted in the 
United Kingdom or the United States of America concerning the providing of the vote to the 
poor, ethnic minorities and women.   
While New Zealand might have a structured and liberal electoral system which was ahead of 
that of the United Kingdom, its parliamentary politics was far less structured.  Unlike the 
United Kingdom there were no official political parties represented in New Zealand’s 
parliament.  New Zealand’s Parliament was highly individualistic and predominantly based on 
private interests and personalities from 1851 to 1890.  As a result, parliamentary debate was 
focused around narrow sectional interests and individualistic arguments with MPs frequently 
defecting from the opposition to government.  Yet, despite this supposedly fluid situation, 
there was a substantial element of stability, as governments between the 1860s and 1890s 
tended to be comprised of many of the same MPs who shuffled their cabinet positions.  This 
situation led to accusations that New Zealand was administered by a ‘continuous ministry’ 
which, as the New Zealand Herald observed, hindered the “growing desire to see new men 
and new ideas have an innings:”48  
It is, as we have often pointed out, supremely ridiculous for the 
present Government to revile their predecessors as the ‘continuous 
Ministry,’ a name specially given by Sir Julius Vogel to a former 
combination of his own, of which no fewer than three members are 
in the present administration (Sir J. Vogel, Mr. Richardson, and Mr. 
Reynolds), whereas there was only one, Major Atkinson himself, in the 
late Ministry.  The present Government is therefore to all intents and 
purposes the “continuous Ministry” renewed.49 
Informal groups which portrayed themselves as ‘parties’ did occasionally establish 
themselves in the Parliament.  In the late 1870s, during the premiership of Sir George Grey, a 
parliamentary group which called itself the “Liberal Party” was formed.50  In reality this “party” 
consisted of a group of parliamentarians who were drawn together around Grey’s colourful 
and autocratic figure.  The disparate nature of this grouping meant that it could not and did 
not survive Grey’s removal as the “party’s” leader and the colony’s Premier in 1879.51  While 
the Grey “Liberal Party” may not have achieved the great programmes to which Grey aspired, 
                                                          
45 Ibid. pg. 885. 
46 “Women’s Franchise,” The Press, September 23, 1893. pg.9.  
47 “Women’s Franchise,” The Press, September 20, 1893, sec. Editorial. pg.4. 
48 “The Coming Men,” New Zealand Herald, August 9, 1887. pg.5. 
49 Ibid. pg.5. 
50 J Rutherford, “Sir George Grey. A Study in Colonial Government” (London, England: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 
1961). pg. 598.  
51"Editorial. Resurrexi", The Evening Star, October 25, 1879. pg. 2. On hearing reports that Grey was being asked 
by some MPs to resume leadership of the Liberal Party, the editorial writer observed that: ‘As soon as Sir George 
Grey stepped from his high position and appeared as one of the rank and file, the spine of the Liberal party was 
injured—its adhesiveness departed, and a well organised, clearly defined party degenerated into a rabble driven 
hither and thither like a flock of sheep. We have no hesitation in saying that Sir George Grey at the head of the 
Liberal party is the right man in the right place, and we will hail with feelings of the greatest satisfaction the 
confirmation of the rumour we publish to-day.’ 
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it did, nonetheless, provide political inspiration for several younger liberal parliamentarians, 
particularly John Ballance and Robert Stout.52   
The individualistic nature of parliamentary politics was to change in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century as a consequence of wider economic forces.  In the early 1880s, New 
Zealand entered a prolonged economic depression.  As employers cut their costs, unions 
found themselves unable to prevent cuts to wages and conditions.  Remaining militancy 
within the union movement was dealt a crushing blow in 1890 with the outcome of the 
Maritime Strike which paralysed the wharves in Australia and New Zealand.  After a 
protracted and bitter battle with employers, the various unions found themselves out-
manoeuvred by the forces of capital and the Atkinson Government.53  As Pat Hickey was to 
lament in the paper of the labour movement, the Maoriland Worker in 1912, the strike was 
disastrous for labour.  
An impartial observer must admit it to have been a poorly advised and 
badly conducted revolt. The battalion of Labor were led out and 
shattered so cruelly and hopelessly that for many years [labour] 
organisation in New Zealand was practically non-existent.54 
Although they had been industrially defeated, unions and workers still had political recourse 
through New Zealand’s liberal electoral system.  Unions started to cooperate with radical and 
liberal minded MPs to protect and further their interests.  At the 1890 General Election a 
number of these MPs were elected to the Lower House of Parliament and agreed to form a 
Liberal Party to govern the country.  
“…The Wave of Socialistic Feeling” – The Alliance between Liberalism and Labour 
Although their legislative reforms were innovative, and despite comments from editorial 
writers and oppositionist politicians about the Party’s socialistic nature, the Liberals were not 
a socialist party.55  The Liberals were, at least for their first decade in Government, a relatively 
progressive party.56  New Zealand liberalism was committed to the imposition of progressive 
programmes, in industry, land, social security and pensions and the economy.  Of course, the 
political importance of the Liberal Party to labour lay in that party’s ability to implement a 
series of pro-labour legislative reforms and to wind back the industrial defeat of 1890.57   
There were some additional advantages for labour as a consequence of their political 
cooperation with the Liberals.  This was in the form of actual parliamentary representation.  
Approximately five Labour men were elected as Liberal-Labour MPs and became part of the 
new Liberal Government.58  However, whilst the radical Liberal William Pember Reeves had 
                                                          
52"Parliamentary. House of Representatives", Wanganui Chronicle, November 1, 1877. pg. 2. In a parliamentary 
debate about Grey’s suitability to be Premier, as a consequence of Atkinson resigning from that position, 
Ballance is reported as stating that: “it was because they believed in Sir George Grey's liberal principles that he 
and others supported him.” 
53 P Hickey, “The Birth and Growth of the N.Z. Federation of Labor,” Maoriland Worker, May 3, 1912. pg.3. 
54 Ibid. pg.3. 
55 “Mr Seddon Amongst the Socialists,” The Press, August 20, 1897, sec. Editorial. 
56 “The Premier. Banquet at Wanganui. Speech by Mr. Ballance. The Policy of the Government.,” New Zealand 
Herald, February 13, 1891. 
57 “Tailoresses’ Union. Presentation to Mr Pinkerton, M.H.R,” Otago Daily Times, January 7, 1891. pg. 3.  
58 W P Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, vol. 1 (London, England: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, 1902). pg. 74.  Reeves claimed that five Labour men were elected to Parliament in the General Election of 
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enthusiastically written about the rapid growth of trade unions, the electoral success of the 
German Socialists and “... the wave of socialistic feeling...” sweeping over the colonial working 
class, the reality was slightly different.59  The unions were demoralised after 1890.  There was 
no independent labour or socialist party arguing over ideas and lobbying for reform.  There 
were simply five men who were elected into Parliament as labour’s representatives who 
were, in Reeves’ own words; “quiet, attentive, business like, well-mannered mechanics“.60  
These were hardly the people who would be ushering in the socialist utopia. 
The Liberal Government – Progressives in Power 
Individual Trades Unions, the Trades and Labour Councils and the newly elected Liberal-
Labour (Lib-Lab) parliamentarians wanted industrial legislation which would protect wages 
and conditions.  Unions wanted an arbitration system that ensured that employers had to 
negotiate with them.  Additionally, labour supported welfare programmes which would 
ensure protection for aged and sick workers.  The Liberals were prepared to implement these 
reforms in return for labour’s electoral and parliamentary support.  Consequently, the Liberal 
Government introduced a limited pension and benefit system.  Legislation covering hours, 
wages and conditions in factories and in shops were also passed.  In 1894, the penultimate 
piece of labour legalisation, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (IC&A Act) was 
introduced.  Largely the creation of Reeves, the Act entrenched the award structure and 
imposed upon unions and employers a series of procedures which had to be followed in the 
matter of industrial bargaining.  The Act also established a system of Arbitration Courts, which 
would settle disputes over wages and conditions.  The newly formed Department of Labour 
was responsible for the administration of the new labour legislation.61  
Initially, the political partnership between Liberals and the labour movement proved 
electorally advantageous.  The working class had gained a small parliamentary enclave from 
which it could advocate its cause.  For the Liberal Party, political cooperation had delivered a 
sizable section of the voting population into the Liberal electoral camp.  From the 1890s 
onward, workers increasingly cast their votes for Liberal candidates.  The city areas of 
Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, which had considerable working class areas, 
became solidly Liberal.62  As Hamer observes: 
A study of Auckland, for example, has shown that in the period 1890-
1908 no booth or seat drawing on a predominantly working class 
electorate failed to return a Liberal majority. The same study 
concluded that the labour section was more reliable electorally than 
the middle class.63 
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59Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, 1. pg. 74. 
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The Liberals also gained support in outlying country areas where there were settlements of 
miners, timber workers and railway workers.64   
Socialism and the Liberal Party 
Although, the Liberals were largely pragmatic in their political programmes, there were 
Liberals who subscribed to socialism involved in the party.  The most prominent amongst 
them was Reeves who openly defined himself as a socialist.  However, he had company in 
Edward Robert Traeger, the first Secretary of the Department of Labour and later, President 
of the New Zealand Social Democratic Party.  There were also individual Liberal MPs such as 
the Dunedin MP Alfred Barclay, who had openly Marxist inclinations.65   
Reeves believed in ethical socialism.  He was convinced that the present inequality which 
existed within New Zealand’s Victorian and Edwardian society needed to be halted and that 
the economic and social programmes pursued by Sir Harry Atkinson’s Government were 
unlikely to do that.  He advocated the greater use of state intervention under an enlightened 
socialist administration as a means by which progressive reform could be fostered.  Reeves 
became a prominent Minister in the Liberal administration and the architect of the radical 
labour legislation which the Government implemented.   
Tregear was never an MP.  He was a friend of Reeves and Ballance and a Liberal supporter 
who was well known for his socialist views.  As the Minister of Labour, Reeves appointed 
Tregear to the post of Director of the newly established Department of Labour.  In his new 
position, Tregear proved to be very influential and sponsored a number of reforms and 
legislative changes which established an enlarged and active state by which industrial and 
economic harmony could be maintained.66  Tregear was not an idealist.  He was a practical 
person.  His socialism was not created from a deep study of ideology and philosophy.  It was 
the result of his own practical experiences, particularly his bankruptcy which had occurred in 
the 1870s.67  Consequently, Tregear was convinced of the need for active state intervention 
as a means to prevent people from falling deliberately or as a result of misfortune into poverty 
and distress. 68 
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Sidney Webb,” Otago Daily Times, August 29, 1898. pg. 3. 
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Alfred Barclay was one of the most ideologically militant MPs in the Liberal Party caucus.  In 
addition to being a Dunedin solicitor, he was also a Lecturer in constitutional history at the 
University of Otago.69  He was to use his knowledge in both areas in his parliamentary 
speeches as the MP for Dunedin City and, later, the MP for Dunedin North.  However, Barclay 
achieved notoriety due to his open admiration of Karl Marx.  Consequently, he was probably 
the nation’s first ‘Marxist’ MP and certainly the only MP in the Liberal Party who openly 
acknowledged Marx.  Prior to being elected to parliament in 1899, he had published an 
address he had given about Marx titled The Origin of Wealth: Being the Theory of Karl Marx 
in Simple Form.  In 1900, he referenced quotes from Marx in his maiden speech in 
Parliament.70   
Throughout his parliamentary career, Barclay advocated for workers and the poor.  In 1907, 
he put forward a Parliamentary Bill advocating that the food and clothing supply of New 
Zealand be nationalised.  Dissatisfied with the political trajectory of the Joseph Ward-led 
Liberal party he was asked to, and agreed to stand for the first New Zealand Labour Party in 
1912.71  Unfortunately, illness forced him to withdraw.  He died later that year.  John 
Robertson, the United Labour Party (ULP) MP for Otaki lamented his death in Parliament in 
1913, observing that Barclay’s energies “… were devoted to the interests of the working 
classes of this country.  The Labour Party, I think, has sustained a great loss in the death of Mr 
Barclay”.72 
Reeves, Tregear and Barclay had additionally been active in the New Zealand Fabian Society 
which established itself in the country in the 1890s.73  In many respects, the Fabians were the 
perfect ideological companions for Liberals.  Established in 1883, as the offshoot of an 
organisation called the ‘Fellowship of the New Life’, initially the Society attempted to 
influence the UK Liberal Party before affiliating to the British Labour Party when it was formed 
in 1900.74  The Fabians subscribed to the ideology of socialist gradualism and were content to 
support practical and pragmatic reforms as a means to achieve that objective.  Arriving in New 
Zealand, the Society quickly established branches.  The Auckland Star reports the 
establishment of the Fabian Society in Christchurch in 1896.  The paper observed that, “ [a] 
Fabian Society for the promulgations of socialistic ideas has been recently started, with the 
Rev. O'Bryan Hoare as honorary secretary. One of its objects is to run socialistic candidates”.75   
The ODT reported a good attendance at the inaugural meeting of the Society in Dunedin.76  
Chaired by Barclay, the Fabian society declared that its objectives were; 
… the mutual instruction of its members and the education of the 
community in social and political questions on ethical and scientific as 
well as economic lines. It was proposed to attain these objects by the 
distribution of literature and the promotion of public lectures and free 
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discussion. The general trend of opinion of the members would, he 
thought, be found to be in sympathy with those movements which 
were now almost world-wide, to obtain control of capital and to assist 
in a more equitable distribution, of wealth.77   
Unlike the United Kingdom, where the Fabians provided considerable intellectual and political 
stimulus to the Liberal and later the Labour Party, the New Zealand Fabians were more 
circumspect in terms of their size and application.  However, while the New Zealand Fabian 
Society lacked the considerable political sway of its British counterpart, the lack of a cohesive 
philosophical programme made New Zealand liberalism susceptible to Fabian ideas.  
Socialism without Doctrine – Liberalism in New Zealand 
In addition to administering state departments, Tregear also published a number of socialistic 
pamphlets for international consumption.  These praised New Zealand’s advanced social and 
economic legislation.  Despite the leading Liberals being embarrassed by them, most of 
Traeger’s articles were based on reports and speeches provided by Liberal personages such 
as Seddon, about the progressive nature of the Liberal Government.78  Interested in the 
reforming nature of the Liberal Government, radical and progressive international 
commentators such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, James Edward Le Rossignol, Albert Metin, 
Andre Seigfried and Robert H Hutchinson visited the country and wrote accounts based on 
their own experiences of the Dominion’s ‘socialist’ programmes. 
In 1912, the French political and social observer Metin referred to New Zealand Governments 
as implementing “socialisme sans doctrine“(socialism without doctrine) referencing the 
significant role that the state played in economic and social affairs.79  In 1916, the Maoriland 
Worker reviewed a book by Hutchinson titled Socialism in New Zealand.  80  Hutchinson, who 
had visited New Zealand while on his honeymoon in 1913, actively threw himself into activity 
for labour and was suitably impressed by the progress New Zealand had made in the areas of 
social policy and industrial relations.81  He also referred to the active and progressive role 
played by the State in the achievement of progressive reform as a journey toward socialism.   
Hutchinson claimed that, “New Zealand is a good place in which to study State Socialism 
because there is more of it there than in perhaps any other place in the world”.82 
Certainly, significant social progress had been achieved by the Liberals from 1891 – 1912.  In 
its first decade of Government, the Liberal Party had alleviated the industrial, social and 
economic distress of workers by implementing new and radical labour legislation, it had 
reformed the pension system and it had broken up the large farm estates, allowing more 
people onto the land.  Yet, despite Tregear’s optimistic pamphlets, there had never been a 
deliberate attempt to transform New Zealand into any sort of socialist paradise.83  In the 
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context of the times, although Liberal programmes could be perceived as being 
‘revolutionary’ and ‘socialistic,’ New Zealand was not, as Hutchinson was to observe, a 
socialist nation:  
One may hear it said that New Zealand is nearer Socialism than other 
countries, or that it is "Socialistic." But the New Zealand system allows 
wealth to be created and distributed by capitalistic methods, and sets 
about to mitigate the inevitable evils of capitalism by palliative 
methods. There is no attempt by those in power to radically change 
this system, but on the contrary every attempt is made to thwart any 
change. Were the State on the road to Socialism a more direct effort 
would be made to correct the inequitable distribution of wealth by 
striking at the root of the trouble and not patching up the symptoms. 
Rent, interest, and profits still exist; they have never been dangerously 
attacked.84 
Instead, Hutchinson put forward the proposition that the ‘socialism’ which was so beloved by 
international and domestic socialist observers was actually a political sleight of hand by 
liberals and conservatives: 
… the Capitalists of the last few years have taken the wind out of the 
Socialists' sails by labelling reforms with socialist titles. It is surprising, 
in fact, to see how many people of all kinds and classes call themselves 
Socialists in New Zealand. What the majority of them mean is simply 
that they approve of the policy of further State ownership and of 
humanitarian legislation.85 
Disenchantment within the Liberal Party 
During the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, there was 
a growing level of discontent expressed by some of the self-styled radicals in the Liberal Party 
caucus against aspects of Government policy and the autocratic and populist leadership of 
Richard Seddon, who had become popularly known as ‘King Dick.’  Often these disputes were 
the result of personal slights or oversights and based around equally autocratic characters.  
However, at times the breaches were of a political nature and were considered serious 
enough for some MPs to leave the Liberal Party caucus and become Independents or to form 
their own faction within it.   
In March 1905, aggrieved by the conservative nature of the Government and various slights 
against them by Seddon, several of the Liberal Party’s more radical MP’s (Taylor, Fisher and 
Bedford) formed a New Liberal Party.86  For the most part, the New Liberals operated as 
disparate parliamentary grouping within the Liberal caucus rather than a separate political 
party with distinct political ideas or objectives.  The New Liberals appeared to have two 
principal concepts which united their MPs.  The first of these was a belief that ‘true liberalism’ 
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had died with Ballance.  The second was a dislike of Seddon and his leadership.87  Aside from 
these two concepts, the New Liberals could not agree on much else.  They lacked a common 
programme and even the ability to vote the same way in parliament.88  Further, despite their 
supposed progressive nature only a few of the New Liberal MPs such as Hogg, Bedford and 
Taylor openly associated themselves with labour.89 
Labour Disenchantment and Disappointment with the Liberal Party 
After 1900, there appeared the first palpable signs of dissatisfaction with the Liberal Party 
from a significant segment of the labour movement.  Although, the numbers of workers 
dissatisfied with the Liberals remained small in terms of overall working class support for the 
Party, their numbers were increasing.  More worryingly for the Liberal leadership, the 
malcontents became increasingly vocal in terms of their frustrations with the Liberal Party.  
There were several reasons for this rising discontent.  Many of the older trades unions who 
had been supportive of the Liberals were supplanted by newer non-craft based unions, which 
represented semi-skilled or unskilled workers.  These new unions were increasingly militant 
in their demands for gaining better conditions and/or wages.  Further, these new unions also 
tended to be led by people who were not Liberal in either their political or philosophical 
orientation.  They drew their political inspiration from philosophies and practices which were 
antagonistic to those of liberalism, particularly drawing on Marxism and syndicalism.   
These new radicals had also become active in some of the older Unions, such as the miners, 
where they questioned the decisions and programmes of the older Liberal Party supporting 
union leadership.  But, even amongst some of the older, conservative Unions, there was a 
discontent and a desire for change.  Several times between 1900 and 1906, Seddon was 
forced to meet and placate representatives from the older and Liberal-inclined Trades and 
Labour Councils, which were dissatisfied with Liberal Party progress in areas of labour 
reform.90 
One of the principal causes of labour’s disenchantment was the perceived bias of the 
Arbitration Courts.  Initially, labour had supported the Courts as their judgements had 
significantly aided them and alleviated the imbalance between capital and labour by 
improving wages and conditions.91  But, after 1900 there was a perception in the labour 
movement that the Courts were now actively working against unions and in favour of the 
employers to hold down conditions and wage increases.92  Starting in 1908, there were a 
series of escalating industrial disputes, which were led by new union militants. While they 
were seeking immediate improvements to wages and conditions, the disputes were also 
calculated attacks by militant labour against the Arbitration system.   
Yet, while this was setting the scene for the rise of independent labour as opposed to Liberal-
Labourism, many labour supporters remained supportive of the role that the state had played 
in the arbitration process, even while they disagreed with the direction of the Arbitration 
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Courts.  They did not want a withdrawal of the state and return to the free-for-all in industrial 
negotiations.  They simply wanted a system which recognised the demands and conditions of 
labour.  As the labour moderate, JT Paul was to remark in his article on the “industrial 
difficulties” confronting New Zealand in 1911 in the Auckland Star:  
I do not think Parliament has been as ready to improve the machinery 
of arbitration as it should have been.  Arbitration has to be adapted to 
the changed phases of industrialism.  The principle of arbitration is 
sound at the core.  Arbitration, properly applied, means the guarantee 
of "fair and reasonable wages".  I am not attempting to show that 
production for profit is right or wrong.  I am attempting to show that 
arbitration is the best method to give the best conditions to the 
worker under the present system, the system we have to deal with to-
day and to-morrow.  Arbitration and the present system cannot give 
absolute justice to the wealth producer; but until this system gives 
way to another we've got to make the most of it, and attempt to give 
the worker the best of it.93 
Conclusion – The Victory of State Ownership and Parliamentarism 
From the late 1890s until the first decades of the twentieth century, New Zealand obtained a 
reputation as a ‘social laboratory.’94 The term became particularly associated with the 
progressive social and economic programmes of the Liberal Government from 1890 - 1912.  
While a number of these programmes were the consequence of pragmatic responses to 
various circumstances in which the Liberal Government found itself, rather than the desire to 
implement a radical programme, there was a certain degree of sympathy shown by a small 
number of Liberals towards various aspects of socialism or radical liberalism.  This group 
comprised two sections.  The larger of these sections was composed of Liberal 
parliamentarians and supporters who were sympathetic to labour ideals and programmes 
and subsequently supported labour initiatives, even if they were not inclined toward 
socialism. However, there were a smaller number of prominent Liberal members and 
supporters who did perceive themselves as socialists and, subsequently, worked toward 
enacting socialist or socialistic policies.  Members of both sections either supported or 
comprised the Liberal- Labour (Lib-Lab) grouping within the New Zealand Liberal party.  
The state had an established role in New Zealand’s economic and social development from 
the early years of the colony’s formation and in the 1890s and 1900s this role was 
substantially expanded into areas of limited social provision. As this chapter has 
demonstrated the state played a progressive influence on the development of the New 
Zealand colony.  It was state action which had built roads, railways, schools and hospitals.  A 
progressive Liberal government had used the state to improve the wages and conditions of 
workers, providing them with a higher standard of life.  Older workers, who were of ‘good 
moral standing,’ became eligible for an old age pension.95  Subsequently, many people within 
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the labour movement and outside of it came to identify the increasing use and influence of 
the state during this period as socialistic.  The image of the state as a benign and progressive 
institution gained acceptance within liberal and labour circles. However, as Hutchinson noted, 
this interpretation was a fallacy.  Nonetheless, this conviction significantly influenced the 
political labour movement in the coming decades.   
The growth of the state went ‘hand and hand’ with the expansion of the authority of 
Parliament and the country’s electoral system.  Although, New Zealand’s political tradition 
was British (and specifically English), the country never experienced the same amount of 
unrest that the United Kingdom did in relation to different groups seeking to gain voting 
rights.  There were no Peterloo massacres in New Zealand.  Even the campaign to achieve 
voting rights for New Zealand women was mild in comparison to the campaign for women’s 
suffrage which was waged in the United Kingdom in the decades prior to World War One.  By 
1900, the majority of New Zealand adults aged 21 and over were entitled to vote and most 
took the opportunity to do so.   
Consequently, use was made of this liberal voting system.  Workers possessed actual electoral 
power which they could use to elect individual MPs or political parties to further their 
objectives.  Likewise, while unions and workers associations may have been industrially 
defeated in 1890, they were not politically defeated.  Consequently, they organised 
electorally and supported a Liberal Party which had improved the conditions and living 
standards of workers in its 21 years of Government.  The success of the Liberal Government 
(1891 – 1912) in improving conditions for the majority of the population provided further 
proof of the success of the parliamentary system.  Any failing in the system was due to the 
belief that Parliament did not have an independent labour party to progress labour policy and 
objectives.  This belief in the power of electoral politics and parliament as means of achieving 
objectives was never really seriously challenged.  As a consequence parliamentarism became 
a central part of New Zealand labour and socialist politics. 
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Chapter Two: Labour Strikes out Alone: The Establishment of 
Labour and Socialist Parties 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief examination of the development of the various labour and 
socialist parties in New Zealand from the first decade of the twentieth century until the 
beginning of the First World War. It was during this period that political labour broke away 
from the governing Liberal party, somewhat hesitantly at first, and sought to stake its own 
independent political claim.  Labour’s independence was marked by hostility and antagonism 
with labour moderates (labour right) and socialist militants (labour left) competing for 
working class loyalty and votes.  Yet, despite the hostility shown by the various factions 
toward each other, the philosophical differences between them were less important than 
their programmatic similarities.  At the core of these programmatic similarities was a common 
belief in state control and public ownership of infrastructure and institutions.   
Additionally, labour politics was largely electorally focused.  By 1900, most New Zealand 
adults over the age of 21 could vote and stand for elections.  As was explained in Chapter 
One, the election of the Liberal Party to government in 1890 had improved the lot of workers 
and ensured growth in economic and social development.  Consequently, labour believed that 
if the citadel of parliament could be stormed then a labour government could implement 
legislation which would further benefit labour.  Such a belief in the supremacy of electoral 
politics was only briefly challenged by industrial militancy prior to 1914, after which labour 
returned its focus and efforts into gaining representation at either the local or national level.   
Independence: The Growth of Political Labour and the Road to 1915  
By 1905, the Liberals had become the victims of their own success. There was a growing 
demand for more radical programmes from the Liberal Government by sections of the labour 
movement and radical liberals.  The failure of the Government to deliver on those demands 
was increasingly seen as a conservative rebuff by an administration, which, while allegedly 
representing labour, was perceived as more openly working in the interests of capital.  
Agitators from the newly formed Socialist Party chided the Liberals and their union allies and 
called on labour to undertake its historic mission as the majority class and to take its place in 
running the affairs of state.  While the more conservative Trades and Labour Councils and 
their leadership were suspicious of, and in some cases hostile to, the socialists, even they 
could see the benefits to labour if it had its own party.  By 1905, there was a conscious decision 
amongst sections of the labour movement to establish their own political organisations 
independent of the Liberal party.   
Doubtless, the other motivating factor for labour to forge its own independent political 
identity was the establishment and electoral success of labour and social democratic parties 
internationally.  The Independent Labour Party (ILP), a forerunner of the United Kingdom 
Labour Party, had been formed in 1891 and the Labour Representative Committee, later the 
Labour Party, was founded in 1900.  The ILP, and later the Labour Party, had its own elected 
representatives in the British Parliament.96  In Europe, there was the growing presence of the 
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German Social Democrats, which was one of the largest parties in the German Reichstag.97  A 
mere 13 years after its formation in 1892, the Australian Labor Party, formed a minority 
federal Government in 1904.98  These parties presented evidence that the labour movement 
could not only organise its own independent party, but that it could also govern.   
The First Attempts at Labour Unity: Political Labour Leagues (PLL) 
The first political vehicle for labour was the supposed ‘Independent’ Political Labour Leagues 
(PLL).99  The PLL was not a socialist organisation.  It was not even politically independent 
initially as its national body was pledged to support the Liberal government.100 At its national 
conference in 1905, the national chairperson for the League, J Rigg, was anxious to note that 
while the league campaigned for labour candidates, this did not mean that it opposed the 
Liberals.  The ODT reported that Rigg; 
… denied that the league had been organised for deposing the present 
Government or Mr Seddon. It sought to have fair labour 
representation on municipal bodies, and a strong Labour party in 
Parliament.  Candidates at the forthcoming general election, he said, 
should recognise that a new factor had arisen in political affairs. If the 
league could not get a candidate of its own in, it could at least keep 
out one whom it did not approve.101 
 
Politically, the League was moderate body, was supported by the Trades and Labour Councils 
and various other groups, including the Liberals.102  Its national platform advocated greater 
state control and ownership of the tobacco industry; the creation of a state bank with the 
sole right of issue; the re-evaluation of Crown lands held under private lease and the halt to 
the private sale of Crown owned lands; the parliamentary franchise to apply to the elections 
of all local bodies and municipal proposals; referenda; the abolition of the Upper House and 
an elected Executive and the abolition of public borrowing except for ‘redemption’ and 
completing ‘works already authorised by Parliament.’103 The programme was very restrained 
and would have appealed to radical Liberals as well as conservative Unionists.  The platform 
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planks - aside from the nationalisation of the tobacco industry - were to reappear in the 
programmes of the League’s political successors.  
The need for the PLL arose because it was apparent that there were a number of left or 
progressive candidates contesting the 1906 election and they were all actively courting 
working class electors.  The League would bring together the various labour and progressive 
organisations in the regions and ensure that there was a coordinated approach by the various 
campaigns.104  Rather than have ‘labour’ or progressive candidates run against each other, 
candidates and their respective organisations would establish Labour Regional Committees 
(LRCs) and campaign under a common platform.105  
While this approach was well meant, it was not successful.  There were too many disparate 
organisations involved and the lack of unity between the various organisations flared into 
open disagreements.  In Dunedin, the President of the Socialist party, Robert Hogg, attacked 
the Leagues in an open public address.  The League, Hogg asserted, was not an independent 
body; it was merely the political front for others.  
It was proposed at one time to call it the Independent Political Labour 
League, but at a meeting of the founders "independent" was struck 
out. Therefore Mr Hogg asserts, there is no independence in the 
attitude of this new political body, and it will accomplish nothing. 
Anything that has been secured for the workers has been won by an 
independent party, and, as the new party had no qualification of the 
kind desired, it will reap no reward. 106    
Contesting a small number of electorates, the various PLL candidates did little more than fly 
the flag for independent labour.107  The Liberals retained their hold over working class voters 
and handily saw off the PLL interlopers.  Electorally, the PLL was a failure and by 1909 it had 
fallen into disrepute.  However the importance of the PLL lay in its attempt to forge a common 
understanding between the various organisations of independent Labour and to provide 
them with the opportunity to work together.  While there may have been disagreements 
between the various groupings involved in the League, they were the first practical attempt 
by the political labour movement to mediate a common set of objectives and platforms.   
A Party for Apologists: The First NZ Labour Party (1910) 
In 1910, a second attempt was made to gain labour representation, this time independent of 
other parties, with the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party (LP).  The Party was formed 
as a result of the national conference of the Trades and Labour Councils.  Consequently, and 
like its British and Australian counterparts, it was a largely labourist organisation in that it 
simply sought independent labour representation in parliament and not the achievement of 
any distinctive ideology such as socialism.108  The lack of a socialist ideology meant that the LP 
appealed to electors as a ‘class-less’ party rather than a class based one.  This appeal was 
necessitated due to the Party being apprehensive about its association with other bodies 
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which might be considered as radical.  In a letter to the Maoriland Worker, a correspondent, 
who had been at the Party’s foundation conference, observed that; 
Being a "Progressive Person," I naturally attended the meeting a few 
days ago at which the new party was formed. I was sorry to see they 
would not admit the Press, not even a representative of “The 
Maoriland Worker." What have we to hide, anyway?  The point that 
struck me most was that everyone who rose to speak apologised for 
the platform, and said that of course there were certain planks they 
could not agree with; and I firmly believe if each speaker had had the 
right to strike out the part he did not agree with, the only thing that 
would have been left would have been the words Labour Party.109  
In line with its emphasis on classlessness, the first New Zealand Labour Party sought to unite 
all classes and create a society which was fairer to all.110 The Party’s objective and platform 
sought the gradual transformation of New Zealand toward a fairer society.  While there was 
a distinctive emphasis on the use of the state and nationalisation as a means of ensuring a 
better standard of living for workers and ordinary people, it stopped short of any direct attack 
on Capital.  The LP contested the 1911 General Election, where it proved to be more 
electorally successful than the PLL.  Two of the Party’s seventeen candidates were able to 
amass more than 1000 votes and one of these candidates, Alfred Hindmarsh, actually won 
the seat of Wellington South on the second ballot. 
Although it did well in those elections, by 1912 the Party was effectively dead.  The 
organisation of the Party was patchy and had suffered as a result of the open warfare between 
the various labour and socialist groups.111  The growth of the Federation of the Labour (FoL) 
had created considerable discontent within the labour movement between moderates and 
militants.  This antagonism spilled over into the new party.  As industrial unrest increased in 
the lead up to the 1913 General Strike, the antipathy between both sides intensified.112  
Realising the Ideals of True Liberalism: The United Labour Party (ULP)  
In 1912, the Labour Party was merged into a new political organisation, the United Labour 
Party (ULP).113  In addition to having a new name, the ULP also had other elements in its 
favour.  It recruited George Fowlds, the former prominent progressive Liberal MP and the 
formidable ‘Professor’ Walter Mills as an organiser.  Mills was an outstanding orator and used 
his oratory to good effect against the ULP’s opponents.114  He also wrote newspaper columns 
on behalf of the Party in which he significantly exaggerated the conflict between the ULP and 
the more moderate elements in the Labour movement against the ‘revolutionists.’115  
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The ULP also secured the services of several MPs, who were able to articulate the ULP’s 
platform in Parliament.116  Amongst them was the able Alfred Hindmarsh, who became the 
ULP MP for Wellington South.  Hindmarsh was a former Liberal, who had grown disenchanted 
with that party.  His attitude was reflective of Labour dissatisfaction with the Liberals.  While 
Hindmarsh believed that the Liberals had once been representative of the majority of New 
Zealanders, the final years of the Liberal government had alienated workers.  In Parliament, 
Hindmarsh claimed that the Liberal Government had enslaved workers and it was labour’s 
role to help “…break the chains of liberalism that has held the people in chains for so many 
years.”117 Consequently, he suggested that it was now Independent Labour which was 
representative of the interests of all New Zealanders.118 
Like its immediate predecessor, the ULP was a Party for moderate trade unionists, 
independent labourites and alienated progressive liberals.  As articulated by Hindmarsh, the 
ULP saw itself as heir to a progressive liberal tradition which its supporters claimed had been 
lost under the premierships of Seddon and Ward.  In line with that belief, Fowlds claimed that 
the objective of the party was to act as; 
… a truly progressive reform party, with the aim of establishing social 
justice. That was the aim of the United Labour Party.  He [Fowlds] 
explained that he had left the Government last September because he 
felt it did not realise the ideals of true Liberalism.  It was not possible 
for any political party to stand still.  The Liberal Party had dropped 
some really progressive ideas held ten or twelve years ago. …. it was 
the failure of the Liberal Party to move forward that had caused the 
United Labour Party to be evolved.119 
The objective of the ULP was to re-establish the progressive programme which had been 
personified by Ballance and appeal to all New Zealanders who wanted a fairer and more just 
society. 120  
Socialism in ‘Willow-Calf Boots’: The New Zealand Socialist Party (SP) 
Fowlds observed that the ULP opposed two threats to civilisation.  The first of these threats 
was unrestrained capitalism.  However, he proclaimed that the United Labour Party also stood 
in opposition to the other threat to ‘civilisation.’ This was the ‘revolutionary socialist.’121  
Revolutionary socialism was represented industrially by the militant Federation of Labour 
(Red Feds), the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and politically by the New Zealand 
Socialist Party (SP).  The Socialist Party had been formed in 1901122.  At its formation the party 
gave little inkling of its development into a revolutionary body.  Initially the Party was a 
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moderate grouping which combined elements of Fabianism, co-operativism and the socialist 
romanticism of British socialist, William Morris.123  This philosophical approach was not 
surprising when it is considered that the party was established by the business and financial 
backer of the Clarion magazine, W R Ranstead, and 190 of his followers who had come to New 
Zealand with the intention of establishing a cooperative socialist community.124   
At its formation the Party stated that its objective was;  
… to work for the organisation of New Zealand as a Co-operative 
Commonwealth in which the land and all the instruments of 
production, distribution, and exchange shall be owned and managed 
by the people collectively.125   
While the Party pledged to stand candidates in elections, this was not at the forefront of its 
organising activities.126  Instead it sought to promulgate socialist theory and teachings through 
meetings, debates, discussions and the “circulation of books, papers, pamphlets and leaflets 
of a Socialistic nature”.127  As one observer noted, Marx was virtually unknown to the New 
Zealand socialists.  The Party had nothing in its principles that left-wing liberals could not 
approve of.128  
The situation was to change in 1902 when the Party engaged the revolutionary British 
socialist, Tom Mann, who toured New Zealand on its behalf.129  Mann’s activities transformed 
the Party, turning it into a mass based party with an electoral agenda.130  The Socialist Party 
did not actually adopt a revolutionary objective until the appointment of the socialist 
journalist, Robert Hogg as General Secretary, and the American socialist, Robert Rivers 
LaMonte, as the Party’s organiser.131 The programme of revolutionary socialism, was largely 
copied from the IWW, and committed the Party to the ‘the integration of a socialist 
commonwealth founded upon the socialisation of Land, Machinery and Capital.’132 As the 
Maoriland Worker reported about nature of the Socialist Party; 
Generally speaking the position of the Socialist Party in every civilised 
country is one of hostility to the existing political order. That order is 
based on private property in the means of production, and its function 
is to maintain and defend that property in the interests of the 
dominant class. Hence the existing political order is in antagonism to 
Socialism.133 
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Until its demise in 1913, at the Unity Conference which formed the Social Democratic party 
(SDP), the Socialist Party actively promoted the theories and programmes of Karl Marx, 
Eduard Bernstein, Eugene Debbs and other international socialist notables.   
Unlike the PLL, the first New Zealand Labour Party or the ULP, the Socialist Party was not 
formed as a political arm of the Trades and Labour Councils.  Many of the Trades Unions would 
not have dealings with the Party due to its radical and uncompromising programme as a group 
dedicated to revolution.134  However, the Socialist Party did have some union support, 
principally from within the militant ‘new’ unions such as the Miners Federation and the ‘Red’ 
Federation of Labour in which Socialist Party officials held prominent positions.135   
Politically, the Socialist Party was hostile toward both the Liberal Party and the ULP.  As far as 
the Socialist Party was concerned the Liberal party was a capitalist organisation whose main 
objective was to lure workers into accepting capitalism and its conditions.  The Socialists 
criticised the ULP as Liberal stooges and openly disparaged the ULP platform as liberal. 
The platform is all right, only it is a Liberal platform. The name is all 
wrong. "United Labor Party" is a swindle. It is not united. It is not Labor 
… Furthermore, the Labor Party claims to be a Socialist Party, and 
resents the charge that it is a Lib.-Lab party. … If the Labor Party were 
a Socialist Party it would be a party of Socialists. It is not such. It is a 
Liberal Party in stolen clothes. But is it quite the honest thing to 
masquerade as a working-class party? 136 
Yet, despite their appeals to revolution, the Party never stopped participating in electoral 
democracy.  The Socialist Party stood candidates at both a local and national level.137 
Sometimes the party stood separately or as part of a wider labour group, although these 
political interactions could be fraught for both sides.138 The party went so far as to chide the 
IWW about its opposition to the Parliamentary action.  In the Commonwealth, the Socialist 
Party’s column in the Maoriland Worker, the party endorsed parliamentary action, remarking 
that any means to achieve the freedom of the workers was ‘justifiable;’ 
Strange to say our old comrades of the IWW are still holding out 
against Parliamentary action.  Why this entrenchment of capitalism 
should not be stormed is beyond my meagre comprehension. The 
freedom of the workers from the thraldom of capitalism being the end 
desired, any means is justifiable to achieve that end. And I consider 
Parliamentary action is a means to that end.139 
Party activists increasingly engaged in industrial activity after 1909 and political activity 
became, for a short while, a secondary focus for the party.  Yet, despite engaging with 
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industrial militancy, the SP never completely forswore parliament.140  Similar to its labour 
counterparts in the ULP, there was a strong strand of belief within the party that 
parliamentary politics was a means to further workers interests despite Parliament being a 
tool of bourgeois capitalism.  With the defeat of industrial unionism as a result of the General 
Strike in 1913 the Party returned to focus on electoral politics.141 
Although versed in Marxism and socialist analysis, the Socialist party lacked a developed plan 
or programme in which economic or social injustice could be rectified.  Consequently, its 
solution was to tinker with the system in the belief that it could be dramatically changed.  As 
the party stated in its ‘Commonwealth’ column of 20 October 1911; 
Socialism does not expect to get along without capital, though 
changing its character fundamentally. To-day capital is the means of 
exploitation; while under Socialism it would lose this capitalist quality 
and become simply the means of production.  Socialism aims at the 
absolute concentration of capital, the realisation of its greatest 
efficiency.142 
The Party perceived that capitalism could be changed and transformed into socialism.  As a 
means of achieving that transformation, the Party adopted a programme which was 
essentially state led (statist).  In proposing such a platform, the SP’s programme appears to 
be little different from that proposed by other labour organisations such as the ULP.143 While 
the SP could be described as more aggressive in its criticism of capital than the ULP, the Party’s 
political programme merely consisted of a significant extension of public ownership.144  Such 
a platform was also a central component of the ULP’s programme.   
In 1911, the commonality between the programmes led to Socialist candidates being openly 
questioned as to whether the Party’s platform was any different to that of the Labour Party.  
This was a question which the candidates attempted to avoid answering.145  Savage, for 
example, on being asked the question during a campaign speech in 1911 in Auckland Central, 
averred that:  
"Well, if you can find any part of the Labor platform about my person 
you can give me in charge of the nearest policeman." "Or send you to 
the Lunatic Asylum," suggested the chairman.146 
In terms of actual policies, there appeared to be little political difference between the various 
groups.  As John A Lee recorded in his book Simple on a Soapbox the SP’s revolutionary appeal 
could be considerably overstated;  
“The Socialists are fakers”, the I.W.W would yell. 
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Joe Savage, who was later to be New Zealand’s Prime Minister, stood 
on the soapbox for Democratic Socialism. 
“Look at my feet,” the I.W.W man bawled at the Savage meeting. “I 
am of the great unwashed. Savage wants to join the middle class.”  
The I.W.W. man took off his shoes and socks from which heels and 
toes protruded … The trick caught the audience’s imagination: I.W.W. 
feet, unwashed, versus Socialism in willow-calf boots.147 
Parliamentary Socialism Revisited: The Formation of the Social Democratic Party 
In 1912, there occurred a bitter labour dispute at the Waihi Gold Mine.  During this period the 
Reform Party, which represented farming and business interests formed a Government.  The 
Reform Party was led by William ‘Bill’ Massey, a former farmer who became the new Prime 
Minister.  Massey and Reform were hostile to the increased militancy of the unions which 
they believed were controlled by the revolutionary socialists and syndicalists.148  Unlike the 
previous Liberal Government, who no doubt due to electoral considerations had some 
hesitance, Reform was not reluctant to use the civil and military forces of the State to resolve 
the dispute in favour of the employers at Waihi.  The Waihi Strike proved to be a turning point 
for the militants within the labour movement, who up to that point had been successful in 
gaining better wages and conditions from employers through the use of industrial action.  The 
savagery of Wahi and the hostile mood of the Reform Government convinced moderates and 
militant labour to find a commonality of purpose politically and industrially.   
The Unity Congress, which was held in Wellington in early July 1913, was the culmination of 
a series of discussions about achieving political and industrial unity.  The Congress drew 
representation from both moderate and radical political organisations.  There was some 
debate on the first day of the Congress as to whether there should be two separate 
organisations, one political and one industrial, or whether there should be one single 
organisation dedicated to achieve parliamentary representation and labour objectives.149   
Eventually, the Congress made a decision that there should be two separate organisations.  
There was a need to have a separate political body which would pursue labour’s objectives 
by securing representation in Parliament.150  It further resolved that party representatives 
should be present at all the sessions of the Congress.151  
The New Zealand Social Democratic Party (SDP) was established on the final two days of the 
Congress.  The name ‘Social Democratic’ was chosen over Labour so as to emphasise the 
Party’s wider commitment to changing the nature of society and that its principles and gaols 
were in sympathy with socialism rather than simply achieving Labour parliamentary 
representation.152  The Party adopted the objective of the ‘socialisation of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange.’ It also presented a ‘fighting platform’ which 
committed the SDP to the establishment of a state bank, state coal mines, state farms and 
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publicly funded health care and education which would be freely available.  All of these 
programmes would be funded through a graduated taxation system and a land tax (which 
was a concession to the Henry George Single Taxers).153  
While the majority of organisations at the Congress decided to either formally join or support 
the new bodies, a significant minority remained hostile and aloof.  Delegates from the more 
moderate unions such as the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, former Liberals and 
Labour MPs, such as Fowlds and David McLaren, and a significant section of the United Labour 
Party, rallied against what they called the more militant aspects of the new organisations.154  
Along with the three ULP MPs, Hindmarsh, William (Bill) Veitch and John Payne, they resolved 
to continue with the ULP as a political organisation.  The ULP ‘rump’ and its supporters 
assailed the new organisations with allegations about their socialistic and militant nature and 
claimed that their former ULP comrades, who had assisted in the creation of the new bodies, 
were ‘renegades.’155  Such comments brought angry responses from some of the Party’s 
former leaders who accused the ULP rump of being ‘wreckers of unity’ and of using 
‘obstructive tactics.’156   
Social Democratic Objectives: Socialism and Socialisation 
The Social Democratic Party appeared to signify a significant move to the political left in 
comparison to the PLL, the ULP and the first NZLP.  Unlike those parties, but in common with 
the Socialist Party, the SDP spelt out implicitly its commitment to socialism as its objective 
through the process of socialisation. In much the same way that ‘Common Ownership’ was a 
concession to the left and the right of the UK Labour Party, the term socialisation could be 
perceived as equally open-ended.  Aside from the fighting platform, there was no definition 
of what this actually meant in real terms. Consequently, the debate surrounding the objective 
tended to be confused, with speakers alleging a number of different explanations.157  A 
common theme which does emerge is that the majority of the delegates were not wary of the 
concept of socialisation; rather they were wary of being defined as ‘socialists.’  This wariness 
is evident in several speeches by Congress moderates in which they argued not against the 
term or even concept of socialisation, but rather its political interpretation.158  Of the 
moderates, only JT Paul was prepared to openly voice his opposition to the socialisation 
objective stating that the objective was a ‘source of strife.’159 When it came to a conference 
vote, the objective was passed with little resistance.160  
SDP Fighting Platform: Practical socialism 
The SDP Fighting Platform, which later was reincarnated as the platform of the New Zealand 
Labour Party, provides the best indication of what socialisation meant in practical terms.  The 
Platform listed 13 Clauses committing the Party to; Proportional Representation; a Right to 
Work Bill; a land tax; a graduated tax; direct representation of workers on governing boards; 
free and secular education from Kindergarten to University; a state owned shipping firm; the 
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extension of state insurance; old age pensions; free ‘motherhood’ endowments; free hospital 
care for married and unmarried people; pensions for ‘all widows, orphans, the blind and “the 
incurably helpless”; and the repeal of the Defence Act and its replacement with a 
democratically organised citizen army on a volunteer basis, “which should not be used under 
circumstances in time of industrial disputes.”161 The Congress minutes records that the clauses 
of the platform were debated at length, at the end of which the Congress approved them in 
addition to the inclusion of two amendments relating to education.162  The only really 
contentious clause was that about defence which ‘open[ed] up the whole question.’163 
Accordingly, it was allotted more speaking time. The next day the Congress approved a further 
amendment to the platform which committed the Party, “... to take over insurance and 
banking as sole monopolies of the State.”164  
Moderates and Militants: The Illusion of Programmatic Difference  
Moderates from the various unions, the New Zealand Fabian Society and the United Labour 
Party had largely supported the general clauses within the SDP platform without the need to 
engage in the contentious debate which had occurred over the adoption of the Party’s 
objectives.  This occurred because the various organisations actually had similar programmes 
which supported the extension of the state as a progressive agent for the common good.  
Even Fowlds, for example, had no problems supporting the ULP’s platform which supported 
the establishment of state ferry services, state colliers, as well as state life, accident and 
unemployment insurance.165  The issue for him was not the platform of the SDP, but rather 
the revolutionary objectives of the industrial body, the United Federation of Labor (UFL).166  
This point can be further emphasised by comparing two of the Party’s MPs who came from 
different ideological backgrounds - Patrick (Paddy) Webb, and the moderate James (Jimmy) 
McCombs.  Webb was elected to parliament as the SDP MP for Grey in a by-election in 1914.  
He was a foundation member of the Labour Party and later became a Cabinet Minister in the 
First Labour Government in 1935.  He was a former coalminer, an active unionist, a member 
of the Socialist Party and one of the founders of the Red Feds.167  In comparison to Webb, 
McCombs was a progressive Liberal.  He had a long association with Liberal-Labour politics 
and had previously been associated with the progressive Christchurch Liberal-Labour MPs, 
Henry (Harry) Ell and Thomas (Tommy) Taylor.  McCombs had previously stood as an 
Independent Labour candidate in Christchurch East in 1908 and then as a Liberal-Labour 
candidate for Avon in 1911, before joining and standing for the SDP in Lyttelton in 1913.  
McCombs won the seat and was to hold it until his death in 1933.168  Despite their divergent 
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political backgrounds, both Webb and McCombs accepted the SDP platform and supported it 
as candidates in the 1914 General Election.  
The Electoral Performance of the SDP and ULP 
The success of the SDP as a political vehicle for labour was mixed.  It succeeded in bringing 
together the various sections (radical and moderate) of the labour movement to form a 
reasonably united political vehicle which could contest elections on behalf of labour. Yet, the 
SDP did not significantly challenge the Liberal dominance over working-class voters.  
Additionally, a significant section of the labour movement remained committed to the ULP.169   
By the 1914 General Election the SDP had, despite the difficult financial and organisational 
circumstances it found itself in, managed to win two by-elections.  McCombs was elected in 
Lyttelton and Webb took the former Liberal seat of Grey.  Their election, when added to the 
SDP’s sole MP, John Robertson, lifted the SDP’s pre-election total to three seats which was 
the same as that of the ULP.170  But, the aftermath of the 1914 General Election reduced the 
SDP’s parliamentary representation to two.  McCombs and Webb retained their seats, but 
Robertson lost Otaki.171  In comparison, the ULP retained its three existing seats and gained 
one extra with Andrew Walker winning Dunedin South.  Overall, political labour had gone into 
the 1914 election with 6 seats and emerged with the same number.172 
Conclusion: The Construction of New Zealand’s Parliamentary Road to Socialism (1910 - 
1915)  
Despite the disappointment of the 1914 elections, labour was now committed to the 
parliamentary route.  The failure of industrial action in the 1913 General Strike had 
degenerated and demoralised the labour movement.  Those on the left of the movement who 
believed that workers’ could gain authority through industrial means had been ruthlessly 
silenced.  In the aftermath of the Strike there was a growing recognition by both the right and 
the left of the labour movement that elections were the means by which labour could attain 
power.  Bolstering this belief, and discussed previously in Chapter One, was that New Zealand 
was unique amongst industrial nations in having a near universal electoral franchise.  If 
workers’ votes could be marshalled by a united socialist /labour party, as was being done by 
socialist/labour parties in Europe and Australia, then political “revolution” could be achieved.  
But, such a strategy required political unity.  The formation of the Social Democratic Party 
was the first major footstep down this passage which was to lead to the establishment of the 
New Zealand Labour Party.  
Socialism was not a guiding principle in the formation of New Zealand’s labour parties.  
Rather, the guiding principle was to achieve practical labour aims.  The PLL, the LP and the 
ULP were labourist organisations whose objective was to ensure labour representation in 
Parliament as a means of gaining practical policies for labour.  The labourist perspective of 
these parties was the result of them being the political arm of established trade unions.  As 
organisations, unions are conservative in their orientation.  They seek either the protection 
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or the extension of worker’s rights within the capitalist framework.  The establishment of 
labour parties by unions was perceived as a politically practical means by which to achieve 
those goals.   
Although they were not socialist, the parties did, nonetheless, accept that monopoly 
capitalism played a negative role against labour.  Subsequently, they accepted state control 
and supported increased public ownership of institutions as this allowed labour to challenge 
the dominance of private capital. As Hindmarsh remarked about the use of the state and the 
need for public ownership; 
I am in favour of the extension of the functions of the State; and if 
these functions are to be extended it is necessary that their 
administration should be absolutely just, honest and 
straightforward.173 
The labour parties wanted a more just and equal country for labour.  Public ownership and 
state control was a means by which that could be achieved.  
Despite their revolutionary banter, neither the Socialist Party nor later the SDP substantially 
challenged the dominance of capital in New Zealand society either.  Ralph Miliband observed 
that the ‘socialistic’ programme, ‘Labour and the New Social Order’ which had been adopted 
by the British Labour Party in 1918 merely;174   
… committed the Labour Party to an extension of state ownership (or 
the socialisation) of mines, banks, and industry.  Labour also 
supported workers representation.  The Party endorsed a graduated 
tax system which it would use to fund state owned school and 
hospitals, in addition to increased pensions and benefits for workers.  
While these commitments all constituted a significant shift from the 
established economic and social norms, the overall effect of Labour’s 
programme would have left the bulk of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange in private hands.   
In much the same manner that the United Kingdom’s commercial and economic base would 
have remained in the hands of private entrepreneurs under a Labour Government, a similar 
situation would have occurred in New Zealand under a Socialist or an SDP administration.  
There would have been little genuine difference to the manner in which economic policy was 
conducted.   Such a conclusion is demonstrated more aptly when one considers that much of 
the SDP’s Platform was consequently implemented by various Governments over the next 
decades without the demise of capitalism.  A number of clauses such as the Right to Work 
Bill, pensions and benefits formed the backbone of the Keynesian-based Welfare State, which 
the Labour Government introduced in 1935.  
The labour parties and, later, the SDP, believed that the state could be controlled or made to 
pursue labour or socialist aims if it was controlled by labour or socialist governments.  
Subsequently, although the Socialist party and the SDP subscribed to socialism, they also 
subscribed to a labourist statist platform.  While labour parties like the ULP disagreed with 
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repr., 1979). pg 61   
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socialism, their platforms were similar to those of the radicals.  The similarity in their basic 
platforms was one of the principal factors that allowed the parties to overcome their 
philosophical differences and be able to cooperate and work together.   
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Chapter Three: The Journey to the Holy City175 
Introduction – The Relationship of Socialism with the New Zealand Labour Party 
At its formation in 1916, the Labour Party committed itself to the achievement of socialism.  
This was listed in the party’s objectives as ‘the socialisation of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange.’  Speaking at a public meeting in late July 1920, Labour Member 
of Parliament176 Peter Fraser, who at that time was still classed as a militant in Labour’s 
parliamentary ranks, reasserted Labour’s commitment to socialist goals. He went onto 
observe that while the Party stood for a ‘sound system of socialism,’ it remained as ‘extreme 
as any other socialist party.’ 177  This chapter will examine the NZLP’s socialist relationships 
with actual socialism(s) as they existed immediately prior and after World War One.  Was 
Labour a socialist party because it actually was socialist? Or, was it a socialist party simply 
because it labelled itself as such? Further, how extreme were some of those other ‘socialist 
parties’ that Fraser was comparing the Labour party to?  
Labour as a Militant Socialist Party – Socialism and the Labour Party? 
To Labour’s opponents the political and philosophical position of Labour was very clear.  
Labour was an ‘extremist’ socialist party.  In the 1919 General Election, the first that the Party 
contested at a national level, the Reform (Conservative) and Liberal Parties and the majority 
of New Zealand’s press termed the party and its candidates as ‘extreme Labour’, they 
depicted the Labour Party as the Party of Bolshevism and as the harbinger of revolutionary 
socialism.  Labour candidates were presented by their political opponents and by most of the 
popular media as using the elections as pretence for their ultimate aim which was the 
establishment of a socialist state similar to that which had been created in Russia as a 
consequence of the Bolshevik revolution.  While Labour candidates might appear respectable, 
their opponents alleged that in actuality they were hiding their true Bolshevik motives from 
public view and scrutiny.  Despite the public persona presented by MPs such as Hindmarsh 
and, the Dunedin North member Andrew Walker, senior Party members, such as Labour Party 
President and Labour member of the Legislative Council, J T Paul, and its more prominent 
candidates such as Michael Joseph Savage, James McCombs, Daniel Sullivan and William 
Jordan, the New Zealand Labour Party was the New Zealand representative of Vladimir Lenin  
and the Russian Bolsheviks.  
These allegations were provided with a degree of substance due to the actions and activities 
of some of Labour’s representatives.  One of the more notable was Henry ‘Harry’ Holland, 
who was later to succeed Hindmarsh as the chair of the Labour caucus in the House of 
Representatives and the Party’s first official Leader. Holland, who was a known labour militant 
and who strongly promoted his and the Party’s commitment to socialism, entered Parliament 
                                                          
175 This title had been adapted from a title for a column written by ‘the Vag’, or Edward ‘Ted’ Howard (later the 
Labour MP for Christchurch South).  Holy City. (1916, September 16) The Maoriland Worker.  
176 Until 1951 the New Zealand Parliament consisted of two chambers.  A Lower elected House of 
Representatives and an Upper appointed chamber, known as the Legislative Council.  Members elected to the 
Lower House were known as MHRs (Member of the House of Representatives) while those people appointed to 
the Upper House were MLCs (Members of the Legislative Council).  The Legislative Council was abolished in 
1951. For the purposes of this thesis all parliamentarians of the House of Representatives will be labelled as MPs 
(members of Parliament).  
177 New Zealand Labour Party – Mr Fraser Replies to Critics (1920, August 11) The Maoriland Worker.  
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as the result of a by-election in the Grey electorate.  In his maiden speech to the House of 
Representatives in October 1918, Holland stated forcefully that the Labour Party came into 
the House, “boldly declaring the socialist objective of the Labour movement in New Zealand.”  
Labour would, according to Holland, replace the two old Parties of Reform and Liberal and 
take its rightful place on the Treasury benches, whereupon it would implement a socialist 
programme.178 
Holland was consequently joined by three other labour radicals, Robert ‘Bob’ Semple and 
Peter ‘Pat’ Fraser, also as a result of by-elections.179  Holland, Semple and Fraser shared 
common history and beliefs. They were all working class.  They were all educated in the 
political and economic thoughts of socialist and labour thinkers and writers, especially those 
of Karl Marx.  They all agitated for socialism, decried capitalism and emphasised the political 
liberation of the working classes which socialism would achieve. They had all been intimately 
involved in the leadership of the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party and, the infamous 
‘Red’ Federation of Labour (‘Red Feds’).  They had all played significant roles in the industrial 
and political unrest of the early part of the decade.  Lastly, all of them had spent time in goal 
as a result of their various political and industrial activities.  As far as Conservatives, Liberals 
and the editorial writers of the popular press were concerned the actions and statements of 
these militants inside and outside of Parliament established Labour’s Bolshevik tendencies 
beyond doubt.  They provided ample evidence that Labour was a revolutionary socialist 
organisation dedicated to achieving revolutionary socialist aims.180      
Yet, the socialist objective of the Labour Party was not as clearly defined as its opponents, or 
indeed, some of its supporters believed.  In actuality, Labour’s commitment to a definitive 
concept and programme of socialism was an illusion.  Although Labour party representatives 
like Holland made bold statements at public meetings, in the press and, in Parliament about 
the Party’s socialist objective and what it meant, the actual ideological position of the Party 
was more fluid.  The pages of Labour party owned papers like the Maoriland Worker (which 
was later known as ‘The NZ Worker’ and later still as ‘The Standard’) and the Grey River Argus 
and the utterances of Labour parliamentarians and speakers offered other perspectives and 
opinions on the nature and role of socialism and its implementation by a Labour government.  
These comments and observations were often crouched in moralistic terms which proclaimed 
the morally uplifting and democratic system of socialism, while denouncing the moral, 
political and economic depravity of capitalism. Programmatically, Labour speakers offered a 
series of broad platform planks rather than definitive policies.  While, the speakers might 
speak of socialism and industrial and popular democracy, the party’s actual platforms 
increasingly tended to reflect the policies of a state led, radical Liberalism.  
                                                          
178 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Vol. 183.). (1918). Wellington, New Zealand: WAG Skinner, Government 
Printer. pg. 92.  Holland remarked that the purpose of the Labour Party was to “... endeavour to effect a change 
of classes at the fountain of power.  We come proclaiming boldly and fearlessly the Socialist objective of the 
labour movement throughout New Zealand; and we make no secret of the fact that we seek to rebuild society 
on the basis that work and wealth will be the measure of a man’s worth.” 
179 Gustafson, B. (1980). Labour’s Path to Political Independence – The Origins and Establishment of the New 
Zealand Labour Party 1900 – 19. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press. pg.137. 
180Holland, in particular, was not averse to propounding Marxist philosophy in parliament or in his speeches.  
While, Fraser caused much disquiet within the Parliament, the media and his own Party when he praised the 
Bolshevik revolution and indicated that Capitalism would ultimately be overtaken by Communism.  Cf. Mr Fraser 
replies to Critics. (1920, August 11). Maoriland Worker. 
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Karl Marx reputedly remarked that he was glad that he was not a Marxist as a result of 
disagreements with self-termed French Marxists.181  As Marx and other socialist writers then 
and since have acknowledged, socialism was an elastic ideology.182  While the Labour party 
might be labelled as a socialist party that did not mean that it necessarily had a clear sense of 
purpose and practical direction as to what socialism meant or how it could be achieved.  To 
many people in the Labour Party and the wider labour / socialist movement, socialism actually 
encompassed a number of viewpoints, positions and goals.  While the meaning of the term 
might have been clear to Holland, Semple and Fraser, it was not so precise in its 
comprehension and detail to others.    
Socialist Differences within Labour Parties – Socialism as a fluid Doctrine 
The New Zealand Labour Party, and other Labour Parties, had a strategy in terms of their 
relationship with and to, socialism.  That strategy was to leave the term as vague and 
therefore as inclusive as possible.  Although, Labour Parties in New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and later, Australia adopted socialism as their objective there was no clear definition 
of what the term actually meant.183  This vagueness was deliberate and primarily due to two 
reasons.  The first was because socialism as a philosophy incorporated a variety of different 
beliefs and objectives.  The second (and related) reason was as a deliberate ploy to maintain 
political peace within the Parties by placating the various individuals and groups.   
In the context of the Labour Party, as Anthony Wright observes, it is more correct to talk about 
‘socialisms’ rather than a singular form of socialism.184  An indication of the number of 
‘socialisms’ advocated by individuals and groups is found in the early debates within the 
labour movement, the early labour parties185 and, finally, within the Labour Party itself after 
its formation.  For some within the Labour Party, socialism was indicative of a society in which 
capitalism was replaced, either gradually or rapidly, by a social system in which workers 
managed and administered society for their own ends.  This came to be increasingly 
                                                          
181 Engels to Eduard Bernstein in Zurich (n.d.). Letters of Frederick Engels 1882.  Retrieved from 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1882/letters/82_11_02.htm#356. This passage was originally 
sourced from Marx – Engels Collected Works (Vol. 46). (1924). Moscow, USSR: Marx Engels Archives. Pg. 353.  
Engels was writing to the German Socialist, Eduard Bernstein and made an observation that, “What is known as 
‘Marxism’ in France is, indeed, an altogether peculiar product — so much so that Marx once said to Lafargue: 
‘Ce qu’il y a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste.’ [If anything is certain, it is that I myself am not a 
Marxist].” 
182 Beilharz, P. (1992) Labour’s Utopias – Bolshevism, Fabianism, Social Democracy.  London, England: Routledge. 
pg. 1. 
183 In the case of the New Zealand Labour Party and the Australian Labor Party, socialism was to be achieved by 
the ‘socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange.’ New Zealand Labour Party Constitution 
and Platform. (1919) Wellington, New Zealand: Worker Print. For the Australian Labour Party (ALP) see, 
Dyrenfurth, N & Bongiorno, F. (2011). A Little History of the Australian Labor Party. Sydney, Australia: The 
University of New South Wales Press Ltd. pg. 69. The ALP immediately upon passing the socialisation objective 
then moved an amendment (The Blackburn Declaration) clarifying what it meant by the term.  In the case of the 
British Labour Party see; Laybourn, K.  (2000). A Century of Labour – A History of the Labour Party. Stroud, 
England: Sutton Publishing. pgs. 30 – 33.   
184 Wright, Tony. (1996) Socialisms: Old and New. London, England: Routledge. pg. 2.  
185 I have used the term labour parties to describe as a group, the various Labour and Socialist parties which 
existed before the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in July 1916.  Used in this context, this grouping 
includes the Independent Political Labour Leagues, the New Zealand Socialist Party, the first New Zealand Labour 
Party and its successor, The United Labour party and the Social Democratic Party in addition to the Independent 
Labour MPs.  
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associated with Marxism and European forms of socialism or social democracy.  For others, 
socialism was a society in which the worst effects of capitalism, ‘the dark satanic mills’ of 
William Blake were ameliorated by a more rational, responsive, caring, benign and 
democratic society, which encouraged workers and rewarded enlightened capitalists.  To still 
others the socialist philosophy had its roots and morals in the teachings of Christ.  Christian 
socialists formed an influential section of the socialist and labour movement.186 
Socialism as a ‘Concrete’ Doctrine 
Over a period of time the concept of what constituted socialism within the Labour Party 
became increasingly defined.  The term became synonymous with the principle of public or 
state ownership and regulation.  The idea that private ownership was conductive to economic 
and social chaos and dislocation had been a common theme amongst socialists and labourites 
of various hues for a number of years prior to the formation of Labour Parties.  Sidney Webb 
for example had advocated the administrative success of public ownership in his 1899 Fabian 
tract, ‘Socialism in England.’187  Webb noted that it was only due to the organisation promoted 
by public ownership that innovation and improvements in industry and social standards had 
been achieved.  He went on to applaud the magnificent effects of nationalised assets and 
public ownership had on communities and the removal of the wasteful effects of private 
enterprise.188   
New Zealand based socialists were no less convinced of the need of socialised public 
ownership as a remedy to the misuse and inefficiency of capitalism.  Reeves, who was later 
Minister of Labour in the Liberal Governments of Ballance and Seddon and a member of the 
New Zealand branch of the Fabian Society, expressed this point of view in his anonymous 
columns to the Lyttelton Times in 1890.189  Even the moderate first New Zealand Labour Party 
                                                          
186 Sinclair, K. (1976) Walter Nash.  Dunedin, New Zealand: John McIndoe Ltd.  pgs. 24 – 5. The Labour Party’s 
second General Secretary and later Minister of Finance, Walter Nash was a Christian Socialist.  Nash emphasised 
the teachings of Christ as the means by which socialism could have a practical and moral programme of reform.  
In a letter to a friend, Nash observes that “Everyone agrees that Socialism is right if it can be worked.  If it is right 
it can be worked.  If it is right then it is Christian.  If it is Christian it will be worked because Christianity – Love 
must win.”  Nash was not alone in his beliefs.  Dan Sullivan, Herbert ‘Tim’ Armstrong, Patrick O’ Regan, Mark 
Fagan and others were practising Catholics (which led to accusations that the Labour Party was Papist).  Holland 
was a former member of the Salvation Army. This Christian influence was reflected in Labour’s phraseology 
which was couched in words and language drawn from the bible. Gustafson, B. Labour’s Path to Political 
Independence – The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party 1900 – 1919.  Auckland, New 
Zealand: Auckland University Press. pg. 120.  In the 1930s, Savage returned to his Christian and Catholic 
background and used the Christian message to encourage and explain Labour’s policy and later, its legislative 
reforms in Government. Cf. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Vol. 251.). (1938). Wellington, New Zealand: 
WAG Skinner, Government Printer. pg. 649.  While, the most notable of his Christian references was the use of 
the phrase ‘applied christianity’ to describe the functions and philosophy of Social Security, Savage’s speech in 
favour of the Social Security Bill was full of references to social security being a fulfilment of Christian ethics.  
Leading Savage to ask the Leader of the Opposition, Adam Hamilton “What is there more valuable in our 
Christianity than to be our brother’s keepers in reality...” 
187 Webb, Sidney. (1890) Socialism in England. London, England: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. Also, Webb, Sidney. 
(1916). Towards Social Democracy? A study of social revolution during the past three-quarters of a Century.  
London, England: Fabian Society.  
188 Webb, Sidney. (1890) Socialism in England. pp. 81 – 97. 
189 Reeves, W P. (1971) Reeve’s Articles on Socialism and Communism, 1890. In W D McIntyre & W J Gardner 
(Eds.). Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History. (pgs. 191 – 195). London, England: Oxford University 
Press. 
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in 1910 had committed itself to the “... gradual public ownership of all the Means of 
Production, Distribution and Exchange”.190  That the New Zealand Labour Party should 
emphasise the positive role of public enterprise and ownership as a central component of its 
socialist vision in its founding platform was a continuation of that line of political thought.191   
During the economic slumps and booms of the 1920s and the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
Labour politicians became increasingly prone to argue that the capitalist economic dislocation 
and chaos was largely a consequence of the private ownership of distribution and production.  
They asserted that this problem could be rectified by the public control of what the Bolshevik 
leader Lenin apparently euphemistically labelled as the “commanding heights of the 
economy”.192  Public or ‘social’ ownership of these key assets, Labour asserted would usher 
in better administration and better economic and social practices.  These in turn would 
resolve the numerous crises that beset the capitalist economies, in addition to ensuring a 
democratic society and a higher standard of living and quality of life for all people.193   
Socialism also became associated with the concept of economic intervention by the State to 
achieve economic and social objectives.  While, forms of state or government intervention 
had been used previously, these had usually served the interests of the governing elite or 
ensuring the defence of the realm during war.  However, in the latter nineteenth century 
Governments began to increasingly use economic intervention to redistribute economic and 
social wealth as a means of alleviating poverty and distress and to ensure better standards of 
living for society at large. Initially, it was the Liberal Parties who pioneered and pursued the 
policies of economic and social intervention.  Whereas previously, Liberals had argued for 
individualism in economic and social spheres (classical liberalism), Liberal philosophers such 
as T.H. Green, LT Hobhouse, J Hobson and F.H. Bradley argued that for the individual to 
prosper, they had to be freed from the conditions of poverty, want, scarcity, idleness and 
ignorance.194  This cache of ideals and practices became known as social liberalism and were 
at the nucleus of Liberal philosophies, politics and economics for a significant proportion of 
the twentieth century.  In the same way that the social liberals had been influenced by early 
socialists, such as Owen and the Chartists, they were to influence ethical socialist thinkers 
such as R. H. Tawney.  In the United Kingdom and New Zealand it was Liberal administrations 
which were at the forefront of using economic intervention to attain degrees of economic 
and social equality and thereby improving the life chances of their populations.   
Despite the Liberal party’s social philosophies and programmes, increasing intervention in 
both the social and economic spheres was associated with socialism not with liberalism.  This 
was due to several reasons. Firstly, it related to the philosophical nature of socialism, whose 
themes were one of selflessness, cooperation and collective action rather than individualism 
and competition, which were seen as the products of capitalism.  Socialism was perceived as 
                                                          
190 New Zealand Labour Party – Objective and Platform. (1910). Wellington Main Branch of the NZ Labour Party   
191 The Labour Party’s Programme. (1919, September 3) Marlborough Express. The Marlborough Express was 
the only paper in the Country to print the Labour Party’s 1919 Election Platform in full. 
192  Priestland, D. (2009) The Red Flag – A History of Communism. New York, United States of America: Grove 
Press. pg. 100. 
193 New Principles in Prevailing Economic System. (1930, April 30) The New Zealand Worker.  
194 Lindsay, A D. (1934) T H Green in FJC Hearnshaw (Ed.), The Social and Political Ideals of Some Representative 
Thinkers of the Victorian Age (pgs. 150 – 164). London, England: George G Harrap and Company Ltd.  For a more 
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the opposite of capitalism and socialists were at the forefront of calling for use of the state as 
a collective agency to deliver economic and social equality and justice.  Lastly, there was the 
nature of the Liberals. Liberal parties were capitalist parties, which despite their progressive 
economic and social programmes, endorsed the capitalist system.   
By the end of the nineteenth century, it appeared that even conservatives had succumbed to 
the use of government intervention and planning.  The greater use of state intervention and 
legislative control over areas that had traditionally been administered and organised by 
private individuals and organisations by both Liberal and Conservative administrations in the 
United Kingdom and, in its Dominions such as Australia and New Zealand, combined with the 
pace of social change was so significant that reputedly no less a figure than King Edward VII 
was prompted to observe, “[t]hat we are all socialists now”.195  In 1912, Hindmarsh, the 
Independent Labour MP for Wellington South, made a similar observation in relation to the 
programmes of New Zealand Governments. Hindmarsh observed that state intervention and 
control of the economy as a means of developing infrastructure and improving society had 
been used by successive Governments regardless of their political creed.196  Hindmarsh’s 
observations were to be echoed in Labour speeches in the following decades as Labour MPs 
asserted that the Labour Party’s programmes were in line with the historical development of 
New Zealand’s political economy. 197   
The Growth of Labour Parties 
The last years of the nineteenth and the opening years of the twentieth century saw an 
increase in working class militancy in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  This 
was reflected in the rapid growth of Trade Unions which sought to represent unskilled as 
opposed to skilled workers.  It was also reflected in the formation of political vehicles such as 
the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in the UK, the 
formation of Labour parties in Australia and the establishment of the Socialist Party and 
Independent Political Labour Leagues in New Zealand.   
While the increase in industrial agitation and working class organisations may not have been 
socialistic, they did reflect a growing desire by a significant proportion of the Labour 
movement in these countries to pursue their own agenda and programme as distinct from 
those of the established Guilds and Labour organisations and more, importantly, the Liberal 
Party.  This desire was not limited solely to labour radicals as even working class moderates 
supported the demand for independent political representation for Labour.198  But, while 
there was an upswing in working class militancy, it was not reflected in electoral support for 
                                                          
195 This quote is commonly associated with Edward VII who reputedly said it at dinner at Mansion House in 
London in 1895, while he was still the Prince of Wales.  However, it is matter of some contention as to whether 
he actually said it and in what context.  Roy Hattersley quotes an observation made by Sir Charles Dilke, a 
personal friend of Edward, who remarked that “The Prince is, of course, a very strong Conservative....” Cf. 
Hattersley, R.  (2004). The Edwardians: Biography of the Edwardian Age. London, England: Abacus. pg. 37. 
196 NZPD. (Vol. 159). pg. 356. Hindmarsh’s comments arose during the regarding the Government’s financial 
statement for 1912.  He observed that Governments and MP’s of all persuasions had been socialist and used 
‘socialism’ in the past as a means of furthering economic and social development or their own self interests.      
197 Lee, J.A. (1938) Socialism in New Zealand. London, England: T. Werner Laurie Ltd. pp. 8 – 9.  One of the 
penultimate uses of this argument that public ownership and spending equalled socialism was found in the book 
on the subject by Labour MP, John A Lee.  
198 Whither? Labour’s Future. Parliamentary Representation. A Plea for Workers. (1909, October 28). Evening 
Post. pg. 2. 
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independent Labour parties.  Only in Australia did the Labor parties succeed in offering a 
popular and dynamic challenge to the existing political culture.  In the UK, the Labour Party 
despite having steady growth in the years preceding the First World War was seen as little 
more than an adjunct of the Liberals and was dependent upon the support of that party, with 
which Labour had an electoral arrangement.199  In 1910, the party only had 42 MPs out of a 
total of 670 seats in the British parliament and 6.4% of the total vote cast.200 
In New Zealand nascent working class parties, such as the first Labour Party, which was later 
to morph into the United Labour Party and the Socialist Party could not electorally challenge 
the electoral dominance or political hegemony of the existing Liberal Party.  By 1914, the total 
number of votes received by the Social Democratic Party and United Labour Party Remnant 
combined amounted to 44028 votes in total or 8.14 percent of the total vote.  This was only 
an improvement of 4342 votes over the number of votes received by Labour/Socialist Parties 
in the December 1911 Election.  This was in comparison to the Liberal’s vote of 227 631 or 
42.14 percent of the electorate.201  Only in Australia did Labour make the great electoral 
breakthrough that it so desired, achieving government at both state and federal levels prior 
to 1914.   
However, the New Zealand Labour party did steadily progress in the years after its formation 
in 1916.  From its first tentative representation in parliament after its formation of five MPs 
who agreed to caucus together, it progressed to eight MPs in 1919, and continued to gain in 
representation and votes throughout the 1920s. By 1925, it had edged ahead of the National 
(Liberal) party in terms of numbers of MPs and percentages of the votes. Labour gaining 
twelve MPs to the National party’s eleven and 27 percent to that party’s 20.73 percent.202  
Labour Parties as the Representative of the Workers 
Yet, even though Liberal Parties might have considerable working class support and social 
liberalism became the prevailing progressive force within the British Empire, Liberal parties 
were not the authentic representative of labour.  While, the various Liberal parties might 
propose policies and implement programmes designed to reduce inequality, only Labour and 
Social Democratic Parties professed to represent socialist views and the interests of workers.  
Liberal Parties and Liberal-Labour MPs might recognize labour and implement progressive 
policies to alleviate labour’s lot, but they were ultimately at the beck and call of capital.203  As 
                                                          
199 Miliband, R. (1972) Parliamentary Socialism – A Study in the Politics of Labour. (2nd ed.). London, England: 
Merlin Press. pg. 20. 
200 Clarke, Peter. (1996) The Penguin History of Britain: Hope and Glory – Britain 1900 – 1990. London, England: 
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Dangerfield noted in his classic work ‘The Strange Death of Liberal England,’ this became one 
of the central dilemmas of Liberal Parties.204  Liberal parties were caught between competing 
and conflicting ideals and desires as a result of their class base which encapsulated business, 
farmer and worker interests.  Labour speakers asserted that due to this philosophical and 
economic contradiction the Liberals were unable to press forward with those reforms which 
Labour needed.  Therefore, only those parties that independently represented labour could 
lay claim to being able to pursue labour objectives and programmes.    
Communist and Left Criticism of Labour Parties 
In the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the formation of affiliated 
communist parties elsewhere, Social Democratic and Labour Parties were subjected to similar 
criticism.  The Bolsheviks criticised Labour and Labour Parties, alleging that only they were 
the true representatives of socialism and the working classes.  Lenin described the UK Labour 
Party (and in association other labour Parties) as a two class party which deceived workers.   
The British Labour Party, which exists side by side with the 
opportunistic Independent Labour Party and the Social Democratic 
Party, is something in the nature of a broad labour party.  It is a 
compromise between a socialist party and non-socialist trade unions. 
[italics mine] 205 
From Lenin’s perspective and that of other Communists, while Labour parties might be 
representatives of labour, they were ideologically a broad church rather than a singular 
socialist organisation.   
This point of view had been recognised within the labour movement and by the various labour 
parties prior to the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in 1916.  There was 
recognition that there were significant numbers of workers and Unions who were suspicious 
of or openly hostile to the notion of socialism.  The Independent Political Labour Leagues 
(IPLL), the first Labour Party and the United Labour Party did not commit themselves to a 
radical or a concrete version of socialism.  They had no conception of what the term meant 
and they were primarily a party formed from the Unions, many of whom were not socialists 
and merely sought practical reforms for the betterment of labour.206  Socialism was not on 
                                                          
204 Dangerfield, G. (1961) The Strange Death of Liberal England. New York, United States of America: Capricorn 
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the political or economic agenda for these groups or individuals, many of whom had links to 
and with the Liberal Parties or with Liberal organisations.   
In 1913 at the Unity Congress called by labour, socialist and progressive organisations to forge 
industrial and political unity in the aftermath of the General Strike, Liberal supporting 
organisations and individuals walked out due to their disquiet about the socialist militancy of 
the proposed programmes.207  In 1916 unity was only achieved due to the antagonism that 
labour had towards the National Government and its attitude regarding conscription during 
the First World War rather than a desire to implement a socialist agenda.  Although Labour 
was a class based party, in that its leaders and membership were largely drawn from the 
working class, this did not translate into a philosophical unity amongst them.208  In common 
with the British Labour Party, the New Zealand Labour Party represented a number of 
disparate views, some of which were diametrically opposed to the other.   
‘As extreme as any other Socialist Party’ – Comparisons with Australian and British Labour 
Parties 
When Fraser asserted that the New Zealand Labour Party was as ‘extreme’ as any other 
socialist party, he was referring to the party’s Labour and Social Democratic counterparts.  
The British and Australian Labour Parties had close connections with the New Zealand Labour 
Party.  Historically and politically the three countries shared much in common.  Australia and 
New Zealand were British Dominions within the British Empire.  Despite having their own 
parliaments, both countries were still subject to administrative and policy oversight by the 
Imperial parliament sitting in Westminster.  The developing political and parliamentary 
structures and procedures of both Australia and New Zealand reflected the political and 
parliamentary makeup and traditions of the British parliament.  Most European settlers 
resident in both Australia and New Zealand had emigrated (either voluntarily or forcibly) from 
the British Isles.   
Labor was very active in Australia in the 1880s and 90s, particularly after the debacles of 
several strikes in this period.  Consequently, branches of the Australian Labor party were 
formed in the various states in the 1890s and the Federal Labor party was formed in 1901.  
The leadership of the New Zealand Labour party had been involved in the Australian Labor 
party or in the various Australian socialist organisations in its formative years.  Many senior 
Labour people, such as Holland, Webb, Parry, Semple and Savage had emigrated from 
Australia to New Zealand.  The scope of this emigration was reflected in the composition of 
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the first Labour Cabinet in 1935 which was a mixed group of six natural born New Zealanders, 
six Australians, one Englishman and one Scot.209  By 1929, the Australian Labor Party had 
formed Governments at state and federal levels a number of times and was responsible for a 
series of economic, social and industrial programmes which had benefited workers.  
However, it was the British Labour party which the New Zealand Labour party appeared to 
have the closest political and philosophical connections.  The British Labour Party was the 
largest and the most prominent of the Labour parties in existence at the time. Yet, despite 
this achievement it had only been in Government briefly in 1924 and, then again, in 1929.  
Nonetheless, the New Zealand Labour party gave a great deal of importance to the comments, 
actions and programmes of its British counterpart in its newspapers and political speeches.  
Doubtless, much of the British party’s prominence and importance was due to the deference 
which a number of Labour party people had toward the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom 
was described as ‘Home’ in popular and labour publications and by Labour speakers.210  The 
British Labour Party was perceived as a significant political body which had achieved 
representation in the Imperial parliament and had a noteworthy role in progressive politics.  
The British Labour party also had the largest number and variety of socialist and progressive 
groups within it.  The philosophical influence of these groups, even in New Zealand, was 
considerable.  Additionally, British Labour Party speakers came to New Zealand and New 
Zealand Labour would use ILP pamphlets for its recruitment and information.211   
‘As extreme as any other Socialist Party’ – Comparisons with the European Social Democratic 
Parties 
There needs to be a distinction made between Labour Parties and those of European Social 
Democratic parties.  While, many of Labour’s supporters and opponents equated the two 
together, there was an ideological and philosophical difference between the type of socialism 
pursued by the Social Democratic Parties of Europe and the Labour Parties of New Zealand, 
Australia and the United Kingdom.   
The emerging European Social Democratic parties were the result of agitation by a collection 
of individuals and groups within the socialist and labour movements against largely autocratic 
and unrepresentative governments.  Unlike, Labour parties who came to adopt socialism as a 
political and ideological creed over a period of time, European Social Democratic parties 
adopted socialism at their formation.  As the parties further politically developed they 
increasingly adopted a strict Marxist analysis of their role and situation.  In the years prior to 
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World War One and in its aftermath, Marxism came to dominate the European Social 
Democratic political perspective.212  Not content with merely having public control or 
administration of the economy, Social Democratic parties came to support and promote 
policies that called for direct worker control of the political system.   
Yet, even though Social Democrats might have largely adopted a strict Marxist interpretation 
of socialist objectives and programmes, which far outpaced that of the Labour Parties, they 
did not seek to realize them.  When the German Social Democrats finally achieved 
Government in 1919, they were accused of imitating past capitalist administrations in terms 
of their policies and programmes.213  Even the objective of workers control was never 
seriously contemplated.  In the aftermath of World War One there were attempts to impose 
such a programme at a lander or city level.  However, they were either politically undermined 
or were forcibly suppressed by troops who were under the direction of the new federal SDP 
Government in Berlin.  214 
Perhaps the real Social Democratic success story in Europe owed less to the mass Party 
created by the Germans and more to slow and steady development of the Swedes.  The 
Swedish Social Democrats, the Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP) was formed 
in the 1890s and like its Social Democratic counterparts adopted a Marxist objective and 
programme.  However, unlike them and like the UK and New Zealand Labour Parties, the SAP 
became more interested in achieving practical reforms rather than the imposition of the 
workers state.  During the early twentieth century, the SAP increasingly came to endorse and 
adopt an ideological and programmatic position that was remarkably similar to the 
programme adopted by the New Zealand Labour Party and would later become identified 
with post World War Two Social Democracy – Regulated economies, full employment and a 
generous and expansive welfare or social security system.215   
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Chapter Four: His Majesty’s (Disgruntled) Loyal Opposition: 
The Formation of the Parliamentary Labour Caucus and the 
Labour Party 
Introduction: The Establishment of the Labour Party 
The initial basis behind the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party was conservative and 
was a reaction to external events.  Despite the militancy which existed in the extra-
parliamentary party the conservative nature and programme of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) in its early years was reflected in the attitude of its leadership toward the war.  
The NZLP was not a radically or revolutionary socialistic body even at its outset and its 
programme of radical socialism was more illusion than real.  The new Party, particularly 
through its parliamentary representatives, was not motivated by any desire to pursue an 
alternative to capitalism.  Rather, and similar to other Labour parties in the United Kingdom 
and Australia, the Party sought representation on behalf of workers and material 
improvements to their livelihoods. While, the NZLP may have subscribed to socialism, the PLP 
was to all intents and purposes, His Majesty’s disgruntled but loyal Opposition. 
An Exercise in Moderation: The New Labour Caucus 
Between 1912 – 1914, four factors significantly influenced labour both inside and outside of 
parliament.  The first three, the 1912 Waihi Strike, the election of the Massey Government in 
1912 and the 1913 General Strike, were domestic events which lacked a dramatic impetus 
required to bring the various labour factions together.  However, such an impetus came in 
August 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War.  
Despite popular mythology which places the birth of the Labour Party in the West Coast of 
the South Island or with the Trade Unions, the initial impetus behind the formation of the 
New Zealand Labour Party came from a group of labour MPs and not from labour 
organisations outside of Parliament.216  The mass mobilisation required for the war effort had 
brought the Reform and Liberal Parties into a coalition ‘National’ Government and created a 
‘National’ Ministry, leaving the SDP, the ULP and the various independent MP’s as the 
Opposition.217  After discussion between the various MPs, Labour decided to stand aloof from 
the coalition and cabinet and form an independent caucus.  This was despite the obvious 
desire of some in the labour movement, such as the ULP MP Payne, who supported the 
formation of the ‘National’ government.218 
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The Wellington South ULP MP, Alfred Hindmarsh, chaired the caucus meeting of five labour 
MPs (minus Payne) and wrote to Massey afterward stating Labour’s position toward the 
coalition.  In that letter Hindmarsh noted;  
That the extent to which the Labour Party are prepared to support or 
oppose the proposed National Government (sic) will depend upon the 
measures brought forward by such Government, and its 
administration, and further, that it is not the Labour Party's wish that 
anyone of its number should be offered a portfolio in the proposed 
National Government.219   
As Hindmarsh was to later inform the House on 9 September 1915, the Party’s attitude was 
not to be seen as disloyal; rather there was no need for labour members to join the 
Government. 
I must say that when the coalition Ministry was formed, as is well known, the 
Labour party was asked to consent to one of its members joining the Ministry; but 
inasmuch as the coalition Ministry was formed mainly for the purpose of passing 
taxation proposals…there was no necessity for the Labour Party to join.  But the 
fact that the Labour Party did not join must not be taken in any sense as a want 
of loyalty to New Zealand.220 
Labour’s opposition to the newly established ‘National’ Government was not based on 
radical or socialistic precepts but on an affront to parliamentary procedure and efficient 
administration.221 The principal concern of MPs was that parliamentary processes would 
suffer if there was no official opposition in the House by which the Government could 
be held to account.222   
Despite the lack of radical political precepts, Labour’s actions in parliament did cause 
considerable comment within the labour and socialist movement.  The Maoriland Worker was 
ecstatic about the new caucus, informing its readers of the opportunities for social democracy 
that its establishment offered.  Holland, who was the editor of the Worker, commenting on 
the fusion of the ‘anti-labour forces’ inside the House, observed that; 
The Fusion's best aspect is that it makes Labour in Parliament the real 
Opposition; and places on the shoulders of the Social Democrats the 
greatest opportunity that has ever been given to a Parliamentary 
party of working class interests. It brings to them a stupendous 
opportunity with far-reaching possibilities—an opportunity which, if 
seized by the men in Parliament (and they have shown that they are 
capable of seizing it) will make for sweeping working-class victories in 
the near future.223 
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In spite of the optimistic statements of the Maoriland Worker, the new labour caucus was not 
a radical body.  Of its five MPs, only Webb subscribed to a militantly socialist agenda.  Further, 
it was not opposed to New Zealand’s war effort.  
Although Webb was later to go to jail over his opposition to the war, general attitudes to the 
war within the caucus was largely supportive.  In the official manifesto issued in the name of 
the new caucus by Hindmarsh, the final paragraph states that; “The Labour Party will assist 
the Coalition Government in every effort to help the Mother Country to maintain and uphold 
the highest ideals of liberty and justice”.224   
What united the caucus was not the idea that the war was wrong.  As JT Paul observed, “[The 
Labour Party] … bowed to no other party in its patriotism and in its desire to see the war 
brought to a successful conclusion”.225  Rather, the PLP was concerned with the practical 
aspects of the conflict such as the debilitating effect that the war was having on living 
standards of workers and their dependants and the need for ‘equality of sacrifice’ from the 
population.   
Labour Unity means Certain Success: The PLP and Labour Unity: 
Certainly, the formation of the new Labour caucus did help to resolve political issues outside 
of Parliament.  By 1915, both the SDP and ULP were floundering organisationally and 
politically.  Both bodies had lost members due to war mobilisation and were financially 
destitute.226 Since neither the SDP nor the ULP were perceived as being able to mount 
coherent or effective election campaigns, Labour Representation Committee’s (LRCs), which 
had played a pivotal electoral role previously, were retained as a means of attempting to 
stimulate discussion and unite labour bodies in electorates.227  However, despite the LRC’s 
intervention, labour candidates received an electoral thrashing in the 1915 local body 
elections and, with a general election due in 1917, there was a growing fear held by both 
militants and moderates that something similar would happen at a parliamentary level.228   
The formation of the Labour caucus contributed to the earnest discussions occurring between 
the various labour groups outside parliament.  These conversations eventually led to a new 
political understanding and rapprochement between the various labour bodies and, in July 
1916 this cooperation was formally constituted with the establishment of a new party, the 
New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP).  Gustafston remarks that the establishment of the New 
Zealand Labour Party was generally ignored by the press.229   
Preoccupied as they were with the war in Europe, the daily 
newspapers and the general public barely noticed the formation of 
the sixth ‘new’ Labour-Socialist’ Party in a little more than ten years. 
The event was recorded without headline or comment and the New 
Zealand Herald ignored it completely.  
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Not so the Grey River Argus.  The paper reported on the formation of the new Party listing its 
objectives, programme and officers.230 
The formation of the NZLP was the practical endpoint of discussions which had been occurring 
since the early 1900s.  While there had been previous appeals for unity from the various 
factions, most notably at the Unity Congress which had formed the SDP, these had met with 
little success.  However, the social and economic deprivation caused by the war finally had 
the effect of bringing the various factions of labour together.  Certainly, by 1915 there was a 
more conciliatory attitude shown by militants and moderates toward each other.  The SDP 
started to approach other labour organisations and seek their support for the establishment 
of the ‘New Zealand Labour Party.’231  Similarly, at the July 1916 UFL conference, the Otago 
Trades and Labour Council had forwarded a remit proposing a new unified Labour party.232  
The Labour moderate and Legislative Council member, JT Paul, offered his support to the 
proposal noting in his ODT column, ‘Industrial World,’ that an agreement would mean Labour 
being “...heard of in all immediate election contests.”233  Later, Paul was to congratulate the 
successful birth of the new party noting that; 
Men formerly separated by what they considered vital points of policy 
and principle, reasoned together last week to such purpose that 
instead of a "new" party they decided to weld all existing political 
Labour forces together under a well-known name, the New Zealand 
Labour party ... Altogether the future outlook for success - and Labour 
unity means certain success - is much more hopeful than at any time 
for 12 years.  And when one looks back, 12 years is a long time.234 
The Pursuit of Freedom and Liberty: The Labour Caucus and the War 
During the 1913 Unity Congress, Hindmarsh had observed that political unity within labour 
could only be brought about by a willingness to “bear all things and suffer all things”.235  The 
war had brought unity to labour by forcing the various factions within the political labour 
movement to seek commonality.  However, it was a commonality based not upon the 
achievement of an ideological goal (socialism).  Rather, it was a practical camaraderie 
achieved upon the pursuit of practical programmes that were required when the country was 
at war.   
Consequently ideology was largely put to one side as the First World War dominated the 
conduct and programmes of the fledgling party. While socialist parties in Europe engaged in 
bitter recriminations in relation to the merits of their involvement, parliamentary Labour in 
New Zealand accepted that the country and its resources would be involved.236  A number of 
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vocal people in the Labour Party and the wider labour movement such as Webb, Holland, 
Fraser, and Semple were strenuously opposed to New Zealand’s participation in what they 
saw as a wasteful and unnecessary war being fought on behalf of capitalists.  Webb’s 
opposition to the War was such that he was arrested and imprisoned for seditious activity 
and consequently forfeited his seat in Parliament.237  Yet, such opposition was reflective of 
the attitude of the Labour caucus between 1915 and 1918.   
In the original announcement establishing the Labour caucus it was made clear that its MPs 
were not opposed to conscription or the war effort.238  Labour MPs would loyally support “the 
government in its defence proposals”239  and the Labour caucus would; 
.... assist the Coalition Government in every effort to help the Mother 
Country to maintain and uphold the highest ideals of liberty and 
justice.240  
As Labour’s parliamentary chairman, Hindmarsh continued to express his own personal 
support and that of the Labour caucus, for the war.  In 1917, he gave a stirring and patriotic 
parliamentary speech on the topic in which he combined the romantic themes of English 
history, nationalism and traditionalism with the democratic principles of British parliamentary 
democracy;  
[It is…] our traditions, our language, our literature.  We are fighting for 
Shakespeare’s memory, for Milton’s memory, and for other 
celebrated men who stood out in English history and helped to create 
the present for us.  Everyone who reads Shakespeare must after he 
has read a little, become imbued with patriotism .... the common 
feeling of the people is always higher than the feeling of individuals 
that compose it.  I believe this higher feeling is the feeling that is 
directing the war and will not rest satisfied until we have achieved 
victory.241 
While, the Labour Party “left” might perceive the war as a clash of two industrialised capitalist 
powers that were politically alike, for Hindmarsh, the purpose of the war was to ensure British 
“freedom and liberty”.242  New Zealanders and the British people were fighting Germany as it 
lacked both freedom and liberty.  As Hindmarsh remarked in the House, Germany existed 
under a despotic regime and such a regime could not co-exist with freedom.243  However, 
even Hindmarsh admitted that there were limits to existing democracy within Britain and that 
there were wrongs to be addressed.244  His stated hope was that the successful outcome of 
the War would further the advance of democracy within both Britain and its Dominions.245  
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This was because, as he confided to the House, money did not drive the democracies of the 
world.  They were pledged to higher principles.  
All the democracies of the world are standing side by side, and therefore as a 
democrat one can only wish these democracies to succeed.  Is it likely that these 
democracies will all stand only for money? Is it likely that all nations will hold up 
certain notions as to the rights of property only? No, it is not likely.  It is something 
far higher that a number of these democracies will rise to … And I believe that that 
spirit prevails in all the other countries with whom we are allied and with whom 
we are fighting.246 
The Labour members (minus Webb, who was languishing in goal) had little hesitation in allying 
with the Reform and Liberal parties in voting for New Zealand’s continued involvement in the 
war.247  
The Question of Equality of Sacrifice and Conscription  
The real point of differentiation between Labour members and the Reform and Liberal 
parliamentarians was over practical policies and the issue of ‘equality of sacrifice’.  Labour 
MPs felt that there should be equality of sacrifice both physically and financially to the War 
effort from all classes.  There was a strong feeling from Labour members that workers were 
being forced to bear the brunt of the war effort, personally, socially and financially whilst the 
country’s wealthy avoided their fair contribution.  In 1914, Webb had referred to the need to 
impose a “war tax” to ensure that all classes contributed equally to the expense of sending 
expeditionary forces to the war.248  He observed that such a tax would ensure that “our 
wealthy patriotic people” contributed their fair financial share to the war effort.249  Webb’s 
main concern was the degree to which the war effort was being unequally shared.  As he 
informed Parliament, “… some wealthy people have done splendidly, and deserve every 
thanks; others have shirked, while others have made capital out of the nation’s troubles.  
Every man should pay according to his income”.250   
In 1917, Hindmarsh noted the poor condition of British troops due to them being forced to 
work in the factories “from six in the morning to six at night” so that others might “ride and 
luxuriate in clubs.” 251  Although a Government MP asserted that such conditions were the 
result of “the snobocracies of the Old World,” Hindmarsh had replied that such snobbishness 
was evident in New Zealand.252   
Labour asserted that the introduction of compulsory conscription was a consequence of such 
class snobbery in New Zealand.  Until the passing of the Military Service Act in 1916, military 
service was voluntary.  However, in 1916 the Government implemented compulsory 
conscription, claiming that such a measure was required to ensure that the country’s quota 
of troops remained high.253  As additional justification, Government MPs claimed that a 
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number of men were “shirking” military duty.254  Labour had supported voluntarism based 
upon certain conditions.  These conditions were that men would be more amiable to enlist if 
they were aware that they would be well paid and if the pension scheme for soldiers was 
improved to ensure that if they were maimed they would be provided for by the State for the 
remainder of their lives 255   
The Party alleged that as a result of compulsory conscription workers, were now forced to 
place their lives, their livelihoods and their families livelihoods at risk for little recompense.256  
At the same time, wealthy individuals could avoid conscription and, most outrageously of all, 
make a financial profit from the war through investing in bank deposits, indentures and war 
profiteering.257  Prior to his imprisonment, Webb had accused the Government of duplicity in 
response to its claim that it was committed to ensuring that the burden of the war would be 
evenly spread and, that it was willing to spend the country’s ‘last shilling’ in fighting the war.  
Webb remarked that; 
What is the use of talking about the last shilling? The Rich will be richer as an 
outcome of this war, and yet there are members in this House who are prepared 
to take men away from their loved ones, but not to insist that the rich men of the 
country shall be taxed to provide adequate pensions and pay for these men and 
their dependents.  I say they ought to be utterly ashamed of themselves.258 
Such was the strength of feeling within the Labour caucus over the issue that a year later in 
1917, McCombs referred, during an Address in Reply debate, to the passing of the Military 
Service Bill as protecting “financial shirkers”.259. 
Hindmarsh’s approach to the issue was cautious. He remarked that Labour’s opposition to the 
Act was not because he or it was opposed to conscription but because the Party was opposed 
to the personal and financial exemptions which the Bill allowed.260  Supporting McCombs in 
1917 during the same debate, he observed that the Act had exempted a number of farmers 
from military service.261  These farmers had subsequently taken it upon themselves to resist 
conscription of their farmhands, which undermined the stated purpose of the Act.  In addition 
they had manipulated the duties imposed by the war to increase their prices and their 
profits.262   
Hindmarsh and Labour MPs particularly referenced the price of general food items and dairy 
products which had increased in price during the war.  Outside of parliament, Holland gave a 
public lecture which detailed the increased prices of various goods.263  He observed that as 
prices and costs increased, workers’ wages remained static or fell due to Government 
regulation.264  The Evening Post reported Holland asserting that; 
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… the Government could have dealt as drastically with profiteers, but instead it 
employed its political power to conserve the interests of the exploiters … the 
grand total of war profits in New Zealand reached the figure of £45,476,187, 
without taking into account the profit on flour, groceries, clothing, boots, and a 
multitude of other items which would probably yield another 10 or 15 millions 
sterling.265 
The lecture was later published by the Worker as a pamphlet.  Additionally, the party noted 
that the overwhelming majority of the men serving at the Front tended to be the sole or 
principal breadwinners for their families.  As such, their departure financially penalised their 
spouses and children as food still needed to be provided and bills and rent paid.   
The Government partially responded to criticism over these issues by establishing a Cost of 
Living Committee to keep abreast of the situation.  However, it was perceived to be totally 
inadequate.  As Labour MPs noted, the Committee only had one labour representative on it 
and had no representation from significant areas of the country.266  The Labour MP, Andrew 
Walker observed that since this was a “matter which affected the working classes more than 
any other class in the country”, Labour’s representation should be substantially increased.267  
Massey, on behalf of the Government, declined Labour’s appeal claiming that the committee 
was quite “even sided”.268.  He then appointed two additional Government MPs on to the 
committee. 
For the most part, the Government appeared to argue that such matters were either 
exaggerated or they could be dealt with at a later date.269  In response, the NZLP argued that 
the situation for working people was perilous.  From the NZLP perspective the Government 
had a duty to immediately alleviate the financial and social distress suffered by both serving 
soldiers and their families.  In his 1917 speech to the House on the Government’s Financial 
Statement, Webb infuriated Government MPs by observing that the soldiers should not have 
to wait until they returned home to experience better conditions.270  He asserted that 
Parliament had a duty to improve conditions for soldiers and their families not only when they 
returned but whilst they were serving.271  To that end, the Government, Webb said, should 
guarantee to soldiers that it would alleviate some of the suffering experienced by them and 
their families by taking over their ‘responsibilities.’272  Webb succinctly spelt out what he 
meant; 
We should be able to say to the men, if we want you to go abroad to 
fight, we are prepared to take over your responsibilities, we will see 
to it that no landlord will increase your rent, we will prevent 
exploitation taking place...273 
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In its response the National Government was unenthusiastic about Webb’s proposal.274  
The Red Tide: Labour’s Changing Political Culture 
Although the PLP (and the wider NZLP) had united around such practical measures, political 
unity remained fragile.  In fact, such was the delicate nature of the caucus that by the middle 
of 1917 there was some question as to whether the Parliamentary Labour Party would 
continue to exist at the next election.275  Of those MPs who had formed the Labour caucus, 
McCombs had withdrawn as a result of Labour’s position on prohibition, Webb had been 
arrested and gaoled for sedition, Veitch had become an independent and it was suggested 
that Hindmarsh was considering re-joining the Liberal Caucus.276  McCallum, the Government 
MP for Wairau, claimed that the Labour Party was represented in the House by “only one 
member – namely the member for Dunedin North [Walker]”. 277 
Hindmarsh’s suspected defection had to do with his distaste regarding the political and 
philosophical objectives of some of his new colleagues.  Certainly, his moderate viewpoints 
on matters were well known.  In a speech to the Wellington Labour Representation 
Committee in 1915, Hindmarsh had talked of the need for Labour to “face facts” and “...adapt 
ourselves to practical politics, as Labour does in the Old Country”.278  However, as Chairman 
of the Parliamentary Caucus, Hindmarsh found his perspective increasingly at odds with his 
new PLP colleagues, especially Holland, who had replaced Webb as the Member for Grey,279 
and, with the wider party.  
Several by-election successes in 1918 had significantly altered the politics of the 
parliamentary party.  The inclusion of Holland, Fraser and later, Semple, into the Labour 
caucus indicated a definitive philosophical and political break with the ‘Hindmarsh era’ Labour 
caucus.  Whereas, the PLP up to 1918 could be described as a moderate body which expressed 
radical lib-lab opinions, the new caucus after that date had militant socialistic aspects to it.  
Very few people, outside of the fledging Bolshevik-aligned groups, would have accused 
Holland, Semple or Fraser of being political moderates.  All three men had strong associations 
with the radical sections of the labour movement prior to their elections into parliament.   
Holland had been a prominent member of Australian socialist and labour organisations before 
coming to New Zealand at the request of the Socialist Party.280  Upon his election to 
Parliament, the Grey River Argus reprinted a column from the Brisbane Standard.  Amidst 
other comments about Holland’s commitment to the socialist cause in both Australia and New 
Zealand, it observed that;  
[Holland] has gone straight ahead, never deviated from the stern and often bitter 
path of Socialism, and today this stormy petrel of the Australian Labour 
movement stands cheek by jowl on the floor of Parliament with those 
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unscrupulous enemies of the workers who fear and detest Holland because of his 
unflinching adherence to the principles of Socialism. 281 
Fraser had worked as a labourer and a watersider, had an active involvement in unions, had 
been involved in the ‘Red Feds’, the Socialist Party, and had been the National Secretary for 
the Social Democratic Party.282  Semple had worked in the mines, become involved with the 
Miners Unions and the Socialist Party, before becoming an organiser for the ‘Red Feds’ and, 
then, the United Federation of Labour and the Social Democratic Party.283  Like Webb, all three 
had been arrested for seditious utterances and activities during the war. 
The militants quickly made their mark in Parliament.  Holland’s maiden speech in November 
1918 with its emphasis on the “socialist objective” of the Labour Party, its strident anti-
militarism and its attack on the war effort of the Government must have caused considerable 
discomfort for Hindmarsh and other moderates in the caucus.  Later comments from Holland 
and Fraser suggesting support for the Bolsheviks in the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia and the ‘pluck of the Russian working man’ must have been equally and 
severely disturbing.  Consequently, it is of little wonder that there were allusions made in 
relation to the continued commitment of Hindmarsh and the other moderates to the Labour 
party.284  
The death of Hindmarsh on 13 November 1918, as a consequence of the influenza epidemic 
which was sweeping the country, neatly, if tragically, resolved this conflict.  In addition, it left 
both the leadership of Labour’s parliamentary caucus and Hindmarsh’s Wellington South seat 
vacant.  Hindmarsh’s Wellington South electorate was won by Semple for Labour in the 
succeeding by-election. 285 Wasting little time the militants flexed their new political muscle 
in selecting Holland as the new PLP caucus chairperson in early January 1919.  Holland’s only 
opponent in the caucus election had been the moderate MP James McCombs who had re-
joined the NZLP and the caucus.286   
Conclusion: The PLP as an exercise in Liberal-Labourism  
The parliamentary Labour party from 1915 – 1919 was not a radical organisation.  This lack of 
radicalism was evident in its formation, which was as a result of concerns relating to practical 
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parliamentary politics, and its practical programme during that period.  Its concern was not 
whether the war was correct (it assumed that it was), but with the mechanics and fairness of 
the war effort.  However, the PLP did provide a level of political unity to the political labour 
movement which had been previously lacking.  It additionally raised the grievances of its 
working class constituents regarding their economic and social conditions during this period.   
Ideologically its approach was liberal-labour rather than socialist.  This was a reflection of its 
composition.  The pre-1919 PLP was dominated by liberal-labourities.  Hindmarsh as the 
caucus chair was essentially a liberal-labour MP who believed in a policy of progressive 
liberalism to achieve labour objectives.287  The political objectives of the majority of the 
Caucus were contained within the platforms of the original New Zealand Labour Party and 
the ULP.  This placed them at variance with Webb, and later Holland, Semple and Fraser, who 
considered themselves as active students of Marx and sought the attainment of socialism.   
Although, politically, the members of the PLP and the wider party subscribed to socialism, 
they differed in what the term meant to them.  Indications of this difference of political 
perspective are evident in the earlier debates at the 1913 Unity Congress.  During the debate 
over the Preamble of the newly formed UFL, the philosophical differences between both 
groups was clearly spelt out.  What was under nominal debate was the wording of the 
Preamble, which sought to include the passage that there could be no cooperation between 
the employing class (capital) and the workers (the exploited).288 But, what was really under 
discussion were the perceived political and ideological differences that delegates had of the 
relationship between capital and labour.   
Delegates from the ULP and the moderate unions were opposed to the Preamble because 
they believed the distinction within it was overstated and that employers and employees had, 
in the words of one delegate, “much in common.”289  Others warned that the Preamble was a 
“… seeming attempt to bring the employer and the employee into hostile and dangerous 
collision.”290  Hindmarsh thought that the Preamble was ‘non-essential’ and that debate and 
discussion during the conference was being held back due to the ‘irreconcilable elements’ 
present.291  Its inclusion, he claimed, alienated a significant minority of the delegates.292   
When he entered Parliament, Hindmarsh continued to assert the principle that politics was 
classless.293  He proposed that legislation should be the result of what was good for the 
majority of the population.294  For Hindmarsh, socialism was not about the achievement or 
advocacy of working class rights, it was about achieving the best outcome for every section 
of the community through the use of the State.  The majority of the PLP agreed with that 
perspective.  As JT Paul was to observe during a debate regarding the alleged political 
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relationship between the NZLP and the Bolsheviks in the Legislative Council, Labour was a 
constructive party which sought to avoid such events as those which occurred in Russia by 
establishing the “… best possible Government in our British community”.295  For Paul and 
others in the PLP, the onus on the Labour Party and Parliament was not a class based 
revolution, but, the establishment of an inclusive society.  This could only be achieved, Paul 
opined by; 
… sit(ting) down and work(ing) out whether the old form of society is the best 
from the point of view of the individual and the point of view of the collective 
whole … (m)y view of the immediate future is that some of the big concerns will 
have to be controlled and owned by the State.  Some other concerns may be 
owned and controlled by groups of individuals … while in addition some concerns 
will remain solely private.296 
Although he was a supporter of labour unity, it is probable that Hindmarsh retained an 
antagonism toward ‘extremist’ socialism and ‘extremist’ socialists two years later when he 
became chairperson of the Labour party parliamentary caucus in 1915.  One can only imagine 
that it must have been increasingly frustrating for him to be associated with the same people 
who to all intents and purposes had seemingly not changed their political opinions in the 
intervening period.  Equally, it must have been frustrating for Webb and, later Holland, Fraser 
and Semple, to be members of a caucus that was led by a Labour moderate, Hindmarsh, which 
had supported the war effort and which was relatively temperate in its political undertakings. 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, western governments and newspapers reported a 
number of incidents which highlighted the spread of Communism and extreme socialism in 
Europe.  The Grey River Argus informed its readers that Germany was under the control of 
the Bolsheviks.297 The Evening Post reported that the Italian Socialists endorsed Bolshevism.298  
Even the British Labour Party was said to be in league with the Bolsheviks with the Ashburton 
Guardian printing comments by Lloyd George warning of the “… wild and poisonous seeds of 
Karl Marxism” within it.299  Unsurprisingly, the election of both Fraser and Semple, the choice 
of Holland as Labour’s caucus chairperson and the Party’s stated objective of socialism, were 
used by the Reform Party, the Liberals and the media as proof that the New Zealand Labour 
Party was also in thrall to Bolshevism.  In reality nothing could have been further from the 
truth.  
Chapter Five: Radicals and Moderates: Radicals, Syndicalists 
and the Labour Party 
Introduction: 
The establishment of the NZLP was the culmination of discussion and development between 
the left and the right of the political labour movement.  While the objective of the new party 
was the achievement of socialism, the PLP had been, as has been previously discussed, largely 
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a conservative and labourist body.  However, the election of militants into key roles within 
the PLP and the wider Party in 1918/1919 appeared to suggest that the NZLP was now 
exclusively committed to the pursuit and implementation of socialism.  Certainly, it was the 
only major political organization which openly advocated for socialism and, it was this 
acknowledgement which established the later ideological disputes within the Party.   
Inspired by the Party’s socialist commitment and the speeches and actions of its new 
Parliamentary leadership, the NZLP became the object of attention of various radicals and 
revolutionists.  A number of these individuals and groups were involved directly in the NZLP 
as full-fee paying members. However, a substantive number were involved in various groups 
within the wider labour movement.  The philosophy of these groups tended to differ.  The 
radicals within the Party wanted the NZLP to promote a socialist philosophy and programme 
which could be brought about using parliamentary means.  Those groups outside of the NZLP 
were critical of the Party’s commitment to parliamentarism and reformism and wanted the 
Party to champion a revolutionary programme.  After 1920, some of the NZLP’s radicals joined 
the nascent New Zealand Communist Party (CPNZ) with its emphasis on the workers’ 
revolution.  However, a number remained with the NZLP and attempted to change its 
methods and programmes by various indirect or direct means.   
This chapter provides a brief overview of the methods by which both sets of individuals 
attempted to directly influence the Party’s ideological direction and programme.  It 
particularly focuses on two attempts which were made to directly sway or challenge the NZLP.  
One of these involved the paper of the labour movement and, the official publication of the 
NZLP, The Maoriland Worker, while the other was an attempt to challenge the control of 
Labour Party parliamentarians through the Party’s internal structure.  The impact of these 
groups and their methods was to have a significant and long lasting effect on the NZLP’s 
philosophy and programmes.  
The Syndicalists 
The most prominent (and the most well organised until the establishment of the CPNZ) of the 
radical groups opposed to the NZLP were the syndicalists.  Most syndicalists had originally 
been involved in the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).  While, the defeat of the unions 
in the aftermath of the 1913 General Strike had seen the IWW as an organisation largely 
collapse in New Zealand.300  Syndicalism as a philosophical or practical ideal continued to exist.  
Syndicalists involved themselves to a greater extent in unions which they then attempted to 
change into syndicalist or revolutionary organisations committed to the use of the strike as a 
political means to achieve the industrial revolution. 
Individuals with syndicalist tendencies were most notably found within the New Zealand 
Workers Union (NZWU) and the Alliance of Labour, (AoL), which was the successor body to 
the United Federation of Labour.  Because the leadership of both organisations tended to be 
comprised of the same individuals, both bodies demonstrated hostility to the NZLP’s advocacy 
of parliamentary methods and reformism at various times during the 1920s.  This antagonism 
was evident in the ongoing criticism of the Party’s platform and methods. However, the 
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syndicalists never achieved their aim of either supplanting the NZLP as the dominant body 
with the Labour movement or changing the Party’s direction or methods.  
From the syndicalist perspective, working class dominance could only be achieved by the 
union movement and industrial workers.301  Working class power would be further enhanced 
through the formation of the ‘One Big Union’ which would unite all industrial workers 
regardless of their occupation.302  Consequently, parliamentary politics was not only 
distracting to the working class movement but actively undermined the workers’ 
revolutionary objectives by forcing them to make deals with the capitalists.303  Additionally, 
once a Labour Party attained parliamentary representation, it was the Parliamentarians which 
set the party’s objectives and programmes.  The syndicalists alleged that Parliamentarians 
were inclined to moderate socialistic objectives and policies to ensure their own political 
survival.  As a result, the syndicalists concluded, a Labour Party became a part of the capitalist 
process and, therefore, part of the problem.304  Given the Labour Party’s subversion or 
conversion it was little wonder, the syndicalists asserted, that such parties could not 
overthrow Capitalism.  Labour parties were simply a ‘fifth column’ deceiving workers and 
undermining the march toward socialism.  Subsequently, their authority over the labour 
movement had to be reduced or eliminated.  
 ‘A Political Press is a Prostitute Press’ - The Battle with the Syndicalists over the Maoriland 
Worker. 
The first open engagement between the NZLP and the syndicalists occurred in 1919 and 1920 
over the Maoriland Worker.  The NZLP perceived the Maoriland Worker as a key component 
of its political propaganda mechanism.  The Worker had the ability to provide the NZLP with 
a mass platform for its speeches, policy statements and programme.  Such publicity was 
denied to the NZLP by the main stream press.  Consequently, the Party was of the opinion 
that the Worker, as the media arm of the labour movement, should unreservedly support the 
political arm of that movement.  However, this point of view was fervently opposed by the 
syndicalists.  They asserted that the Worker was a powerful voice for labour and industrial 
unionism.  Whilst it should support the NZLP, it should not be uncritical support as the paper 
had a role to represent the labour movement and not to be held hostage by the ‘political 
bosses’ of a small section of that movement.  The arguments regarding the editorship and 
political direction of the Maoriland Worker proved to be the most visible indication of the 
hostility between the proponents of parliamentary reform (and democratic socialism) and 
those advocating industrial revolution.   
It was perhaps inevitable that the paper would be the centre of conflict, given its history.  The 
Maoriland Worker had been established as a means by which all of the various strands of 
thought within the labour movement could be represented.305  This noble intention was 
proclaimed by the Maoriland Workers’ original masthead which declared that it was “a paper 
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devoted to the promotion of industrial unionism, socialism and progressive politics.”306  While 
the paper’s policy adhered to the programme of the 1910 Annual Conference of the Trades 
and Labour Councils, including the TLC’s objective of the “socialisation of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange,”307 the paper also appealed to moderate workers who 
supported Liberal-Labour.  In its first edition, the radical Liberal MP, T E (Tommy) Taylor 
endorsed the paper and remarked upon the importance of having an independent labour 
publication which would act as a counter to “… the confirmed Tories and social snobs” which 
operated the others.308 
On 8 October 1913, after the conclusion of the Unity Conference, the paper’s masthead was 
changed to reflect its new role as the official publication of the United Federation of Labor 
and the Social Democratic Party. 309  In 1919, the Worker became the official publication of 
the newly established NZLP, which had incorporated the SDP.310  Although the NZLP was not 
formally on the Maoriland Workers’ Board, under its rules of association the paper was 
obligated to support the Party.311  This relationship was officially reflected in the masthead of 
the Maoriland Worker which contained the legend, “The official organ of the United 
Federation of Labor and the New Zealand Labor Party.”312 
Syndicalism and Direct Action – The New Editor’s Syndicalist Intentions 
In 1919, the Worker’s Management Board appointed William Kraig as the Maoriland Worker’s 
new editor.313  Kraig was an experienced journalist and had a previous association with the 
Worker having been an advisor to the paper’s Board when it was first established.314  An 
introductorily article welcoming Kraig to the editorship of the paper described him as an 
“…able writer and a fearless and consistent advocate of working class rights.”315  Kraig was “… 
a strong anti-militarist and a firm believer in political action in both the industrial and 
legislative arena”.  The article also went on to observe that Kraig “… regard[ed] industrial 
unionism as the basic foundation of all working-class action in the future”. 316  Kraig was a 
syndicalist and an active proponent of direct industrial action.  Consequently, he allied himself 
with Arthur Cook and the syndicalists within the New Zealand Workers Union and quickly 
found himself offside with the NZLP Executive and the Parliamentary caucus.   
For Kraig, the principal points of contention were the Maoriland Worker’s relationship with 
the NZLP and the paper’s promotion of parliamentary reform.  Kraig had made it clear in his 
first editorial that he did not perceive the role of the Maoriland Worker as being an uncritical 
                                                          
306 “Maoriland Worker Masthead,” Maoriland Worker, September 15, 1910. pg. 1 
307 “Policy of ‘The Maoriland Worker,’” Maoriland Worker, September 15, 1910. pg. 5. 
308 T E Taylor, “The Need for a Labor Paper,” Maoriland Worker, September 15, 1910. pg.4. 
309 “The Maoriland Worker Masthead,” Maoriland Worker, October 8, 1913. pg. 1. 
310 “Maoriland Worker. Masthead,” Maoriland Worker, January 8, 1919.  pg. 1. This was the first Masthead to 
proclaim that the Worker was the official publication of the Federation of Labor and the NZ Labor Party.  Previous 
editions had retained the paper as the official publication of the SDP. 
311 William Kraig, “A New Broom Sweeps Clean,” Maoriland Worker, March 5, 1919. pg.4. 
312 “MW,” January 8, 1919. pg. 1.  
313 “Our New Editor,” Maoriland Worker, February 12, 1919. pg.7. 
314 “MW,” July 18, 1923. pg. 4. 
315 “MW,” February 12, 1919. pg.7. 
316 Ibid. pg.7. 
69 
 
 
supporter of either the NZLP or parliament.317  Instead, Kraig claimed that the role of the paper 
was to;  
… exercise the right to watch with a critical eye, but with a just 
judgment, all the representatives of Labor, and [it] will not hesitate, 
when necessary, to express its opinions in regard to the actions and 
utterances of all Labor representatives. This, indeed, is one of the 
chief duties of a Labor organ, and is one that the present editor is 
given the right to exercise, and will exercise, not arrogantly or for 
petty personal ends, but with a due regard to the nobility of his calling 
and the great responsibility of his high office, the highest a man could 
occupy in the Labor movement.318 
The focussing of Kraig’s critical eye did not take long.  In April, the paper refused to support 
Labour’s policy regarding the liquor question.319  Kraig declared the Maoriland Worker for 
prohibition against the NZLP’s policy of state control and political neutrality over the issue.  
From the NZLP perspective, such a move was perceived as a betrayal of the paper’s 
commitment to the Party and was bitterly attacked by Holland.320  In an editorial response, 
Kraig chided Holland and the NZLP, observing that the paper acted on behalf of the labour 
movement and not the NZLP.321   
As the official organ of the Labor Party, The Worker gives general 
approval and support to the policy of that Party in the interests of the 
movement as a whole.  But, The Worker is a trustee of the whole 
movement; it must do justice to all sections of the movement and all 
shades of opinion in the movement, and if it cannot do that, if it has 
to regard its chief function as being to say "Hear, Hear" to the 
decisions of the Labor Party, it will fail to fulfil its proper functions.322 
Incensed, Holland brought the matter up at the NZLP’s 1919 Annual Conference.  The 
argument between the Worker and the NZLP appears to have had the effect of uniting both 
the Left and Right of the Party.  NZLP President JT Paul informed Conference delegates that 
he had also written to Kraig on the Party’s behalf323.  Paul’s letter supported Holland’s 
assertion that the Maoriland Worker’s articles of association committed the paper to support 
the NZLP’s policy and platform.324  The Conference sided with Holland and Paul over the issue 
and also moved that the NZLP obtain representation on the Worker’s Board325.  Additionally, 
a deputation headed by Paul had waited upon the Chairman of the Worker’s Board (J Glover) 
and had sought and achieved a commitment from the Worker that the editor and the paper 
would:  
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… whole-heartedly support the principles and policy of the Party as 
determined at the Annual Conference, and not to oppose or adversely 
criticise such policy.326   
The Unrepentant Editor 
Despite this commitment, Kraig was unrepentant.  As a result, the relationship between both 
bodies grew even more contentious during and after the 1919 Election.  In the aftermath, the 
paper was accused by the NZLP Leadership of providing the Party with scant coverage during 
the campaign.  It was alleged that the Worker had not even printed the NZLP’s official election 
manifesto and had attacked the Party’s programme in its pages.327  Kraig’s subsequent 
comments, in the edition published immediately after the election, that the money spent on 
elections might have been better spent on ‘reconstruction,’ further antagonised the 
situation.328  Subsequently, the Party’s Press Committee reported to the NZLP’s Annual 
Conference in July 1920 that the Maoriland Worker had failed to support the NZLP despite its 
previous commitment and its articles of association.  Holland read out the Committee’s report 
and remarked that; 
When the five Labor members made their determined and 
uncompromising fight, in the last session they received no help from 
the official organ; when the great, working-class battle at the polls 
occurred in December last, we were without that journalistic backing 
which the working men were entitled to demand from the leading 
columns of the National official organ; in the present session of 
Parliament, another uncompromising fight is being made by the eight 
Labor members; but in the leading columns of the official organ there 
is no indication of the solid stand that is being maintained on the floor 
of the House.329 
However, Kraig did receive some support from an unexpected source at the Conference.  
McCombs challenged Holland’s interpretation of the paper’s motives, noting that he did not 
understand how the paper had ‘undermined’ the NZLP’s position on the Peace Treaty.330  
Further, he informed the Conference that he had provided Kraig with copies of his speeches 
from Hansard and was confident that these had been reported in the paper.331  Holland 
responded that McCombs’ experiences with the paper were not his.332  Armstrong, siding with 
Holland, observed that the paper had a responsibility to print NZLP material.333  Another 
delegate, Forde, observed that he was “… mainly concerned with the leading articles of The 
Worker, and he thought from that standpoint the paper had failed. Some drastic change was 
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necessary in the interests of the movement”.334  The concerns of McCombs were swept aside 
as the Conference endorsed the Committee’s report.  
However, if Kraig’s behaviour had alienated the NZLP, it was warmly supported by the Annual 
Conference of the New Zealand Workers’ Union, held in May 1920.335  Conference delegates, 
including some future NZLP MP’s such as Frank Langstone, observed that the paper had a 
duty to represent the entire labour movement and that it was not simply the apologist for the 
NZLP.336  Those opposed to the direction of the paper, it was suggested, were simply exhibiting 
“jealousy” as they had not secured the “editor they wanted.”  Holland and the NZLP were 
described as “freaks” who were now trying to “burst up the Worker.”337  The NZWU Secretary, 
Arthur Cook informed NZWU delegates that the new political direction of the paper would 
halt its declining circulation.  He asserted that this decline was solely due to the Worker’s 
previous commitment to reformism and parliamentarism.338  Cook confidently informed the 
Conference that;  
Now that it was decided to make it [the Maoriland Worker] an 
industrial organ it would get the support of many unions that would 
not support it before.  Too much political dope had been served out 
in the past.  He [Cook] had got sick of the seeing the doings of the Big 
Four – Semple, Fraser and Co – chronicled.  He believed that it [the 
paper] would get support if it advocated industrialism and the One Big 
Union.339 
Doubtless buoyed by the support shown by various industrial sections of the Labour 
movement, Kraig took the initiative in July 1920 to sever the official association of the Worker 
with the NZLP.340  He declared in an editorial that the role of the paper was not to simply say 
‘Hear Hear to Labour politicians.’341  In a direct retort to Holland and the Party, he proclaimed;  
There are political representatives in the movement, with intelligence 
enough to know better, who declare that the Platform can beat the 
Press. Argument is futile with people who hug such a delusion.  In fact, 
those who put it forward are very keenly alive to the value of the 
Press, and in many instances are no mean writers themselves. Their 
whole attitude to the Press gives the lie direct, to their ludicrous 
argument, upon which no further time need be wasted. There are 
others again who are so keen on having a Labor daily that they are 
starting to build up one before they are ready, and risking the 
possibility of valuable time, effort and money being spent on wrongly-
conceived ideas, to be carried into operation by men who can be 
described only as bungling amateurs so far as the newspaper business 
is concerned.342 
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The most obvious sign of this political estrangement was the paper removing the reference 
to the Labour Party from its masthead.  In its place, the Maoriland Worker imposed a new 
masthead, in which it committed itself to being a journal ‘of Industrial Unionism, Socialism 
and Politics.’  The paper did, however, continue to provide a dedicated NZLP page which had 
been promised by the Board of Management of the Worker to the Party in 1919.343 
Not content with separating the Party and the paper, Kraig appears to have sought out other 
opponents in the labour movement as well.  Editorials in the August edition of the Worker 
became increasingly vitriolic and damning both of Labour politics and of individuals within the 
labour movement.  In the editorial of 25 August, Kraig intervened in a bitter demarcation 
dispute between Cook (and the King Country Timber Workers Union) and John Read (and the 
Wellington Timber Yards and Sawmills Union).  Siding with Cook, Kraig publicly denounced 
Read, proclaiming that he was the sort of unionist, organised labour could do without.344  
Mr. Read is a type of Labor bureaucrat that is a hindrance to the Labor 
movement. By being "in" the movement, Mr. Read means being a 
barnacle of a bureaucrat who never moves except when forced, or 
when nominations for offices of honour or profit are being called 
for.345 
Such comments might have proved to be the proverbial step too far for the Worker’s Board 
of Management.  In the edition of 8 September 1920, Kraig is no longer listed as being the 
paper’s Editor.  Instead, it is reported that P H “Pat” Hickey had become its new ‘Managing 
Editor’.346  Although there is no official comment in the Worker, it appears that Kraig was 
dismissed from the paper at the end of August 1920 by the Board.347  That his removal was 
divisive was revealed by a small notice in the edition of 15 September 1920.  It informed 
readers that a special meeting of the NZWU Executive was being called for that date.  The 
purpose of the meeting was to; 
… consider the attitude of the Union delegates on The Worker Board 
of Management. This has been convened on the motion of Mr. R 
Templeton who alleges that the Board delegates have acted contrary 
to the New Zealand Workers' Union constitution.348 
The argument over the Maoriland Worker was not merely about personalities or whether the 
paper critically or uncritically supported the NZLP, although these matters played an 
important part in the dispute.  The conflict over the Worker was part of a wider fight over the 
political and ideological direction of the labour movement, the implementation of socialism 
and the creation of a workers’ state.  The Maoriland Worker played a central role in that 
conflict due to its importance as a primary mass source of information and instruction for 
workers.  Subsequently, both the NZLP and the syndicalists realised that they could ill-afford 
not to be in control of the paper.  Eventually, the Labour Party prevailed.  This outcome was 
partly due to Kraig’s own carelessness.  It appears that, to use the adage, “he had won the 
battle, but lost the war”.  It was also because, regardless of what Kraig and Cook believed, 
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there was a strong desire, particularly amongst unions, to support a united Labour Party in 
parliament.  In 1919, the NZLP had achieved the election of 8 MPs.  This was a larger number 
of MPs than any of the other Labour or Socialist parties had previously achieved.  Henceforth, 
it was seen as important not to isolate the NZLP and lose those gains.  
The syndicalists lost the conflict over the Worker because they were outmanoeuvred by the 
NZLP and its supporters.  The unions made up the paper’s Board of Management and there 
were a number of Labour activists who were also union officials who were appointed to that 
Board.  It was the Board which ultimately decided the editorial policy of the paper and chose 
the editor.  This was a lesson that Kraig appears to have learnt at his own cost.  
Labour’s Love Regained: The Maoriland Worker reaffirms its support of the NZLP  
Hickey carried on as the Maoriland Worker’s Editor until 1922 after which James Thorn was 
appointed to the position.349  Thorn was an active NZLP member and his ascension effectively 
meant that the Party had regained editorial control.  The Maoriland Worker once more 
became the NZLP’s ‘unofficial’ publication and, as such, it promoted the Party’s virtues of 
parliamentary socialism and democratic reform.  However, the Maoriland Worker‘s days were 
numbered.  In its edition of 30 January 1924, readers were informed that the Worker’s board 
had decided to change the paper’s name to the ‘New Zealand Worker’.350  When the new 
paper was published, its masthead declared that the ‘New Zealand Worker’ was “A New 
Zealand paper for New Zealand people”.  Gone were any references to the Labour Party and 
Unions and any official recognition of socialism.  Not that such official references mattered as 
increasingly the New Zealand Worker became the paper of the NZLP during the 1920s, with 
its content being the speeches, policy programmes and thoughts of Labour Party personages.  
Kraig might well have ruefully observed in the Worker that the “political bosses” had won.  
Radicals and the Political Boss  
The Maoriland Worker was not the only point of visible conflict between the NZLP and the 
militant left.  There was also a revolt within the NZLP, through various branches and affiliated 
unions, to reduce the prestige of its parliamentarians and to commit it to a platform of radical 
socialism.  These attempts and demands tended to be made by the Party’s left and supported 
from outside the organisation by the syndicalists or other left groups.  The principal 
motivation behind the motion appears to have been the assertion by a section of the Party 
that the membership and not the parliamentarians set the NZLP’s agenda and programme.351   
The role of the parliamentarians was a vexed question within the Labour Party during this 
period.  Much of the criticism about the role and dominance of the PLP within the NZLP was 
the result of various disputes and conflicts within other Labour parties.  While the British 
Labour Party was mentioned as having unrepresentative MPs, special attention was drawn to 
the Australian Labor Party (ALP), in particular the federal ALP.352  The ALP was riven with 
discord which was perceived to be the direct result of the actions and activities of both state 
and federal MPs and labour leaders.  Subsequently, critics of the parliamentarians and the 
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supporters of the remits referenced the actions of ALP politicians, and particularly the former 
leader of the Federal ALP, William ‘Billy’ Hughes, as an example of what occurred when the 
parliamentarians and not the membership were in control of the party.353   
In 1920, a remit was moved at the NZLP Conference proposing to remove the right of the 
Party’s parliamentarians to hold Executive office within the Party.354  The motion prompted 
considerable debate by conference delegates.  Fraser, who was in the Chair as Vice President, 
did not take part in the debate and refused to provide an interpretation of what the motion 
might mean for existing or new NZLP Executive members who were parliamentarians, as he 
was personally involved.355  Holland was absent for the initial debate.356  The motion was 
initially approved by 29 votes to 17, with the provision that it not be enacted until the 
following year.357  However, the next day Holland returned and announced his decision to 
revisit the issue.358  The question was re-opened by Conference which, after considerable 
debate, decided to overturn the previous agreed motion by 37 votes to 14.359  An additional 
motion that the matter would be revisited in 6 months and that the result would be binding 
on electorates was also passed.360  However, it appears nothing became of it.  
Syndicalist Support of Motion 
Although the Syndicalists were not responsible for the motion, they supported the removal 
of political power from the parliamentarians and, subsequently, they supported the 
resolution to the utmost.  The Maoriland Worker railed against Holland and his supporters.  
Kraig, who at the time was still Editor, responded to Holland’s contentions that the motions 
effectively meant that MPs were disenfranchised from their own Party by commenting that;  
The argument used by Mr. Holland that the decision of the Party that 
members of Parliament should be debarred from holding executive 
office within, the party, means their disfranchisement, is weak. Every 
man holding a responsible position as a representative of Labor has 
rights and privileges belonging to that position, and must, in return for 
these, give up other rights and privileges. This principle has not been 
recognised by the Labor movement hitherto, the result being that 
although "one man one job" has been preached as a principle of 
Labor, it has been dishonored by not being practised. 361 
While The Worker had indicated one of the concerns that had been expressed within the 
debate, that of “one man, one job,” it was not the principal concern of those at conference.  
Rather, their concern was regarding the amount of control which the parliamentarians could 
or should exercise over the Party.  A significant section of the NZLP membership felt some 
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apprehension that, as in the United Kingdom and Australia, the Party membership would be 
removed from the decision-making process as the number of MPs increased.362  
Holland’s Response – Labour’s Working Class Mission 
Holland’s response, and that of the supporters of the PLP, was that Labour MPs should not be 
refused positions within the Party simply because of their status.  This was particularly 
important, Holland observed, since the Labour Party was campaigning in parliament that 
workers and other oppressed people, such as the Samoans, should not be denied 
representation on the basis of their status.363  Subsequently, it was contradictory to remove 
the rights of MPs while expecting them to continue to campaign for the rights of others.   
However, the central point of Holland’s reply related to the relationship between Labour MPs 
and NZLP members.  Holland asserted that it was a close relationship, which was founded on 
the MP’s origins from within the working class and their involvement within working class 
organisations.  Consequently, NZLP MP’s, unlike some of their international counterparts, 
were very aware of the Party’s status as a working-class Party.364  Holland asserted that it was 
impossible for Labour MP’s not to beware of, or forget their ‘working class mission’ as 
Labour’s parliamentary opponents would not allow them to do so.365   
Labor members in Parliament would no more succumb to their 
environment than the well paid official of an industrial organisation 
would.  Let them read the speeches in Parliament, they would realise 
the venom and hatred which the Parliamentary party was up against. 
There was not much danger of them forgetting their class mission, 
because the enemies of the working class would see to it that they did 
not forget.366 
Claiming that it would be unlikely that Labour parliamentarians would be unrepresentative 
due to their working class and socialist principles, Holland does not address the statement 
made by Armstrong, soon to become a Labour MP and later a Cabinet Minister, when moving 
the motion that the numbers of MPs could mean that rank and file Party members would be 
alienated from the decision-making processes.  Rather, Holland asserts that trust needs to be 
placed in the principles of the PLP and in the democratic mechanisms of the Party.367  In short, 
Party members needed to have trust and faith in their labour representatives.   
Labour’s Rejection of Industrial Revolt and Direct Action 
There was an attempt to pass another, similar, resolution at the 1921 Conference which was 
also unsuccessful.368  It appears that the outcome of the 1920 Conference had muted the 
criticism about the role of the PLP within the Party.  Consequently, there was a change of tack.  
Instead of directly confronting MPs at the 1922 Annual Conference attempts were made to 
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commit the Party to direct action.369  A remit was moved by the Canterbury Trades and Labour 
Council proposing that the objective of the Party be changed to include the “break [ing] and 
shatter [ing] the available ready machinery of State”.370  What is notable is that both of the 
remits were handily defeated at the respective Conferences.  At all three Conferences, the 
NZLP leadership, principally Fraser and Holland, had emphasised that the objective of the 
Party would be achieved through constitutional means.  Holland, who still perceived himself 
as a Marxist and continued to rail against the injustice and violence of the capitalist state in 
Parliament, declared that the 1922 remit was “... entirely foreign to the spirit of the Labor 
movement”.371    
Conclusion: The Radical Rejection 
The outcome of the syndicalist takeover of the Maoriland Worker and the radical left’s 
conference remits to reduce the power of the MPs and to commit the NZLP to a programme 
of direct action, was defeat.  In both instances the NZLP and the Party leadership were able 
to quell discontent and to overcome radical sentiment.  In doing so, the NZLP demonstrated 
two important details about itself.   
Firstly, that the NZLP would pursue socialism through constitutional and parliamentary 
methods.  The Party was not receptive to direct action or militancy as a means of pursuing 
and achieving its programme and platform.  In the aftermath of the 1921 Conference, NZLP 
National Council member C H Chapman wrote to the Maoriland Worker praising Fraser’s 
recognition that the only means of progress by the Party was through constitutional means 
and commenting that there was remarkable degree of “unanimity” at the Conference about 
this issue.372  It was a sign, Chapman asserted that; 
... that the Party as a whole is convinced that transformation of the 
existing order is possible only when the principles of socialism have by 
propaganda, permeated society. The growth of these principles can 
reasonably be measured by the number of votes cast at any time by 
the candidates put up by the Party.373 
Chapman’s comments draw attention to the fact that the PLP was supported by the larger 
Party membership and affiliated unions.  While the defeat of the 1920 conference remit did 
require the direct intervention of Holland, the membership nonetheless eventually supported 
the actions of the MPs.  There appeared to be little desire on the part of the NZLP membership 
to alienate either the PLP or to advocate for revolutionary methods as Kraig and Cook 
discovered.  The majority of the Conference delegates and the larger Party membership 
appeared to be satisfied with the parliamentary route to socialism as advocated by the Party’s 
working class MPs.  The membership placed its faith in their MPs and believed Holland when 
he stated that Labour MP’s were their political representatives. 
Secondly, the Party perceived itself as the sole political representative of labour.  Although 
there was obviously some sympathy toward aspects of the syndicalist programme by some 
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members of the Party left, the programmes and platform of the syndicalists, their allies, and 
later, the Communists, were largely dismissed by the NZLP as being unrepresentative of 
workers.  It was the battles waged by the NZLP which became the battles of the ‘working 
class’ and the labour movement as a whole.  So, when Holland declared that the 1919 General 
Election was a great working class contest, it was taken as a given that this was, indeed, the 
case.  This perception that Labour was the sole representative of workers’ political interests 
led to the NZLP demanding loyalty from the various organisations within the labour 
movement.  The Party justified this approach by observing that it had been established by 
trade unions, which were affiliated to it, and labour/socialist parties.  Consequently, dissent 
in any form was, or could be perceived as, treasonous, as Kraig had discovered.  
The syndicalists and their allies did not help their cause by their continued hostility toward 
the Party.  The intransigent attitudes of the NZWU, Cook, Roberts and Kraig merely 
entrenched the attitude of the Party leadership that they could not talk with or cooperate 
with the militants.  This antagonism led to a political “cold war” between the leadership of 
the NZLP and the AoL throughout the 1920s, with both sides accusing the other of betraying 
the cause of labour.  Eventually, this rift was healed by the severity of the 1930s “Great” 
Depression.  The chaos and misery caused by the Depression convinced both organisations 
that labour unity was a more rational approach to overcoming the dire situation of the labour 
movement than ongoing ideological dissent and division.  
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Chapter Six: Red Obstacles on the Parliamentary Road to 
Socialism: Labour and the Spectre of Bolshevikism. 
Introduction 
In the early 1920s, the New Zealand Labour Party faced a more potent challenge to its socialist 
programme.  The Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) had been formed in 1921 with the 
aims of promoting the revolutionary socialist programme of the Bolshevik Party and the newly 
established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.374  Throughout the 1920s, the NZLP and the 
CPNZ maintained an acrimonious relationship with each other brought about by their 
competition over a common electoral and political base and a shared commitment to a 
socialist objective and programme.  While opposed or critical of Soviet-style socialism, the 
Labour Party, nonetheless, needed to present itself as a radical, and yet practical, choice for 
socialists to support.   
Despite the altercations between both bodies, the NZLP, its leadership and its agencies such 
as the Maoriland/New Zealand Worker, had at various times officially promoted and 
endorsed aspects of the emerging Soviet regime and its leadership.  Yet, the Party additionally 
took considerable care to distance itself from the CPNZ and its associated agencies (such as 
the Friends of the Soviet Union (FSU).  This led to a number of occasions when NZLP 
representatives, and those of the CPNZ, would publicly criticise the leadership, programme 
and platform of the other.   
Labour’s political opponents used the Bolshevik threat to challenge the NZLP’s socialist 
objective and its political programme.  The Reform and Liberal Parties and the Press alleged 
that the NZLP was a “fifth column” for the Bolsheviks and, despite the Party’s claims to pursue 
socialism through Parliament, that the NZLP’s programmes and methods were undemocratic.  
Although such claims were rejected by the NZLP, accusations alleging that the party was 
actually revolutionary socialist in nature and, in league with the Bolsheviks did have a studied 
effect on the NZLP’s political and ideological development.   
This chapter will discuss how the NZLP’s political opponents drew attention to the association 
between Labour and revolutionary socialism and the effect that their criticism had on the 
NZLP’s political objectives and programme.  The chapter will also examine the methods by 
which the NZLP rejected the programmes and objectives of the revolutionary socialists.  In 
contrast the NZLP developed its own programme of parliamentary socialism which would be 
achieved through the electoral process.   
NZLP and the CPNZ: The Struggle over Socialism 
In the early 1920’s there was a spectre haunting the New Zealand Labour Party.  That spectre 
was Bolshevism.  Subsequently, the NZLP became involved in a philosophical, organisational 
and programmatical conflict with that spectre and its New Zealand personification, the CPNZ 
(Communist Party of New Zealand).  The CPNZ was established in the aftermath of the 
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Bolsehvik Revolution in Russia from assorted New Zealand socialist groups.375  The CPNZ’s 
principal objectives were to establish similar revolutionary socialist political consciousness 
amongst workers and support for the new regime.376  The CPNZ was provided with political 
support and guidance from the Third Communist International, which was based in 
Moscow.377  While the International urged a rapprochement between the different parties 
which represented Labour, it also clearly spelt out that Moscow-aligned communist parties 
needed to be at the forefront of the socialist movement.378  
The alleged connection between the NZLP and the CPNZ was exploited by the NZLP’s political 
opponents and the Press.  They alleged that both groups supported the same socialist 
principles, and that both parties appealed to the same class of extremist revolutionary 
unionists and workers379.  In parliament and in the editorial pages of the nation’s Press, Labour 
Party MPs and NZLP leaders were assailed about previous sympathy they had expressed 
toward revolutionary socialism or, and more annoying to the NZLP leadership, about NZLP 
members who publicly supported the reforms and programmes of the Bolsheviks.   
Labour’s Red Programme 
Unsurprisingly, Labour’s opponents asserted that there was a commonality of programmes.  
Labour and the Bolshevik regime advocated, and in the case of the Bolsheviks practised, an 
extensive programme of nationalisation.  Labour proposed to nationalise the mines, shipping 
and essential economic services as well as to establish a state bank, to the exclusion of private 
banking interests.380  Labour’s land policy drew particular conservative attention.  The policy 
proposed that land ownership would gradually be transferred to the State.  The State would 
then lease it to individual farmers.  Land would be provided to farmers based on ‘occupancy 
and use’ which, according to the policy, would “.... secure to the farmer the full fruits of his 
labour and exertions”.381  The Party attempted to pass this off as a radical extension of the 
Liberal’s Lease-Hold policy, as Holland informed a rural audience in Putaruru;   
He [Holland] said that neither the Reform Party’s freehold nor yet the 
leasehold advocated by sections of the Liberal Party satisfied the 
Labour Party.  What the Labour Party desired and stood for was in 
reality a usehold.  Their [Labour’s] platform declared for a land tenure 
based on occupancy and use of the land designed to give the working 
farmer the full fruit of his labour and exertions. 382 
                                                          
375 O’Farrell, Harry Holland. Militant Socialist. pg.108.  These organisations were the New Zealand Marxian 
Association, which sought to encourage, as O’Farrell notes “a sympathetic attitude to the Russian revolution” 
and the Socialist Party.   
376 Powell, “The History of a Working Class Party 1918 - 40.” pg.5. 
377 Ibid. pg.5. Powell notes that at this point the CPNZ was an adjunct of the Australian Communist Party.  It was 
not a unified body and only became so that decade.  It was in 1928, when it became a separate party, that it 
officially affiliated to the Third International.   
378 Menshevik, “Labour Party,” Evening Post, March 5, 1924. pg.9 
379.New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 186. pg.218. 
380 “General Election. The Labour Party’s Programme,” Marlborough Express, September 3, 1919. pg. 7. 
381 “Land and Finance. Speech by Labour Leader,” Arunui Press, February 6, 1925. pg.np.  
382 “Labour’s Policy. Leader at Putaruru,” Putaruru Press, March 5, 1925. pg.np. 
80 
 
 
However, such explanations did not clarify the policy and left the suspicion that it promoted 
substantial land nationalisation like that practised within Russia.383   
In 1925, the Reform Party published election posters alleging that the NZLP was an agent of 
the Soviet Union. Underneath a crude drawing of a supposed Russian Revolutionary, the party 
asked voters to consider why Labour had supported a crippling strike in the United Kingdom 
which had harmed New Zealand exports.  Reform alleged that the reason that Labour 
supported such a strike was due to its commitment to Bolshevikism.  The poster announced 
that;  
[t]he fact has been disclosed that Communist agents, inspired by 
Russian hatred of Britain's opposition to the spread of Bolshevik 
influence, are seeking the ruin of the British Empire. The shipping 
strike is but one example of the insidious methods practiced.  
Bolshevik leaders in Russia are pulling the strings, and extremists in 
the Labour movement in Britain and elsewhere are their puppets.384 
Subsequently, Labour’s enemies were able to maintain a general unease amongst the public 
about the policy by exploiting its “revolutionary” aspects as well as the obvious ignorance of 
its mechanics, as expressed by NZLP members and candidates.385  Both of these factors were 
obvious during the 1925 Franklin by-election, which had been caused by Massey’s death.  Lee, 
who helped Labour’s candidate John Montgomerie during the campaign, remarked to Nash 
that the very mention of the policy chilled the audience “to a remarkable silence” at election 
meetings.386  He observed that the policy appeared to be a crude attempt to “immediately 
socialise all land values”.  It was, Lee asserted, a policy which desired to achieve “socialism in 
five minutes”.387  Its inclusion as a part of Labour’s platform, Lee concluded, had cost the Party 
the Franklin seat.388  
Lee’s comments indicate that he felt the real difficulty for the Labour Party was that it was 
committed to an extreme variant of socialism.  Consequently, it was easy for conservatives to 
attack the NZLP as being extremist and aligned with the Bolsheviks.  Certainly Reform and 
Liberal provocation focused on the similarities of the objectives of the parties and the threat 
that “extreme” Labour consequently presented to the electorate.  Such speeches formed a 
significant proportion of the various attacks against the Party in Parliament.  Repeated 
conservative allegations forced repeated Labour denials.  As Howard observed in Parliament, 
“I repeat our platform is not a Bolshevik platform – that is to say, there is hardly a plank in 
common, except they stand for socialism”.389 
The perceived threat of Labour’s socialism or bolshevism was used to attempt an 
amalgamation between the Reform and Liberal Parties in 1925, by the Independent MP, Harry 
Atmore.390  Atmore was a constant critic of the NZLP and referred to them on a number of 
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occasions as “marxist – socialists”.  On this occasion, he warned the Government and the 
Liberal Opposition that the danger of not uniting would be to place civilisation at risk.391  He 
warned Parliament that, “[c]ommunists and revolutionary [s]ocialists are issuing a world-wide 
challenge to civilization, and it is our duty to combine all our sane progressive elements to 
fight the menace in this country”.392 
Atmore claimed that electorally, the Labour Party had failed to convince workers to vote for 
it, both in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand.393  However, a “fusion” between Reform 
and Liberal was required due to the success that the “New Zealand Socialist group – which is 
called the Labour Party” - had in converting a number of workers to its position.394  Atmore 
cautioned that; 
There is a real danger – a very real danger – of ignorant men 
misleading others who are entitled to information on subjects which, 
owning to limitations of time and for other reasons, they have not the 
time to study.395 
Although Atmore’s claims were exaggerated and a number of them were also later proven to 
be incorrect, they did highlight two principal concerns that were shared by some Labour Party 
members.  These were that the electorate was conservative and that socialism was 
unpopular.  By the early 1920s, Labour was eager to expand on its electoral success of the 
1919 election.  This meant that the Party needed to appeal to conservative NZLP voters, who 
traditionally supported the Liberals and, to small business people and farmers.396  Neither of 
the two former groups were obvious supporters of socialism.397  Comparisons with the 
Bolsheviks were unhelpful in convincing either them or the wider electorate that Labour was 
an electorally safe option.   
Ideological Dances: Labour Distances itself from the Bolsheviks 
This rationale led to the NZLP attempting to distance itself ideologically and practically from 
the Bolsheviks and their affiliated parties.  The first method which was employed was to 
explain that the Bolshevik regime was a result of conditions specific to Russia.398  However, 
this did not quell disquiet about the NZLP’s motives as some of its senior members had 
previously expressed admiration for the Bolsheviks and their ways and means.399  It was 
additionally noted by the Party’s political opponents that the Party Executive had sent a note 
of condolence to the Soviet Union on the death of Lenin.400  Such an action appeared to 
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suggest that while the NZLP were opposed to the Soviet regime on certain issues, it was not 
on others and was indeed sympathetic to it.   
Another strategy was to publicly denounce both the Bolshevik regime and the local Bolshevik 
parties.  McCombs, in particular, was known to be publicly hostile to the Bolshevik regime and 
was greatly affronted by the NZLP’s decision to send condolences to the USSR on the death 
of Lenin.401  He subsequently engaged in a very public war of words with the NZLP General 
Secretary, Walter Nash, about the NZLP’s relationship with Bolshevism and the undemocratic 
policies of the Bolsheviks.402  This debate was much to Nash’s annoyance and probably chagrin 
as he, Nash, was not a Bolshevik supporter.403   
The third approach appears to have been to ignore the CPNZ and the Bolsheviks (at least 
publicly) and concentrate on the ability of the NZLP to develop and deliver practical policies 
which would benefit workers and their dependents.  Savage best exemplified this approach.  
During a parliamentary speech on the merits of the Public Trust office, which turned into a 
wider speech expressing admiration of public ownership, a Reform MP attempted to interrupt 
him to query Labour’s support for the Bolsheviks.404  In response, Savage simply observed that 
it was not his concern as to whether the Russians did the “right or wrong thing” in relation to 
the Revolution and that he and Labour were not going to be engaged in “a side issue” in 
relation to the “rights and wrongs” of the Soviet regime.405  He then continued to extoll the 
public ownership model.  This approach, which came to be employed more frequently by 
Labour MPs in the 1920s, emphasised the practical success of other Labour administrations 
in the United Kingdom and Australia in administering economic and social affairs rather than 
referring to ideological positions. 
The final approach was for the NZLP to recapture and reframe the socialist programme.  This 
approach was largely adopted by Holland and the Party Left.  It was also the official policy of 
the Party.  The basis of this approach was to assert that the Bolsheviks and the CPNZ had 
presented a biased analysis of socialism and that the NZLP needed to re-emphasise and 
explain its alternative socialist programme.  The NZLP could achieve this feat through better 
publicity and education.  The electorate would be gradually brought to socialism as a result.406  
Supporters of this approach noted the increasing Labour vote and its Parliamentary 
representation at each election as proof that Labour was succeeding in convincing the 
electorate of its overall socialist programme.407   
Labour: Creating Socialists 
A number of Labour parliamentarians and Party members appear to hold variants of these 
approaches to a greater or lesser degree at various times.  Some, like Edward (Ted) Howard, 
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appear to have endorsed two contradictory approaches.  This was to both pledge opposition 
to and support for the Bolsheviks.408  Regardless of individual concerns it was, nonetheless, 
the official policy of the NZLP to effect a socialist programme.  Certainly, Labour activists and 
members were as committed to the socialist ideal as their communist counterparts.  The 
NZLP’s foundation objective was, as Party members were very aware, the socialisation of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange.  Its programme was designed to implement 
that objective.  The problem remained how to explain the programme better to the electors 
and, in doing so, differentiate the NZLP’s socialist programme from that of the revolutionists, 
who also claimed socialism as their guiding ideology.  
An explanation of the Party’s socialist programme would be best achieved through public 
education.  This action would be undertaken by the NZLP at all levels.  As the Party President 
T Brindle reminded the NZPL Conference in 1923, the primary role of the Labour Party was to 
“make more Socialists”.  Brindle told conference delegates to; 
… enlist all those who desire to serve the world in our ranks, to rouse 
all those opposed to war in the knowledge that while Capitalism lasts, 
War is inevitable, to spread the Gospel of Service throughout the 
Dominion so that our children may develop their personalities to the 
full, our Mothers freed from the financial cares of the home; and that 
every man and woman desiring to work should be free from the 
Nightmare of unemployment.  The Future is ours – open to us to 
endow.409  
Subsequently, the Party engaged in a propaganda campaign to promote socialism and its 
agenda to the electorate.410  To coordinate this campaign, the Party decided to establish its 
National Office on a ‘solid basis’ under the General Secretary, Nash.411  A central component 
of the new NZLP office would be the creation of a Labour Research Department and the 
institution of a Bureau of Information and Statistics.  The establishment of these new units 
would ensure that;  
 … a constant stream of facts and statistics relating to national and 
international social, economic, industrial, financial and political 
conditions and situations will issue to Trades Unions and Federations, 
Trades and Labour Councils, Labour Representation Committees, 
Branches of the Labour Party, Parliamentary Labour Party, Labour 
Candidates for Parliament and Local Bodies.412 
This was a substantial undertaking on behalf of the Party and to help finance the new office, 
£1000 was required.  Subsequently, an Office Establishment Fund was formed and party 
members and supporters were urged to pledge £1 per week to ensure its maintenance.413  
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Revolutionary Constitutionalism : Labour as a Revolutionary Party  
Education was to be required to quell one of the most damning accusations levelled against 
the NZLP which was that it was an extremist revolutionary party.414  Labour attempted to 
defuse this argument by observing that it had at no point advocated violence or social unrest 
to achieve its objectives.  The Party’s position was that it had been created as a parliamentary 
party and that it was committed to the constitutional delivery of its policies.415 Consequently, 
the NZLP was, as Parry informed an incredulous parliament, the most constitutional and 
democratic in the country 416   
The Labour Party is the only party in New Zealand at the present time 
that stands for a real constitutional form of government.  We stand 
for a system of government that will give to ordinary people complete 
control over the parliamentary representatives of the country.417 
Additionally, the NZLP argued that the terms “extremist’ and “revolutionary” could symbolise 
non-violent, yet radical, reform which was designed to substantially change the nature and 
direction of a society.418  Holland ruminated on what that perspective meant when asked to 
define his revolutionary socialism as a consequence of a Court case brought against the New 
Zealand Worker by the Rev. Howard Elliott of the Protestant Political Association.419  
Subject to his own interpretation he [Holland] was prepared to carry 
the label of revolutionary Socialist.  But that did not mean that he was 
a physical force revolutionist.  Every great change in society 
constituted a revolution and the most revolutionary changes were 
those that came peaceably.  Indeed, the change in the thoughts of 
men were one of the most revolutionary factors.  He held that there 
was never a great material change that was not preceded by an 
intellectual revolution. 420 
In that context, the NZLP had no problems with the idea that its policies were revolutionary.  
Its radical economic, social and constitutional reform would provide the basis for the creation 
of a socialist society.421  As Holland remarked to the House, there had been other well-known 
radicals throughout history, whose extremist views had a beneficial effect on society.   
Would Christ ever have gone to the Cross if He had not been an 
extremist? Would the primitive Christians, especially during the first 
three centuries of Christian history, ever have been called upon to 
endure what they endured if they had not been extremists? Would 
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the Christians have made Christianity the power it eventually became 
if they had not been extremists?422 
Holland asserted that extremism was not necessarily bad if it resulted in a better society.  The 
NZLP, like Christianity, was committed to spreading its message to the wider population, 
converting them to socialism, as millions had been converted previously to Christianity.  This 
was revolutionary, in that it constituted changing the intellectual and philosophical basis of 
capitalist society.   
Conflict with the CPNZ 
The decision by the NZLP to continue to promote itself as a parliamentary socialist party was 
attacked by the CPNZ.  The Party had made it clear that it wanted to supplant the NZLP as the 
official party for labour and made it similarly clear that the NZLP and its leaders would be its 
principal target.  CPNZ speakers condemned NZLP representatives, ridiculing their speeches 
and informing their audiences that the NZLP was ignorant of socialism and its platform was 
merely humane capitalism.423  In a front page article for the Maoriland Worker, J A McDonald, 
who recruited for the CPNZ in Wellington, wrote about the recognised ability of Labour parties 
to betray the objectives of the workers.424  Referring, in particular, to the programmes and 
policies of the Australian and British Labour Parties he observed that labour parties; 
… took [their] stand on the side where [they] rightly belonged-the side 
of the ruling class. That they [Labour parties] will act differently in 
other countries to what they have done in Australia and England, no 
one with any degree of intelligence would suppose.425 
The CPNZ also dispensed literature promoting the success of the Soviet economic miracle.  
The distribution of material could be done through the publication of its own material and by 
having Party spokespeople tour the country giving lectures.  However, it substantially 
benefited the CPNZ when local or international Labour Party activists undertook to openly 
praise the Soviet regime as representing the pinnacle of practical socialism.  One such person 
was Tom Carter.426  He was the chairperson of the Auckland East branch of the NZLP and had 
travelled extensively in Australia, America, Europe and the Soviet Union.  Upon his return, the 
New Zealand Worker published his travel recollections.  In these recollections, Carter 
provided a fulsome report about the expansion of Soviet industry and the nature of Soviet 
society in the developing Soviet Union.427 
Such reports were provided with international credibility by people like the Fabian socialist 
and known British Labour Party supporter, George Bernard Shaw.  Shaw, who had previously 
been a critical supporter of the Bolshevik regime in the early 1920s,428 later became an 
enthusiastic adherent.  In the late 1920s, he visited the Soviet Union to ascertain their political 
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and societal development, 429 and when he returned to the United Kingdom, he wrote a widely 
published series of articles on his experiences in which he praised the economic and social 
progress of the USSR.430 
Reds in the Bed: CPNZ infiltration of the NZLP 
In addition, the CPNZ resorted to more indirect means to disperse its message.  Throughout 
the 1920s the CPNZ undertook entryism, in which a number of New Zealand communists 
attempted to indirectly infiltrate the NZLP or its affiliated bodies.  In 1924, six members of the 
Otago LRC were expelled from the Party because they were active communists.431  The six 
people in question made it easier for the NZLP to undertake expulsion by stating that their 
allegiance was to the Third International and the concept of violent revolution as a means of 
overthrowing capitalism.   The report to the Labour Party Executive stated that; 
[The] main objective of the six persons examined in being members of 
the Labour Party was to achieve the foregoing object 
(Communist/Soviet System) by converting the Labour Party to that 
point of view.432 
NZLP Conferences were also platforms for pledging support to the new Soviet state and its 
beliefs.  Some Party affiliates and branches had proposed a range of remits in favour of some 
aspect of Soviet socialism.  Some, like the remit which called for opposition to the Allied 
military incursion on the side of the whites and congratulated the newly established Soviet 
state regarding its “magnificent and successful effort” to withstand the “combined effort of 
imperialistic capitalism” were accepted by the Party.433  Others, such as a motion by the 
Hastings branch NZLP at the 1921 Annual Conference, asking that the NZLP affiliate to the 
Third International, were not so successful.  This particular motion was referred to the 1922 
Conference.  In the interim, the Conference was informed that;  
[The] National Executive [would be] instructed to watch further 
developments in connection with the International movement, obtain 
all available information of the various International Bureaux, and 
report to the annual conference of 1922.434  
There is no record of the issue having been discussed at the 1922 Conference.  However, at 
the 1923 Conference, it was announced as part of the President’s report that there were 
conferences between the different ‘Labour parties’ to create unity between them.435  It was 
also reported that the Western social democratic and labour parties established a ‘Labour 
and Socialist International’ (LSI).436  Such a body was designed to foster political relationships 
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between the different Western parties, perhaps as a western socialist response to the 
Comintern. 
It is perhaps of little wonder that members of the Labour Party hierarchy became increasingly 
hostile to the CPNZ and their sympathizers.  Prior to the 1922 Party conference, Savage 
confided to Nash that whenever he heard NZLP people refer to the “great democracy,” as the 
Soviet Union was known, he wanted to address them with a ”17-inch gun”.437  Additionally, 
when he heard of some of the “lunacies” that were being proposed by the more radical and 
communist inspired elements of the NZLP for the same Conference, he remarked that the 
Conference agenda committee needed to put “… fire to most of them”.438   
Labour denounces Bolshevism  
However, the NZLP appears to have been aware that neither the CPNZ nor other left groups 
could pose a serious electoral or philosophical threat to it.  Remits that might be perceived as 
communist or radically inspired and which advocated positions such as the “smashing of the 
machinery of the state”, were soundly defeated at the NZLP’s Annual Conference.439  
Additionally, CPNZ candidates were readily seen off by NZLP candidates at elections.440  CPNZ 
approaches to the NZLP made directly or indirectly were rebuffed.  Some senior NZLP 
members commented on the duplicity of the CPNZ position which was to assert that the party 
wanted a closer relationship with the NZLP, while at the same time undertaking actions 
designed to destabilise Labour.441  This was a point which Thorn took up in response to a 
published accusation from a CPNZ speaker about NZLP hostility towards the need to have a 
‘united front’ of labour.442   
Our only comment on this is that Mr. Thomson's efforts on the West 
Coast for a united front hardly appear to have pleased his comrades. 
Probably they think that to revile a man as a fraud and faker and then 
to express yearnings to act in unity with him is a bit over the odds. We 
entirely agree with them if they do.  (Ed.MW).443 
It was Savage’s Auckland Central branch that moved the remit which finally saw the CPNZ 
listed as a proscribed organisation by the NZLP at the 1926 Conference.444  Consequently, 
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members who held dual party membership or were perceived as being followers of the CPNZ, 
were expelled.445  
The NZLP also had an advantage over the CPNZ in terms of working class support.  Unlike the 
CPNZ, the NZLP had the recognised support of the trades union.  A significant number of 
unions politically and financially supported the NZLP and a number of unions were also 
directly affiliated to the Party.446  Consequently, CPNZ approaches to them or the infiltration 
of unions by the CPNZ tended to be rebuffed.447 While the New Zealand Workers Union might 
revel in its syndicalism and programmes of direct action, the other unions, especially those 
associated with the Trades and Labour Councils, tended to be moderate bodies.  They were 
satisfied with the programme of the Labour Party.  They perceived that the best way for any 
union programme to be achieved was through the election of a Labour Party, which promoted 
radical, yet practical reforms on behalf of workers.448   
While the attacks on the NZLP by the CPNZ and the syndicalists continued in the 1930s, the 
ability of the CPNZ to persuade workers dissipated.  The CPNZ was active in unemployed rights 
groups, which were established during the Depression, which they used to spread their 
message about the socialist programme of the USSR. This was to no great effect,449 however.  
Likewise, its activity in and around the NZLP similarly declined.  Whilst some NZLP members 
continued to express support for the Soviet Union, only nine people voted at the 1929 Labour 
Party conference in favour of lifting the proscription on the CPNZ and allowing direct 
communist affiliation.450   
The Modification of Socialisation 
The inclination of the Party to avoid the ideological entanglements of the Bolsheviks and the 
CPNZ had a practical effect on the NZLP’s platform.  Specifically, socialisation suffered as a 
consequence of the ideological realignment of the NZLP. By the mid-1920s, the Party opted 
for a practical approach in its programmes and message.  Despite the educative method 
pursued officially by the NZLP, there was increasing disquiet within the Party in relation to 
what was perceived as its more extremist socialist policies.  Anxiety about the appeal of 
Labour’s programme became more obvious in the latter years of the 1920s.  Labour suffered 
two electoral reversals in 1925 and 1928.  In the aftermath of those setbacks, there appears 
to have been an increasing desire to construct a programme that did not propose the 
application of socialism, but rather establish a more humane capitalistic society.  Thorn, who 
was the NZLP President, publicly called for an end to conventional socialist conventions at the 
Party’s 1930 Annual Conference.451  Thorn observed that the purpose of the Party was to; 
…create a new society in which the workers shall not be subordinated 
to the power of any selfish monopoly or vested interest.  The Labour 
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Party’s conception of industry is not that of a class possession 
operated primarily for individual enrichment but that of a social 
organisation which gives to the people security of useful employment, 
just remuneration and encouragement to serve the public interest.452 
In case there were any Labour Party socialists who were confused by what Thorn meant, he 
later clarified the Party’s new political commitment.  Thorn opined that people should not see 
capitalism as being in a state of collapse but as currently inadequate to fulfil their needs 
without radical reform.453  Or, as James McCombs had succinctly remarked several years 
earlier, prosperity could be achieved through a programme of “enlightened capitalism”.454  
What both men articulated was that the new objective of the NZLP should not be 
socialisation, but economic and social regulation.   
One of the first significant fatalities of the “enlightened capitalist” approach was the Party’s 
policy on land.  Concern about the effects of the land policy on the Party had never really 
abated.  Given that the policy apparently provided for the state having the first option of 
purchase on land, there was considerable truth in assertions made by Labour’s opponents 
that the land policy would lead to eventual state ownership of all private land.455  The Hutt 
LRC wrote to Nash suggesting that the Party simply be upfront about the matter and re-title 
the policy, ‘The Nationalisation of Land.’ In its letter the Committee noted that, “[t]his is 
undoubtedly our objective and all the clauses are in conformity with this.  I do not see why it 
should not be put in”.456 
Consequently, there appeared to be two options for the party.  It could retain the existing 
policy and convince people, through education, that it was the correct approach.  
Alternatively, the NZLP could formulate a new policy which would accept private ownership 
of land and not alienate potential electors.   
The latter proposal was the favoured option of the majority of the Party’s parliamentarians 
who raised the issue in caucus.457  After a lengthy discussion, it was moved by Savage and 
seconded by Fraser that a subcommittee consisting of Savage, Lee, Fraser, McCombs and 
Langstone be established to ‘furnish a report dealing with the land question.’458  There was 
little doubt that the subcommittee was going to recommend significant changes to the policy 
and it did.  Accordingly, the changes recommended by the subcommittee were accepted by 
the caucus and then by the Party.459 The new policy was simpler to understand.  Further, it 
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accepted the concept of private ownership of land.460  This was in line with the Party’s more 
moderate appeal to small farmers and homeowners. 
Equally, the retreat from socialisation by the NZLP continued in the economic sphere.  When 
the western world was overtaken by Depression in the early 1930s, the Comintern and its 
CPNZ representatives emphasised the positive economic and social development of the 
Soviet Union as a consequence of the 5 year plans and its abandonment of capitalist 
economics.461  In contrast, Labour had started to develop a series of programmes to deal with 
economic and social distress, which sought to modify aspects of capitalism.  Whereas, the 
CPNZ emphasised the creation of a “worker’s state” through public or state ownership of 
services and industry, Labour’s emphasis, particularly in the mid to late 1920s, was less on 
nationalisation and more on the regulation of capitalism and the extension of social provision.   
These changes of philosophical direction saw the alienation of the NZLP’s socialist 
parliamentarians, like Holland.  O’Farrell observes that in the latter 1920s and early 1930s, 
Holland had become increasingly isolated from the Labour caucus and his views were seen as 
anachronistic by his fellow parliamentarians and by the electorate.462  In comparison, 
parliamentarians such as Savage, who were now seen as more amenable by their colleagues 
and, importantly, by the wider voting public, came to prominence.463  Whereas Holland was 
described as stern and unbending, Savage was regarded as a congenial NZLP moderate, whose 
arbitration and intervention had helped resolve a number of disputes within the Party.464 
Yet, despite the unease that some members of the Party might increasingly express about the 
socialisation objective, there was no attempt to remove it from the party’s platform.  When 
the NZLP was elected to Government in 1935 the objective of the “socialisation of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange” remained.465  However, the party ensured that the 
application of the objective was altered through the policies contained in the programme 
where it was not mentioned.  
Conclusion: Alternative Socialist Reality 
In Lewis Carroll’s novel, Through the Looking Glass, Alice steps through the mirror into an 
alternative reality where a number of things appear the same but are opposite.  Certainly, 
that is how Labour’s opponents depicted the relationship between the Bolshevist CPNZ and 
the democratic socialist NZLP.  They suggested that while the NZLP might appear moderate, 
the hidden reality was that it was violently revolutionary and undemocratic.   
Such ideological and programmatic comparisons with the Bolsheviks and the CPNZ were 
completely overstated.  The New Zealand Labour Party was not a revolutionary party in the 
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sense that it advocated the violent overthrow of the State.  At no time was such an objective 
part of the Party’s programme.  It was, like a number of its social democratic counterparts, a 
constitutional party which endorsed the electoral road to socialism.  As we will see in later 
chapters, this did not mean that the NZLP forswore a ‘revolution.’  Instead it postulated that 
revolutions took many forms.  The bolsheviks, the syndicalists and the radical Left talked 
about the workers revolution, brought about by a force of arms.  But, the leadership of the 
NZLP spoke about the need for a “revolution” of ideas and practices.   
The NZLP’s ‘revolution’ would be achieved through Parliament.  Subsequently, the NZLP 
required increased parliamentary representation.  Such increased representation could not 
occur if the Party did not appeal to moderate electors.  The outcome was that the Party spent 
considerable time and effort ideologically and programmatically re-orientating itself in the 
1920s.  Gone were Holland’s references to the NZLP being the standard bearer of the socialist 
objective of the labour movement.466  In their place were more studied liberal objectives 
emphasising classlessness and practical planning.   
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Chapter Seven: The Constitutional Road to Socialism: 
Electoral Reform and the NZLP 
Introduction: 
Having rejected the revolutionary socialist ethos of the Bolsheviks, the Labour Party needed 
to develop how its socialist programme could be achieved through the ballot box. Historically, 
socialists and liberals of the British tradition had called for reform of working conditions and 
standards of living through the parliamentary process. Aside from the industrial turmoil of 
the period 1910 – 1913, the majority of New Zealand’s socialists had been advocates of the 
parliamentary process to achieve their goals.  The constitutional platform of the Party was an 
important component of its socialisation objective.  Socialism, the NZLP inferred, not only 
required the socialisation of the economic and social spheres, but also the socialisation of the 
constitutional and electoral sphere.  It was not simply enough that people voted every three 
years for a new Parliament; electoral participation needed to be both on-going and inclusive.  
Only if the people could freely participate regardless of their obligations of class and gender 
at a municipal and parliamentary level could New Zealand experience genuine democracy.   
While the Party’s economic programmes have been lauded, the NZLP’s parliamentary socialist 
programme required the socialisation of the constitutional and electoral sphere.  This chapter 
will examine how Labour used electoral and constitutional reform to pursue its vision of the 
parliamentary road to socialism.  The Party believed that electoral participation needed to be 
inclusive, participatory and representative.  This chapter also will examine the four most 
notable of the Party’s constitutional planks by which it would achieve these ideals - the Recall, 
the Initiative, the Referenda and Proportional Representation (PR).  It will examine what 
success it had in achieving these policies, whether the reforms were as socialist as the Party 
suggested, and what effect the success or failure of these policies had on the NZLP’s overall 
socialist programme and objective. 
Electoral Reform and Popular Democracy 
One of the principal demands of the early socialists was the right of participation.  Demands 
for electoral and Parliamentary reform had a significant history within the progressive and 
socialist movement.  The election of annual parliaments, universal suffrage and popular 
representation had been advocated by the English Chartists in the 1840s.467  Although the 
Chartists were unsuccessful in achieving the immediate demands of the People’s Charter, 
their platform continued to thrive in later socialist and labour organisations who continued 
to endorse and promote their demands.468   
By the early twentieth century, a number of these demands had been met.  Also, Socialism 
had undergone a transformation from a largely middle-class ideology which emphasized 
social justice to a more revolutionary belief which encapsulated working class ideals and 
principles.  The socialist demand for participation changed from simply campaigning for an 
extension of the electoral franchise to issues of participation and control.  It was not enough 
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that workers gained votes and representation in Parliament, which remained paramount; also 
needed were changes to the control that they could exercise within society.  
As opposed to the United Kingdom, where parliamentary democracy and the electoral 
franchise still faced an arduous struggle for the first two decades of the new century, New 
Zealand male and female workers could vote and Labour was represented in Parliament 
through independent representatives.  Despite the supposed democratic nature of New 
Zealand’s Parliamentary and electoral system, the NZLP asserted that it was, in reality, class 
based and elitist.  The elite, the NZLP charged, was sustained by an unresponsive and 
undemocratic electoral system which allowed its members to be elected to Parliament, where 
upon they would implement policies which reflected their own narrow class-based capitalist 
programme.469  Whether the MPs were Tory or Liberal was of no significance as they 
represented the same class.  Holland put forward this opinion more bluntly in his maiden 
speech in the House in 1918;   
What is wrong with the men on Government benches to-day is not 
that they are worse than other men – they are bad enough, the Lord 
knows – but that they represent powerful class interests, which class 
interests are always in conflict with the interests of the community, 
with the interests of the men and women who render social justice.470 
Labour stated that the actual differences between the two parties were trivial.  Despite the 
contrary allegations of MPs, business leaders and the press, Parliament and the electoral 
system which supported it were undemocratic.471  In a parliamentary debate on the nature of 
Parliament and government in New Zealand, Holland went so far as to exclaim that;  
It is utmost nonsense to refer to our system of government in New 
Zealand as a democratic system.  So long as we have a handful of non-
representatives holding the power of veto over all the acts of the 
people’s representatives, you cannot have a democratic government.  
And, when the day comes that the people themselves hold the veto – 
when no one else, either inside or outside New Zealand, can veto the 
popular will – on that day you will have democratic rule.472  
Labour’s Platform of Electoral Democratisation 
Labour’s solution was the transformation of the system through the implementation of 
substantial constitutional and electoral reform.  Such reform would increase electoral 
participation and nullify the class basis of parliamentary representation.  As to how this could 
be achieved, the NZLP advocated a number of proposals in its Constitutional and Electoral 
Platform.  The Party called for women’s representation in Parliament and on the Legislative 
Council, the extension of political rights for civil servants, the compulsory registration of 
voters and, the abolition of the Legislative Council.473  The principal demands of the party’s 
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constitutional platform were the policies of Electoral Recall, the Initiative, the Referenda and 
the application of Proportional Representation.474   
Electoral Recall would ensure that MPs remained obligated to pursue their platform after they 
were elected.  An MP could be recalled by their electorate if they were perceived as breaching 
their manifesto or promises.  A recall election was to be instigated by a percentage of eligible 
voters in a given electorate.  If an MP was successfully recalled, then a new election would be 
held.475  The Initiative would allow voters to initiate, amend or even remove Acts of 
Parliament,476 while Referenda ensured that popular opinion could be sampled on various 
issues.477   
The other critical component of the NZLP’s reform of the electoral system was the 
implementation of Proportional Representation.  The NZLP criticised the Plural (First Past the 
Post) Electoral System and, its various components like the Country Quota - which provided 
overrepresentation to rural electorates - as being unrepresentative and undemocratic.478  In 
arguments which were to be repeated in the early 1990s, the supporters of Proportional 
Representation argued that the current system of plural voting discriminated against a 
growing minority of voters and was unfairly weighted in favour of the older, larger, parties.479  
The NZLP was keenly aware that the increasing use of a Proportional Representation voting 
system among European nations had led to significant numbers of Social Democrats being 
elected.480  The unfairness of the outcome and the unrepresentative nature of the New 
Zealand system were particularly evident when New Zealand election results were compared 
to the results of countries in Europe or various Australian states, which had systems of 
Proportional Representation.481   
In terms of transforming the basis of parliamentary sovereignty and control, the most radical 
components of the NZLP’s electoral reform platform were the Recall, Initiative and 
Referendum proposals.  While the importance of Proportional Representation is not to be 
understated, it merely sought to change the means by which Parliamentary representatives 
were elected.  The Recall, Initiative and the Referendum, by contrast, were actively 
acknowledged by the Party and its opponents as policies which were designed to substantially 
increase the sovereign power of the electors.482   
Leading NZLP members, Party candidates and MPs attended NZLP and public meetings to 
discuss or enlighten Party members and voters on the benefits of the three proposals of direct 
legislation.483  The use and success of the platforms in ensuring even minute popular 
participation or reform were reported on by Labour members and by those papers supportive 
of the Party.  The Maoriland Worker, for example, reported that the threat of Recall had been 
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successfully used on a School Board in the United States to pursue issues of school 
maintenance.484  In 1917, the demand for democratic reform had some Labour supporters 
urging the Party to go further than electoral politics and adopt the Recall for senior public 
figures such as Judges and other senior civil servants.485 
The Recall, Initiative and Referenda – Self Government by the People 
In 1918 and, again, in 1919 McCombs introduced the “Popular Initiative and Referenda Bill” 
to Parliament on behalf of the NZLP.  It was essentially an amalgamation of both the Initiative 
and Referendum planks of Labour’s platform.486  The Bill’s name aptly described its intentions 
as its purpose was to allow voters to propose referendum ballots and additionally initiate, 
amend or repeal Acts of Parliament.487  Introducing the 1919 version of the Bill, McCombs 
asserted the popular self-government purpose motive strongly, informing the House that; 
The object of the Bill is to secure for the people of New Zealand a 
larger measure of self-government than they at present possess.  It is 
supposed that we are a free self-governing people, but an 
examination of the New Zealand Constitution, especially an 
examination of parliamentary practice, will show that we are a long 
way off being a self-governing people.488 
The argument was repeated by Holland who observed during the same parliamentary debate 
that;  
If there should be any power of veto – and there should be – over the 
Acts of this Parliament, this power should be exercised not by any non-
representative body but by the people themselves.... if you deny the 
people the right to exercise the power of veto, you have got to assume 
that the people are hopelessly and irretrievably ignorant – that they 
cannot possibly be educated up to the position where they will be able 
to comprehend their own policies and to exercise a control of the 
affairs of the country.  They can and they will....489  
It might be supposed that such proposed legalisation, which usurped conventional 
parliamentary sovereignty, would be opposed by its political opponents.  However, the Bill 
was mostly accepted by the House with little adverse comment from either the Tory or Liberal 
Parties. Downie Stewart, the Reform Party Minister of Finance, noted that arguments 
presented by the Bill were recognised as being valid “all over the world.”490  While the more 
radical and philosophical Liberals cordially welcomed the proposals.  The Liberal MP and 
former Cabinet Minister, Sir James Findlay, was warmly supportive of the proposed 
legislation.   
Sir, if we are sincere in our belief that the people should rule, the 
logical thing is to accept the initiative and referendum.  Either we 
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mean what we say or we do not.  If we mean that the people should 
be supreme and control their affairs, the means for the people to 
express their opinion should be adopted by every true democrat …. 
Nearly every thoughtful writer upon the matter … regards the popular 
initiative and referendum as essential in every truly developed 
democracy.491 
Downie Stewart and Findlay were not alone in their warm appraisals.  The radical and former 
Liberal MP George Fowlds had expressed similar opinions in the Maoriland Worker.  In an 
article titled ‘Direct Legislation,’ published in the October 24 1917 edition of the Worker, 
Fowlds asserted that the Recall, Initiative and Referendum options provided an addition to 
Parliamentary procedure by enabling voters to, “…more directly control the acts of their 
legislators and to secure legislation which Parliament either refuses to enact or has not the 
time to do so”.492  After discussing the pros and cons of the topic, Fowlds, like Findlay, 
concluded approvingly that the implementation of the three platforms would facilitate the 
realisation of the famous passage of Abraham Lincoln of Government “for the people, by the 
people”.493  
Further, as noted by Fowlds, these proposals were already in place in countries such as 
Switzerland and the United States of America.   
Switzerland has had "direct legislation" for over fifty years, and 
Viscount Bryce, late Ambassador to the United States, declared at 
Cambridge that, Switzerland is the most successful democracy that 
the world has ever seen… [i]n the United States a total of 21 States 
have adopted constitutional amendments which grant these 
powers…494  
Fowlds noted the success of the direct legislation of Initiative and Referendum in achieving 
voter participation in Oregon and California.  Voters had deliberated and voted on over 50 
questions in Oregon and 48 in California. In the California situation, over 27 questions had 
been referred to a Referendum by the State legislature while another 21 had been initiated 
by voters.495 Additionally, and of more interest to Labour, were the other effects, of the 
legislation, according to Fowlds, in ensuring the practices of monopoly capitalism were 
confronted and contained.496  
The Preferential Voting Bill: A Modified Response 
Despite the democratic declarations by members of the House, however, the Popular 
Initiative and Referenda Bill never passed.  Subsequently, in 1927, 1928 and 1929, the NZLP 
put forward another Bill, titled the “Preferential Voting Bill.”  The new Bill did not seek radical 
reform but instead it sought to introduce preferential voting in relation to existing 
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referenda.497  As McCombs noted in his speech regarding the second Reading of the Bill to the 
House in 1927; 
The Bill now before the House has nothing to do with the election of 
members to Parliament.  It is to be applied to issues submitted by 
means of a referendum to the people where there are more than two 
issues on the ballot paper, and the method of determining a matter is 
to be by the means of preferential voting.498  
McCombs noted that the purpose the Bill would provide the ‘machinery’ wherever and 
whenever a referendum was taken with more than two issues on the ballot paper. 499  It was 
not particularly radical when compared to the Popular Initiative and Referenda Bill.  Its 
radicalism was further curbed when McCombs revealed that the suggested electoral 
mechanism proposed within the Bill had been adopted from an earlier Bill that had been 
introduced by Massey in 1923.500   
Although, the Preferential Voting Bill retreated from the previous position of allowing people 
to initiate legislation and conduct referendum, it did allow for a means by which people could 
allocate their votes in a referendum ballot so as to provide a majority in the situation where 
there were different balloting options available.  The most obvious and ready example Labour 
had of such a ballot was the three yearly liquor licencing referenda which were conducted 
alongside the voting for General Elections.  Labour’s MPs argued that people who supported 
one option might also support another option but, were unable to vote for it.501  Fraser 
explained to a sceptical House how the Bill might improve democratic representation in this 
situation; 
Now it is quite clear that the present method, with three issues on the 
ballot–paper and the necessity to obtain a majority over two of these 
issues in order to change the state of affairs is quite undemocratic, 
because those who vote in favour of State control have no method of 
expressing their opinion whether they are in favour of continuance or 
of prohibition as a second preference…the two issue ballot paper 
disenfranchises them.502  
Interestingly, the conservative response to the bill was again extremely muted.503  Reform 
Party MPs offered little debate in the House and confined themselves to voting against it.504  
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A similar response occurred in later sessions, with Parliament rejecting modified versions of 
the Bill again in 1928 and 1929. 505 
Proportional Representation: Improving the Democratic Condition of the People 
The area where Labour did have some success was with Proportional Representation. 
McCombs had managed to impose a system of PR in the Legislative council in 1914 and 
although it was never introduced at a national level, it was successfully introduced by Labour 
representatives at a municipal level for some local body elections.506 Proportional 
Representation was important to Labour for two principal reasons.  The first was the 
democratic aspect of PR.  As it was mentioned previously, the establishment of a PR system 
would ensure that overall parliamentary representation would be substantially increased.  
Such an increase would increase the political representation of the general population 
ensuring a democratic system and a more representative and democratic parliament.  As 
McCombs responded to a member of the Christchurch public who queried him about the 
objectives and need for PR; 
Briefly, proportional representation aims to secure the representation 
of all the electors in the deliberative assembly. The majority secures a 
majority of the representatives and the majority "rules." The minority 
has no right to rule but is entitled to a voice on all questions affecting 
the commonweal. It is entirely in the interests of good government 
that the majority party should have to listen to the full voice of the 
people before coming to any decision. While proportional 
representation does not give all the representation to the majority, it 
is the only system which ensures that the majority gets the 
representation it is entitled to, and therefore is the only system which 
ensures majority rule. With the majority only represented, the best 
we can hope to get is, as John Stuart Mill says, rule by a "majority of a 
majority," which often means minority rule507 
The NZLP argued that the lack of a proportional system not only weakened democratic 
participation. It additionally weakened the ability of the party as the official representative of 
political Labour to advocate on behalf of workers.508 Labour had very quickly recognised the 
importance of a Proportional System in securing its own political potency.  Starting in 1919, 
and then continuing at those various conferences following a General Election, Party 
delegates were informed that the Parliamentary representation of the NZLP would be 
significantly increased under a system of PR.   
The 1919 election proved to be an apt example of the unfairness within the electoral system.  
Prior to the dissolution of the Parliament for the 1919 General Election, the Grey River Argus 
lists the Liberals as having thirty one MPs in Parliament while the NZLP had eight MPs.509  In 
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the election, the aggregate Liberal vote fell by 14%, while the vote for the NZLP improved 
from 8% in 1914 to 23% in 1919.510  Yet, despite Labour significantly increasing its overall 
percentage of the vote, the outcome of the final election results provided the Liberals with 
twenty MPs to the NZLP’s eight.511.  Savage, reporting back to the 1920 Labour Party 
conference on behalf of the NZLP Executive, remarked that;  
The General Election of 1919 was the first occasion in which the forces 
of organised Labour entered the electoral contests as a unified party.  
The number of Labor candidates duly selected and endorsed, who 
went, to the poll, was 46. Although only eight of these were returned, 
the margin of vote by which many of the others were defeated was 
very small, and on the whole the results were satisfactory.  The votes 
actually cast for Labor throughout the Dominion amounted in round 
figures to 53,000.  In 1919, they totalled 123,000, an increase of nearly 
150 percent.  If proportional representation had been in operation, 
Labor would have had nineteen members returned to the House of 
Representatives instead of eight.  The Liberals would have had twenty 
four instead of nineteen, the Reform Party would have had twenty 
seven instead of forty four and the number of Independents would be 
as at present.512   
The Secretary of the British Proportional Representation Society, John Humphreys, also 
commented on the iniquitousness of the New Zealand electoral system in the Maoriland 
Worker.  Humphrey’s particularly noted the differences in voting outcomes in New Zealand 
and New South Wales remarking that the “… general fairness with which Proportional 
Representation worked in New South Wales may be judged from the following table showing 
the result for the three greatest parties”.  
 
NEW SOUTH WALES—Election, 1920 
    Votes   Seats   Votes per  
Party   Polled   Won   Seats   
Official Labor  241,345  42   5,748  
Nationalist  154,176  28   5,863  
Progressive  82,185  15   5,479  
 
Electors in New Zealand, Humphrey said, “…may like to compare those results 
with those of their own last General Election, which were approximately as 
follows;” 
NEW ZEALAND—Election, 1919 
Votes   Seats   Votes per  
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Party   Polled   Won   Seat  
Reform   194,833  44   4,428  
Liberal   164,096  19   8636 
Official Labor  125,970  8   15,740513  
 
Summarising the different results, Humphreys observed that the figures were “ very 
striking”.  Humphrey’s concluded that the voting figures demonstrated that in New Zealand, 
“… each supporter of the Reform Party has as much weight in Parliament as two Liberals or 
four members of the Labor Party”.514 
A similar electoral outcome occurred for Labour in the aftermath of the 1922 General Election 
and, then again for the Party in 1925. It is arguable that the result of the 1925 election was 
worse for the Party as Labour lost MPs despite its percentage of the vote increasing.515  The 
only bright spot for parliamentary Labour was that it finally surpassed the Liberals in terms of 
parliamentary representation in 1926 and became the official Opposition. 
The Unthinkable Alliance: The Aborted 1922 Electoral Pact 
The introduction of PR was an issue where Labour did receive support from Liberal MPs and 
the Liberal Party.  The Lib-Lab MP, Veitch was also a supporter of PR and, like McCombs, had 
moved various bills supporting its introduction since his election in 1911.  While Veitch’s bills 
enjoyed both NZLP and Liberal support, similar to the NZLP’s bills, they either lapsed or were 
defeated.  Yet, there was a brief moment in 1922 in which the implementation of PR appeared 
to be a viable possibility.  Prior to that year’s General Election there were attempts to broker 
an electoral agreement between the Labour and Liberal Parties which would have resulted in 
the introduction of PR for national elections.516  However, the deal was to flounder on the 
rocks of political discord and suspicion.   
Apparently, members of the Proportional Representation League (PRL) had contacted Holland 
with a proposal. This proposal involved endorsing and electing those candidates who 
supported the introduction of proportional representation to Parliament.517  In a statement 
to the House of Representatives on the issue, Holland said that the League’s representatives 
had suggested that such an arrangement;  
...should provide that at the next election the Party whose candidates 
either won out or ran second to Reform last election, should be left to 
make the fight in the constituencies affected, without official 
opposition from the other Party, and in the event of the defeat of the 
present Government, the Party with the greater number of elected 
members to assume office, put through proportional representation, 
supply, etc., with the support of the Party on the cross-benches, and 
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immediately after call a fresh election for the purpose of securing a 
majority Government.518 
The NZLP’s General Secretary, Moses Ayrton, and the editor of the Maoriland Worker, James 
Thorn, were also contacted by people with a similar proposal.  However, the people who 
contacted them did not claim to be representatives of the League.519  Rather, they claimed to 
represent the Liberal Party and its leader, Thomas Wilford.  Both Ayrton and Thorn were 
informed that the Liberals were willing to enter into an electoral agreement with the Labour 
Party on the basis of the proposals suggested by the League.520   
That the NZLP seriously considered the proposal is evident, as remits proposing an electoral 
alliance between the Labour and Liberal Parties for the upcoming General Election were set 
down to be discussed at the NZLP Annual Conference.521  However, prior to the Conference, 
the Party’s National Executive discussed the proposal and decided against it.  After some 
discussion, the Conference did too.522   
It appears that what changed Labour’s mind over the issue was Wilford deciding that the 
Liberals would not resign and call new elections after a Liberal-led Government had 
implemented proportional representation.  Rather, it would carry on for the remainder of the 
parliamentary term, with him as Prime Minister.  To the Labour Party, this suggested Liberal 
duplicity, particularly when Liberal MP’s were, at the same moment, publicly stating that the 
Party would not become Government if it had to rely on the support of the NZLP.523  As the 
Party’s retiring President, Frederick Cooke, caustically observed as part of his Address to the 
Conference, such deceit was typical of Labour’s relationship with the Liberal Party.  
There is a slight attempt by some of our members to bring about an 
understanding or an alliance with the Liberal Party for the purpose of 
getting a Proportional Representation Bill through the House of 
Parliament, and then have another election. But an understanding or 
an alliance with the Liberal Party is unthinkable. There was such an 
understanding in 1914, when Labor votes went to Liberal candidates 
with an understanding that several reforms, Proportional 
Representation being one of them, should be placed on the statute 
book. The 1914 election resulted in a Reform Party being returned 
with a majority of one vote, but had the Liberal Party been in earnest, 
and had they been true to their promise to Labour, several measures 
could have been put on the statute book. Proportional Representation 
would have been law now, but for the betrayal of Labor by the 
Liberals, who coquetted with the Reform Party and then became part 
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of them, the bargain being the spoils of office, not the progress that 
Labor is trying to win.524 
The aborted 1922 Electoral Alliance was the last attempt to forge a political or electoral 
relationship between either party.  It was also the last time that a serious attempt was made 
to implement a PR system in New Zealand until the late 1980s.  
A Problematic Solution: Christchurch Adopts PR 
There had been some success in introducing Proportional Representation at a municipal level, 
particularly in Christchurch.  However, the introduction and overall effect of PR in that city 
proved to be problematic for the Labour Party.  Firstly, there was no political consensus 
around PR and, its continued existence proved to be dependent upon which Party controlled 
the Council chamber.  McCombs had managed to get the Christchurch City Council to adopt 
PR in 1916, with the result that the Labour increased its numbers on the Council.525  A 
conservative win in municipal elections in 1923 saw the Council abolish PR and return to plural 
voting the same year.526 However, a Labour majority on the Council in 1927 overturned that 
decision and reintroduced the system.  In 1929, a PR election returned a left majority on 
Council, comprising of a coalition of Labour and Independent Labour Councillors.527   
Secondly, the outcome for Labour under PR was questionable.  The results of the 1929 
municipal elections were not decisive for either the NZLP or the left.528  As the Party was 
forced to admit in the aftermath of the elections, PR had cost Labour council seats.529   
That Labour would lose some seats under proportional representation 
was anticipated.  At the time of writing, the final result had not been 
published, but the latest news is that Labour has a chance of winning 
eight of the sixteen council seats, which with the Mayor will give it a 
majority.530 
The Party attempted to put a positive perspective on the results.  The New Zealand Worker 
informed its readers that despite the record poll in Christchurch, some twenty thousand 
people had not voted.531  Christchurch’s Labour Mayor, J K Archer, told the Worker that Labour 
had survived despite the most “fierce” assault upon it and him personally.532  Further, this 
attack had generated a wave of sympathy for the Party which had “staggered and 
dumbfounded” its opponents.533  However, the opponents of PR within the Party were not 
concerned with those issues.  Their principal concern was that PR had cost Labour an absolute 
majority at a Council level.  If these results were replicated at a national level, it would stymie 
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a majority Labour Government. This was a moot point and was to be used in future debates 
regarding PR within the Party.   
Hesitancy and Opposition to Reform 
Despite the apparent warmth of some of the Liberals, Labour’s constitutional bills lacked 
substantive parliamentary support.  The Reform Government was opposed to electoral 
reform and, even during the 1922 to 1925 parliamentary term, when the Government 
retained a narrow majority in Parliament, it could rely on the support of Independent MPs to 
oppose contentious or hostile legalisation.  As far as Labour was concerned, such opposition 
was to be expected due to the Reform Party and its business allies directly benefiting 
economically and politically from the system which was in place.534   
Liberal support was more tenuous and tepid.  While the Liberals did indicate some political 
support, especially on the part of more philosophical MPs regarding Labour’s constitutional 
measures, this encouragement did not generally manifest itself in terms of actual voting 
support in the House.  This was a point on which Labour MPs and the Party publicly 
commented.  In an article listing the parliamentary transgressions of the Liberals, Holland 
observed in relation to their support on PR (and most other issues) that Liberal Party MPs 
were consistently split. 535  It was particularly noted that Labour amendments supporting PR 
had been defeated by such actions, whereas they could have been passed if the Liberals had 
voted uniformly.536  
Other criticism of Labour’s platform came not from the Liberals or the Reform Party but, from 
the independent Labour MP, John Payne.  During the 1919 debate over the Popular Initiative 
and Referendum Bill, Payne opined that the NZLP would be better off constructing practical 
programmes for working class voters rather than engaging in “political dreams”.537  Payne was 
opposed to Proportional Representation.538  Payne criticised both Veitch and Labour, claiming 
that PR not only allowed for unrepresentative Government by a minority of voters but, that 
it would programmatically prohibit a future Labour government from achieving labour 
goals.539  Payne stated that Labour should use the current Plural system regardless of how 
unjust and unrepresentative it might be. 
I say to the Labour Party from my place in this House, drop your ideals 
for fairness and justice in elections and strive for practical ends, and 
thus be able to carry out the Labour platform, the real bread and 
butter platform for workers.540 
Payne also expressed concern that such legislation could be used against Labour by the Tories 
and the Liberals for their own ends.541  Although Holland and the PLP discounted such a 
concern by claiming that voters would see through conservative manipulation of the electoral 
and referendum process, it was consistent with evidence that perhaps voters were not as 
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enlightened as the NZLP appeared to think that they were.  The conservative nature of the 
electorate, particularly in relation to referenda, was additionally commented on by both 
Findlay and Downie-Stewart in their speeches and formed part of their responses to Payne.542  
As Findlay observed regarding the outcome of referenda; 
In Mr Hobson’s book The crisis of Liberalism, he outlines the popular 
initiative and referendum.  He shows first how erroneous it is to be 
afraid of the referendum and the popular initiative because they 
might lead to a too rapid and dangerous progress.  The results of the 
referendum in Switerland showed that the system was distinctly 
conservative; so that it is not true to say that the referendum and 
initiative lie in revolutionary or ultra-progressive directions.543 
Additional evidence of the conservative nature of the electorate or how it could be prone to 
political persuasion was provided with the outcome of a referendum in Queensland.  It was 
the policy of the Queensland Labor Party to abolish the Upper House and when it was elected 
to state government in 1915, it decided to do just that.544  In the resulting referendum 
campaign the press, business interests and the Party’s political opponents came out against 
the policy.  Their intervention in the referendum proved to be effective as they mobilised 
public opinion to reject Labor’s proposal.545  Nonetheless, the Government proceeded with 
its plan and abolished the chamber.  The Party justified its decision to do so on the basis that 
it had been elected to office with the abolition policy as a central part of its platform.546 
The Left Response and the Fallacy of a Socialist Electoral Revolution 
There was also criticism of Labour’s constitutional and electoral platform from the political 
left. Although, Labour was adamant that its electoral programme was in keeping with a 
socialist platform, this claim was contested by left revolutionists.  The communists and the 
syndicalists denounced Labour’s commitment to parliamentarism as merely maintaining the 
capitalist status quo.  In one editorial titled, “Industrial Democracy,” the syndicalist editor of 
the Maoriland Worker, Kraig, described Western democracy and its various systems as 
perpetuating the ‘existing economic system by removing some of its worse features.’547  
Referring to the system of democratic representation, Kraig observed that under the capitalist 
system, it was; 
…also the intention of their authors (capital) to prolong the existence 
of the present forms of Government, which have become incapable 
of meeting the demands of the present age.  Parliaments as they 
flourish today have their roots in form that existed in feudal days, on 
which have been grafted those of capitalist ‘democracy,’ which gives 
the power of the selection of members to the people, but leaves the 
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real powers of society – the economic power - in the hands of the 
capitalist class.548 
Parliaments, Kraig said, were the “creatures of the ruling classes, whose interests they serve, 
and who use them to main supremacy.”549  
The British political author and communist, Henry Brailsfrd, posed similar arguments in an 
interview published by the Maoriland Worker on 24 March 1920.550  Brailsford compared 
parliamentarism with the Soviet system and found parliament and electoral systems as 
lacking accountability and the ability to challenge the economic power structure of capital.551 
The Soviet system additionally removed the political alienation which workers experienced 
within parliamentarism.  It provided workers with direct participation and control at a 
national level and workplace level.   
[The] Soviet, unlike Parliament, had direct relations with the 
instruments of production.  Besides relieving the orthodox chamber 
of jobs it could not do, it would stimulate the worker, whose own 
freedom depended on the functioning of the machine he created.552    
As the communists observed, European and western nations were not the only nations which 
had radical electoral systems.  The newly created Soviet Union had the initiative and the 
recall.  They were integral clauses within the new Soviet constitution.553   
The communists and the syndicalists were adamant that only direct workers’ control would 
ensure real worker democracy.  Such a situation was in total opposition to the bourgeois 
concepts of universal suffrage, electoral reform and Parliament.554  Consequently, the reform 
of Parliament and capitalism through the implementation of more democratic systems of 
voting was pretence.  No amount of constitutional reform could achieve the same amount of 
control as was exercised by ordinary people in the soviets or in industrial committees.  
Labour’s response was to be critical of the ability of the Soviet system and the industrial 
democracy of the syndicalists to offer actual substantive and, importantly, democratic 
change.555  The NZLP hierarchy increasingly perceived the newly established Soviet Republic 
as dictatorial and undemocratic.  It was noted that the USSR had achieved its political 
structure through political revolution; whereas, the NZLP adamantly opposed such methods 
and had consistently proposed constitutional means to achieve its objectives.  Labour MP, 
John A Lee, steadfastly defended the Party’s constitutional agenda in one parliamentary 
debate by noting that;  
[The] New Zealand Labour Party, to the best of my knowledge, is a 
constitutional party.  I, in common with other members of the Party, 
fought an election constitutionally, was returned by an electorate in 
                                                          
548 Ibid. pg. 4 
549 Ibid. pg. 4 
550 W C Atkinson, “Parliament or Soviets.  An Interview with H N Brailsford,” Maoriland Worker, March 24, 1920. 
pg. 5.  
551 Ibid. pg. 5.  
552 Ibid. pg. 5.  
553`“The Russian Constitution,” Maoriland Worker, March 12, 1919. pg. 5.  
554 “Soviets and Representative Democracy,” Maoriland Worker, November 3, 1920. pg.5. 
555  New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 195. pg. 438. 
106 
 
 
New Zealand along constitutional lines, and have done my best along 
with my colleagues on these benches to adhere to the constitutional 
forms of this House and of the country, and where in any action of 
ours there can be any seen any menace toward constitutionalism I do 
not know. 556 
Although some Labour MPs, especially in the years after its 1919 election, appeared to 
endorse the radical concept of industrial democracy, telling workers that they needed to be 
ready to “take over the industries at the request of a Labour Government and run them.”557  
This was never the official policy of the NZLP.  Further, such comments tended to be tempered 
by statements relating to the NZLP’s on-going electoral progress.  As Fraser informed a large 
audience in Wellington in the aftermath of the 1919 General Election, electoral participation 
had ensured a “mental revolution” in favour of Labour.558  The outcome of the election was 
that;  
[A] landmark of progress had been achieved, and it must be 
maintained and extended by means of further education in regard to 
Labor ideals.  There is no getting over the fact that at the recent 
election the Labor votes had increased…. this was an indication that a 
mental revolution was going on in the minds of the people of this 
country.559 
The Withering of Electoral Reform  
By the late 1920s the constitutional debate appears to have stalled and aside from McCombs, 
there appeared to be little appetite in the NZLP for constitutional or electoral reform.  In 1930, 
the Constitutional platform of the Party was in the process of being revised.  PR, in particular 
came under considerable pressure from within the Party.  While there had been opposition 
to PR from some members previously, such as the Labour candidate, and after 1935 MP, C 
Morgan Williams, who echoed the earlier concerns of Payne, such individuals were in a 
minority.  By 1929/30, it appears that this minority had become substantial enough to 
significantly challenge the policy and debate its purpose within the Party and its affiliated 
bodies.560  Consequently, remits were moved at every NZLP Annual Conference from 1930 
onward to delete PR from Labour’s constitutional platform.  In 1931 and 1932, PR’s opponents 
had some success when they managed to refer the policy to the NZLP’s National Executive for 
its consideration.561  However, such action could not halt the demand to remove the policy 
completely and at the 1934 Conference, PR’s opponents had their victory and it was deleted 
from the Party’s constitutional platform.562  While the Recall, Initiative and Referenda were 
retained there was no serious attempt to enact them after Labour became the Government 
in 1935.  Subsequently, they were rendered impotent.   
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The change of policy had a significant effect on the position and conduct of the Party, 
particularly at a local council level.  Since its establishment, Labour had argued for PR at all 
levels of Government, local and national.  Some municipal councils such as Christchurch, had, 
with Labour’s support, implemented PR.  Now the NZLP did an abrupt volte-face.  NZLP city 
councillors, much to the delight of their opponents, were in the embarrassing position of 
arguing and voting against their own previous proposals and positions.563  In Christchurch, 
where the prominent Labour MP Dan Sullivan was Mayor and the Council had a NZLP-led 
majority, a special Council meeting was convened at which the voting system was 
subsequently returned to First Past the Post.564  Sullivan and his follow Labour Councillors 
admitted that the change had occurred as a consequence of the NZLP Conference decision.565  
The result was that in the following local body elections in 1935, Labour lost control of the 
council to the conservative Citizens and Ratepayers Ticket.  As the Christchurch Press was 
quick to note in the aftermath of the election, a Labour-led council majority would have been 
retained if PR had been kept.566  
The Rejection of Constitutional Reform: “Labour is not engaged in Speculative Matters”  
There appear to be three principal reasons as to why the constitutional programme was 
rejected by Labour.  Firstly, James McCombs had died in 1933.  McCombs had been the 
principal proponent of Electoral Reform and, especially Proportional Representation within 
the Labour Party.  It was McCombs who drafted and introduced the NZLP’s many bills on 
electoral reform and had been responsible for the adoption of PR in Christchurch’s municipal 
elections.  Indeed, McCombs commitment to PR was such that in 1922, he effectively 
blackmailed the PLP into supporting what had been his own Private Members Bill 
(Proportional Representation and Effective Voting Bill (No.2)) on the matter.567 The 
Christchurch Press described McCombs as being the New Zealand authority on conducting 
elections.568 That his opinion of PR was respected by the Party is evident as when the deletion 
of PR from the NZLP platform was suggested in 1932, the debate was held over until McCombs 
could attend.569  There was no one of similar stature and authority regarding constitutional 
matters in the Party after his death  
Secondly, the Party’s primary focus changed.  The NZLP became less concerned with 
constitutional issues and more concerned with economic and social problems.  As the 
country’s economic condition worsened after 1929, and into the 1930s, the NZLP focused 
predominantly on protecting conditions and diminishing the Depression’s effects.  Criticised 
by the National Party opposition in 1947 about its lack of action on constitutional matters 
during its time in Government, Labour’s response was that there were more important 
matters to deal with in the 1930s than constitutional reform.570  As the (now) Labour Prime 
Minister Peter Fraser informed the House; 
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When Labour came into office there were seventy-five thousand 
unemployed and a hundred and fifty thousand people near starvation.  
Would anyone who was absolutely callous, deal with a matter of 
constitutional reform when the crying need was to provide food for 
the people?571 
The incoming Labour Government in 1935, Fraser informed the House, was not interested in 
“speculative matters” such as constitutional reform, but in the practical matters of providing 
employment, social security and economic security for the people.572  In such a context, it 
mattered less as to how a Labour Government was elected, it was more important that a 
Labour Government was elected.   
The final motive is largely speculative and has to do with the NZLP’s own agenda:  whether 
that agenda was motivated by political self-interest or a desire to implement a progressive 
programme to alleviate the Depression.  PR and the electoral reform offered by the Party 
would have prevented the election of a majority Labour Government and the implementation 
of a Labour programme.  There appears to have been an increasing acknowledgement by the 
NZLP that a proportional system of representation could, and probably would, stop the party 
from achieving that political objective at a time when the party was convinced that it was 
most needed.  As Labour had previously noted, PR was useful in ensuring the representation 
of the minority; now that Labour was in the position of the majority, it made the prospect of 
such reform unappetising.  
The Parliamentary Road to Socialism and the NZLP Left-Wing Dilemma  
Given that the NZLP’s attempt to establish socialism through constitutional reform had been 
rejected, why did the left of the Party not either take on the moderates in the NZLP or break 
away and form their own Party as had happened in other Western states?  There appears to 
be several reasons which prevented this from occurring.  Firstly, there was a party of the 
revolutionary left in New Zealand and that was the CPNZ and it failed to persuade workers 
that it was a viable option.  Despite the coverage and encouragement that the USSR received 
from radicals in the NZLP, the CPNZ was a minority political force in New Zealand. As the 
pervious Chapter demonstrated the CPNZ had not attracted a large proportion of workers to 
its ranks nor had it performed well at elections. Although, a number of left NZLP members did 
leave and join the CPNZ, there was no mass exodus of members.  
Secondly, the NZLP, despite its faults, was the only mass party which had declared for 
socialism and had a socialistic programme.  As shown in this Chapter and Chapter Four, the 
increase in Labour’s electorate vote from the 1919 election onward convinced a substantive 
proportion of the NZLP members and its leadership that a socialist programme could be 
achieved through constitutional methods.  Instead of destructive revolutions, which workers 
were not inclined to support, the Initiative, Recall, Referendum and Proportional 
Representation would be the means by which capitalism and its instruments and agencies 
would be democratised. Such reform and democratisation was a practical means by which 
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the Labour Party would be able to pursue its wider objectives.  As Savage observed, Labour 
had no time for lunatic schemes and revolutionary plotting.573 
In lieu of the Initiative, Recall, Referendum and PR, left-wing NZLP members appear to have 
become convinced that socialism would be achieved through increased public ownership and 
control.  This conviction was spelt out very clearly at a meeting of the Raetahi Branch of the 
NZLP in 1929; 
The State is personified in the members of Parliament, and as the 
members of Parliament are the only representatives of the people, it 
will be seen that the slogan “the land for the people” will become a 
reality.574  
If an industry or private concern was nationalised by a Labour Government (or even by a non-
Labour Government) and taken into public ownership then it was deemed to have been 
‘socialised.’  That such an opinion had credence within the ranks of the NZLP will be 
demonstrated in the next Chapter.      
Conclusion: A Lack of Revolutionary Ardour   
There was no attempt to revisit aspects of Labour’s former constitutional platform either 
following the Depression or in the aftermath of the Second World War.  Confronted by the 
leader of the National Party opposition in 1947 about aspects of the Party’s former 
constitution policy of 1918, Fraser quipped that he did not know that the Leader of the 
Opposition, Sidney Holland, was an “antiquarian” or an “archaeologist.”575  Although, not 
opposed to discussing such matters, it is apparent that the Labour Government did not 
perceive them as a political necessity.   
Yet, when they were first included in the Labour Party’s constitutional platform they were a 
necessity.  At that time, the Party acknowledged that by providing popular democracy and 
self-government, they allowed a more complete version of democracy and socialism to be 
achieved.  Although it was not a revolutionary party, in the conventional sense of the term, 
the Party was revolutionary in that it proposed to democratise political decision making.   
The Party’s rejection of those constitutional and electoral programmes meant that Labour’s 
overall socialist vision became more restricted.  The Party became more focused on 
nationalisation as a means by which its objectives would be achieved.  Under its new vision, 
Labour would control the state which would operate the economy and implement policies on 
behalf of the people.  Under such an agenda socialism would be achieved through the election 
of a Labour Government and the implementation of its programme.  People could choose to 
join the Labour Party.  Alternatively, they could be either nominated or elected as members 
on to the various Boards that Labour would establish to administer its new economy.   
Such a vision fell well short of the original intent of Labour’s programme in this area.  
Essentially, Labour became no different to its international Social Democratic counterparts. It 
accepted that socialism or a progressive social democracy would be achieved through the 
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election of a majority Labour Government, increased public control of industry and the 
economy, combined with universal social provision.  If a person wanted such a society, then 
their options were limited to supporting the NZLP.  
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Chapter Eight: The Sugar Kings: A Tale of Sugar, Trade and 
‘Profiteering Brigands’ 
Introduction: The Chelsea Sugar Refinery and the Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
In 1924 the Labour Party was involved in a dispute about the future of the Chelsea Sugar 
refinery and the Government’s proposal to introduce a sugar duty.  The Chelsea sugar matter, 
the actions of the refinery’s parent company, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSRC) 
and the Reform Government demonstrated to the NZLP the predicaments that were inherent 
in the capitalist economic system.  To the NZLP, the CSRC represented monopolistic behaviour 
and intimidating tactics which private firms excelled in under capitalism.  Its behaviour was 
aided and abetted by the conservative Government which used its political dominance to 
ensure that the company’s interests (and profits) were maintained.  The NZLP’s asserted that 
the matter could be resolved by the use of socialistic policy which would see the refinery 
taken into public ownership, trade restored and better economic practices put in place.  
Although, the matter was resolved by the end of the same year, the ‘Chelsea Sugar’ incident 
is informative for several reasons.  It clearly demonstrates, as the Labour Party maintained, 
the monopolistic tactics of the private owners and the Reform Government.   However, it also 
demonstrated the problematic nature of Labour’s programmes at this time.  This chapter will 
provide a basic examination of the Colonial Sugar Refinery issue and the proposed imposition 
of a protective duty.  It will briefly examine the Labour party’s arguments against the 
imposition of a duty and its arguments for the nationalisation (state ownership) of the 
refinery.  Subsequently, this will be used to discuss how Labour’s proposed solutions and 
policies reflected the Party’s overall programmatic and ideological approach in this period 
and how they demonstrated a structural weakness in the party’s policy and programme.     
The Issue with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company   
In 1923 the Reform Government wanted to end state control in the sugar market.  However, 
it was consequently faced with a threat by the CSRC to shut its sugar refining factory which 
was based at Chelsea on Auckland’s Northshore.  The Fiji and New Zealand Sugar Company 
(FNZSC), which operated the Chelsea refinery, was a subsidiary of the Australian based 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company, which had been established in 1855.  Although it was 
Australian based, CSRC saw potential in New Zealand.  Such potential was no doubt aided by 
the New Zealand Government announcing in 1882 that it would award a bounty to the first 
company which produced local sugar. A New Zealand subsidiary of the Company (New 
Zealand Sugar Company) was quickly established and the North Shore of Auckland was chosen 
as the place to build a refinery.  This was due to the closeness of the port and its deep harbour, 
plentiful fresh water, land and timber. The name Chelsea was apparently chosen by the 
refinery’s first customs officer after his hometown in England.576   
However, despite early hopes, the Refinery was not successful.  Shortly after its 
establishment, the world sugar market collapsed and the New Zealand Sugar Company faced 
financial ruin.  Subsequently, it was disestablished and re-amalgamated back into its parent 
company in 1888.  In 1915, the CSRC partially re-established its New Zealand agency under a 
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new moniker, the Fiji and New Zealand Sugar Company, which took back the operation of the 
Chelsea refineries.577  Fiscal stability for the refinery was provided by the war time financial 
measures of the Liberal-Reform ‘National’ Government.  That Government introduced state 
control of the sugar supply to ensure the refinery’s economic viability and its ability to 
maintain production.  Under an arrangement reached between the Company and the 
Government, the State fixed a price for sugar and guaranteed the Company a monopoly in 
the New Zealand market.578    
In 1923 the conservative Reform Government of William Massey proposed ending state 
control.  It suggested that the sugar supply of the company be returned to pre-war conditions 
which meant that supply would be determined by the free market through free trade.   As the 
Minister of Customs, Downie Stewart informed the House, such an action would allow sugar 
to be “... obtained by merchants and others from any source they liked for the purpose of 
supplying the wants of New Zealand”.579 
The issue became a political flashpoint for the Company and the politicians.  After considering 
the matter in the relevant Select Committee, Parliament voted to end state control and 
instead impose a duty on imported sugar for one year to September 1924.  During that time, 
the Government would consider what could be done to retain the industry when (or if) the 
duty was lifted.580  However, in May 1924 the Company, in an economic pre-emptive strike, 
informed the Government and Parliament that it was unable to meet the continued costs of 
refining and selling New Zealand sugar.  Its directors asserted that the only solution to the 
problem that the Company found itself in was to further extend the duty on imported sugar, 
thereby enabling it to keep the Chelsea refinery open. Otherwise, the refinery would close, 
its employees would be laid off and the considerable economic benefits of the refinery to the 
local Auckland community and the wider economy would be lost.581  
 The 1923 Parliamentary Debate: “The Biggest Octopus the Country has ever had” 
The possible ending of state control and the imposition of a sugar duty in its stead had 
prompted animated discussion in Parliament when it had first been mooted in 1923. The 
Reform Government had decided that it was time that those controls and tariffs which had 
been introduced under war conditions were lifted and that pre-war economic conditions were 
returned.  There remained concern, however, about the impact that such a decision might 
have on the supply of various goods such as sugar.582  New Zealand was one of the world’s 
largest users of sugar and any impediment to the sugar supply could have serious economic 
consequences.583  Subsequently, the issue of whether state control in this area should be 
maintained or lifted were discussed by Parliament’s Industries and Commerce Committee.  
However, the Committee was unable to reach a decision.  When its report was provided to 
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Parliament, MPs were asked to choose between which of the two options put forward by the 
Committee were preferable – the retention of state control or the imposition of a duty. 584  
After taking advice from the CSRC, the Reform Government proposed that a duty of £180,000 
per annum (or £2 18s. 4d. per ton) be imposed.585  The opposition Liberal party and the Labour 
party were both opposed to the extension of the duty on sugar.  The opposition by the Liberal 
party to both options was principally due to its belief in Free Trade or a “free breakfast table” 
as one of their MPs was to describe it.586  Labour’s opposition to the select committees options 
was based around its belief in state ownership and, also its reluctance to support duties and 
tariffs for protecting private industries. In addition, both Parties were agreed that the CSRC 
was a monopolistic entity which was attempting to deceive Parliament and the public as to 
its financial situation and its motives.  Statements by the Company’s representatives that any 
decision not to impose a duty might mean the closure of its Chelsea refinery and the 
subsequent redundancy of its workers, further incensed opposition MPs.   
In a robust debate, Liberal and Labour MPs attacked the Government’s proposition that the 
CSRC would be severely financially disadvantaged if it was forced to return to its pre-war 
situation.587  Robert Masters, the Liberal MP for Stratford, described the CSRC as the “biggest 
octopus the country has ever had.”588  Holland produced figures for the House which had been 
collected from publicly available documents and media reports, to show that the Company 
had been extremely profitable before and since the war and held considerable financial 
reserves.  Holland further alleged that it had paid its shareholders generous dividends through 
its own manipulation of its share prices.589  The New Zealand Worker later reported that the 
Company had first reduced its share price in 1920 (£20 to £16), and that the difference was 
given to shareholders as a bonus.  It had then increased its shares back to £20 with the 
additional £4 in bonus stock being appropriated by the shareholders without paying an “extra 
farthing.”590 Even the £3,250,000 provided by the CSRC to establish the FNZSC was issued as 
a 6% bonus to shareholders.  Despite the contention of the Company that it was losing money, 
Holland asserted that the CSRC had ensured that its shareholders had achieved a nice return 
on their investment;  
In 1920 capital returned amounted to £650,000; in 1921, £1,625,00.  
In 1921 cash bonus amounted to £203,125.  At the present time, the 
Fiji and Maoriland company is in the process of liquidation, but the 
profits and reserves are not disclosed.  The capital returned, however, 
is £1,625,000 while the cash bonus from the Fiji liquidation is 
£325,000, and the reserves capitalised £6,050,000.591  
Holland alleged that the Colonial Sugar Refining Company was misleading Parliament and the 
Dominion about its current financial situation; 
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There is no company in Australasia that has so systematically lied 
about its position as the Colonial Sugar Refining Company has done. 
There is no concern in Australasia that has so repeatedly falsified its 
position as this concern has done. 
The Government’s limp response was that the Company’s representatives appeared to be 
honourable men and that the options for the Company were limited.592  Either state control 
was retained or a duty was imposed, or the Company would be faced with a considerable 
financial loss on its New Zealand operations which it could only resolve by shutting the 
refinery.593 Labour’s speakers alleged however, that attempts to get the CSRC to prove its 
financial state in that regard had been stymied by the Company representatives who were 
refusing to present their books and records.594 Holland observed that as a result of its actions, 
the Government was allowing the CSRC to hold a whip over the New Zealand public and 
Parliament by asking for a duty; 
Indeed, it is not a whip they hold, it is a pistol that, metaphorically 
speaking they are presenting at the head of the Government, just as 
any ancient highwayman presented his pistol while demanding money 
from his victim.595 
Despite attempts by Labour to amend the motion, Parliament voted to impose a temporary 
duty for one year and then discuss the issue again at that point.  In the interim, the matter 
was again sent back to the Industries and Commerce Committee for more discussion.596   
The Threat: “Give us the Duty or We close Down” 
While Labour’s parliamentarians might have been satisfied to call the Company’s bluff over 
the matter, Auckland’s employers and the refinery’s workers were not.  They were adamant 
that the Company was sincere in its desire to shut the refinery if a duty was not granted.  The 
subsequent granting of a duty allowed the Company to continue refining in the short term.  
However, this situation was brought to a close in 1924, when the Company informed the 
Government that it would halt production unless it got guaranteed protection in September.  
The CSRC alleged that the cost of refining sugar in Auckland was prohibitive due to the cost 
of production, landing costs and the high costs of labour. The alternative was to take 
advantage of the lower production and labour costs in Java and import sugar into New 
Zealand.597    
The Secretary of the Auckland Chamber of Commerce informed the Minister of Finance, 
Downie Stewart, by telegram of the seriousness of the Company’s intention.  The Company 
had, the Secretary asserted, already stopped all new and non-urgent work.  He stated that; 
“... 40 hands have already been discharged, and others have been definitely informed that 
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the refinery will close unless the present duty is maintained”.598  The President of the 
Chamber, A.A. Martin, was especially blunt, stating that unless the Company received the 
duty, the refinery would close.599  
The Government and employers were already aware of the situation. On Saturday 24 May 
1924, the New Zealand Herald had dutifully recorded a meeting of the men employed at the 
refinery to discuss what actions they could take in relation to the matter.600  Although the men 
had not been officially informed by the Company about a possible closure, the meeting was 
indirectly informed that the refinery was to close if the duty was not extended and a measure 
of protection given.601  Workers were already aware that alterations and maintenance at the 
refinery had been halted and some men had been discharged.602 Not surprisingly, fearful for 
their jobs, the workers who were present unanimously supported a motion regarding the 
need for a “sugar import protective duty”.  The meeting observed that “... that some measure 
of protection is absolutely necessary if the interests of the workers is taken into 
consideration”.603  A committee of eight men was elected to bring the “workers’ view before 
members of Parliament and others concerned.”604 
On 24 July 1924, the committee met with Massey to do just that.  Massey, Downie Stewart 
(who was also present) and the workers discussed the duty, the benevolent nature of the 
Company, the possible loss of work to sweated ‘black’ labour in Java and the islands and, the 
position of the Labour Party over the issue.605  Massey was at his gregarious best during the 
meeting, offering the workers his “strong personal support” and sympathy.606 He emphasised 
the Government’s concern about the loss of work and expressed confusion about the actions 
of the Labour Party, which appeared to have deserted those very men it professed to 
represent. Press reports held that Massey had informed the delegates that there needed to 
be a remedy to the situation .  A solution was to be found, he averred, in providing the 
Government with a majority to pass the necessary measures of protection.  
I think that it will be found in a majority in the House on this question 
... it was a very close thing last session, only one or two votes, and 
according to hearsay there are one or two who voted for the 
resolution last year not inclined to vote for it again ... “What you have 
to do,” continued Mr Massey, is convert some of those people you 
spoke about,” referring to the action of the Labour Party.607  
Lulled by Massey, the workers thanked him and left. The New Zealand Herald recorded that 
the arguments of the men “carry great weight” and they disposed of the arguments that have 
been repeated with “parrot-like monotony” by opponents of the duty.608   
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Labour: On the Horns of a Dilemma 
The Chelsea Sugar issue placed Labour in a dilemma.  On the one hand, it was opposed to the 
duty.  Yet on the other hand, it was very opposed to 350 workers losing their jobs.  The 
governing Reform Party made the most of the difficult position the NZLP found itself in.  In 
Parliament and in the press, the Labour Party was criticised as lacking practical answers and 
only concerned with ideological attacks on the CSRC. Labour also found itself increasingly 
assailed about its lack of compassion for those very people it was supposed to represent.  
Speaking to reporters on the matter, Prime Minister Massey accused the Labour Party of 
being concerned solely with tactics;  
In this particular case it is a matter of small moment that almost 400 
men will be thrown out of work.  Tactics are everything ... Labour is 
more concerned with the general question and less with the living of 
400 men at Chelsea and their dependants.609   
However, contrary to newspaper reports and Reform Party utterances, Labour was acutely 
aware of the situation regarding Chelsea refinery workers.  Labour MPs and branches were in 
touch with them.610   The party additionally took time to discredit some of the claims of the 
CSRC, the Government and their allies in the press who were alleging that the Company 
treated its workers generously and that they were well paid. The New Zealand Worker and 
Labour spokespeople noted that the Company had applied for an exemption from the 
arbitration awards so as to ensure that workers’ wages were kept low.  Additionally, workers 
at the plant were on the minimum allowed for under the Arbitration Court.611  
Further, McCombs noted the discrepancy in the claims by the CSRC and the Government that 
£180,000 was to be used to simply pay the workers supposedly high wages.  He observed that 
the amount asked by the CSRC would come to £514 per year per worker.  Yet, the present 
yearly output of the plant was valued at £195,000 and the total yearly wages came to £90,000.  
McCombs commented that under the amount asked for by the company, workers would get 
their wages more than twice over.612  
On 24 July 1924, the Labour party caucus met with the Chelsea worker delegates to discuss 
the issue of wages and work. There was much discussion about sweated labour in the Islands 
compared with domestic labour.613  It was as a consequence of this meeting that Labour 
eventually decided to support a duty, although at a lesser amount than that which the 
Government was proposing, if its own amendment in favour of state ownership and control 
failed.614  The decision to support a duty no doubt grated with the Labour Party caucus, given 
the finances and behaviour of the Company.  However, there was little recourse available to 
the Party given that 350 men were facing an almost uncertain future.  As Holland was to 
remark later in Parliament; 
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I would not be concerned about those working men if there was a 
Government on the Treasury benches that would say, “if these men 
are thrown out of employment we will put the responsibility on the 
country of maintaining them until they have work to go to.”615 
Labour’s Proposal: State Control 
Labour’s preferred solution to the issue was state ownership of the refinery.  There appears 
to be two reasons behind its support of this policy. The first of these was doubtless as a 
rejoinder to the threat by the CSRC to close the works at Chelsea. As Fraser forcefully stated 
in parliament, the Government should tell the company that it would not agree to the 
company’s terms and that it would “commandeer your works” and run them.616  In response 
to questions as to where Labour would receive sugar supplies from, Labour spokespeople said 
that new supplies would be sourced from Java.  This sugar would then be refined at Chelsea.617  
The second reason lay in the Labour Party’s belief that those private monopolies which lay at 
the centre of the productive process should be in the hands of the Government, which would 
then control them on behalf of the people.  It was obvious to the Party that the Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company was a perfect example of a private profiteering concern which was using 
its position to exploit both the Government and the people of New Zealand for its own private 
gain.  Either its demands were met, Holland observed, or it would bring ruin upon the 
economy.   
If you will not pay us tribute of £180,000 a year that we demand, we 
will close up the refinery, we will withhold sugar from the people of 
the country, we will destroy your jam factories, we will destroy your 
other industries in which sugar is necessary, and we will make you pay 
for having refused to bribe us with a duty of this kind.618 
A state-owned refinery would halt this type of exploitation from occurring.  It would 
guarantee a supply of cheap sugar to the people as well as ensuring that workers at the 
refinery kept their jobs and their pay packets.    
Labour’s proposal was derided in Parliament by the Reform Party and in the pages of the 
conservative press.  It did receive guarded support from the refinery workers, who stated to 
the Labour Party caucus that they would be happy with State ownership, but not State 
control.  They were wary of the works being owned under the Reform government.  This was 
because they feared that Reform would not provide them with the current terms and 
conditions which they received under Company ownership.619    
The 1924 Parliamentary Debate: “...The sugar industry does not commence nor end at 
Chelsea”  
Unsurprisingly the Industries and Commerce Committee’s report to Parliament in 1924 opted 
for protection of the sugar works.  However, while it met the Company’s demands in that 
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area, the Committee could not agree on as to the “amount of protection” which would be 
required.  A motion was moved; “That the report do lie upon the table”.620  The intention was 
that Parliament would now decide on the level of protection or the amount of duty that the 
Company would receive.  Fraser moved an amendment which provided for state ownership 
of the refinery and new negotiations with the Company based on that ownership.621   
Overall the discussion that occurred in 1924 was similar to that of the previous year.  The 
difference was that this time the Liberal Party remained largely mute.  Liberal leader Thomas 
Wilford repeated the Party’s opposition to the duty, its support of free trade and its decision 
to withdraw from the parliamentary debate on the issue.622 The Party’s actions in this respect 
might be explained by its perilous political situation.  While philosophically in favour of free 
trade, the Liberals were now fighting for their political lives.   It is possible that they sensed 
that political catastrophe could overtake them if they publicly and strenuously opposed the 
duty, especially since they appeared to have no other alternative than to advocate for free 
trade.  As Labour speakers noted during the debate, Liberal MPs, while wanting to oppose the 
Government’s policy, were not prepared to openly speak against the duty or openly speak in 
support of Labour’s proposals for the nationalisation of the sugar works. The Liberals had 
additionally decided that they were not going to support Labour’s lower duty proposal.  
Subsequently, Savage was moved to inform Parliament that the Liberals had not shouldered 
their responsibility in the matter.623  Chiding the Liberals he commented that, “… [apart] from 
a negative action, the Liberal Party have done nothing.  They have suggested nothing”.624  
The response from Liberal MPs was that the logical solution was to support “middle of the 
road” options.625  Labour’s solution, the Liberal MP Robert Masters informed the House, was 
as extreme as that of the Government.626 The situation became increasingly farcical for the 
Liberals when the parliamentary vote on the nationalisation option put forward by Labour 
was lost.627  Labour MPs wasted no time pointing out to the Liberals that they previously had 
supported Labour’s position of nationalisation as a sensible and “middle of the road” option.  
However, nine Liberal MPs had voted against the measure and in favour of the Government’s 
position.  As Savage retorted to Masters, the vote meant that some members of the Liberal 
Party must have “...taken to the bush”.628 
The loss of Labour’s nationalisation amendment saw the Government put forward its 
additional motion that a duty of £2 18s 4d per ton should be granted to the Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company.629 Labour’s response was to put forward an amendment that if a duty was 
to be imposed, it be paid at a lesser amount of £1 9s 6d.630  After more debate that 
amendment was lost as well.  However, the Government’s proposed duty was accepted.631  
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There was a small measure of recompense for Labour as in both instances Liberal MPs voted 
with that Party against the Government, reducing its majority to three votes.  But, as far as 
Parliament was concerned, the matter was over.  The Government had granted a satisfactory 
duty to the Company which guaranteed its continued operation at Chelsea. As a New Zealand 
Herald editorial was to gleefully inform its readers a year later when a reduction in the price 
of sugar was announced; 
The firmness of the Government, backed up by the wisdom of a 
majority in the House, kept this fatuous opposition (Labour) from 
having its way.  The upshot has absolutely justified the action of the 
action of that majority.  There is now the enjoyment of a cheapened 
commodity, side by side with the keeping of the employees in 
continuous work ... it is evident that there are occasions when the 
workers may well ask to be saved from their professed friends.632    
So why was the Chelsea Sugar Incident important? 
While Labour’s opposition was seemingly based against the profiteering of the Colonial Sugar 
Refinery Company, the issue was really about the Party’s wider economic and philosophical 
approach to capitalist industry.  To the NZLP, the CSRC was the perfect model of a large private 
monopoly which threatened the Government, Parliament, the economy and ordinary 
people’s livelihoods.  Consequently, Labour was opposed to a tariff for the Company on two 
levels.  The first was based on the simple economic rationale that the Company was actually 
wealthy and had no need for economic protection.  As McCombs succulently stated, Labour 
was “… particularly objecting to … the tremendous protection, the unwarranted amount of 
the protection that these people are asking for...”.633 
The second and principal reason that Labour was opposed to the CSRC was on philosophical 
grounds that the company was a prima facie model of capitalist economic greed. 
Consequently, the NZLP argued that nationalisation was a cure for that greed.  Certainly, 
Downie Stewart’s earlier chiding of the NZLP during a Customs debate in 1921 - that it had no 
position on the trade issue other than that any problem would be resolved if industry was 
nationalised was partially correct if seen from this perspective.634  However, such a 
perspective fails to fully articulate the Party’s beliefs in this area.   
Labour’s Real Problem: Free Trade or Protectionism? 
During the sugar duty issue, Massey had attempted to portray the Labour Party as being more 
interested in political tactics and political point scoring against the CSRC, rather than helping 
the Company’s workers.  Reform’s implication was that Labour was so ideologically 
constrained that it ignored the practical and human costs of its programme.  This belief was 
also shared and referred to by the refinery workers.  At the May 1924 meeting of refinery 
workers, Labour’s opposition to the protective duty was put down to it being committed to a 
policy of free trade.635  The accusation that the Party had an ideological commitment to free 
trade which meant that it was indifferent to the needs of the affected workers certainly 
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caused the Party some inconvenience. Yet, despite the allegations of Massey, the Labour 
party was decidedly ambiguous over the matter.   
Labour found itself in a dilemma in relation to the issues of free trade and protectionism. 
Protective duties allowed the financial inefficiency inherent within the capitalist system to 
continue and caused workers to continue suffering economically.  In 1921, during a debate 
regarding changes to New Zealand’s customs schedules and preferences, Labour spoke 
against providing industry with protective tariffs using both reasons as support for its 
position.636 The Party’s first argument against tariffs was that protectionism allowed 
inefficient capitalist firms the ability to continue to operate by taking money from the public 
purse.637 Boot making was a pertinent example of such an industry. New Zealand 
manufactured boots had high duties638and yet, despite being protected by tariffs, boots 
remained expensive. Holland had earlier noted in a debate regarding the Government’s 
Financial Statement that the Government intended putting a 45 per cent ad valorem duty on 
boots under the general tariff and yet this might not be enough for ‘protective purposes.’639 
As he lamented to the House over the issue; “… [this] is a leather-producing country, and yet, 
in the hands of private enterprise, New Zealand boots are amongst the dearest in the 
world”.640  
Labour’s second contention was protection of these inefficient enterprises had the effect of 
lowering a workers’ take home pay by charging high prices for protected goods. As Holland 
alleged; 
Every time a tariff is imposed the price of the commodity affected 
goes up, and that represents a corresponding reduction in the actual 
wages of the workmen.  It goes without saying that to reduce the 
purchasing-power of wages is to reduce the actual wages. 641 
Holland drew attention to two particular duties which had this putative effect on workers’ 
wages; tea and sugar.642  He noted that the sugar produced in Fiji (by the Fiji and New Zealand 
Sugar Company) was let in free.  But sugar from other countries carried a duty of 1/2d a 
pound.643  Labour MPs consequently described the protective tariff as an indirect tax which 
was being levied on workers.  As with any indirect tax on a good or service, the capitalist could 
avoid payment through imposing a charge on the good or service which would then be paid 
by the consumer or the worker.644 There was no way that workers could avoid paying unless 
they did not purchase the good. This was not an option for workers who needed food, clothing 
and shelter.    
During the debate over the Customs Amendment Bill in 1921, the Government admitted that 
many of its custom duties were exercises in revenue gathering.  The motives behind the 
various changes to the tariffs were a means, as Massey explained to the House, by which to 
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lower those taxes paid by income earners and land owners.645  In opposition to Massey’s 
proposals, Labour argued that income tax should be graduated and increased on higher 
income earners so as to decrease the burden on the working class.646 As Holland remarked; 
When it comes to revenue raising – and there is no question of 
protection involved – we should get the money from those who have 
the incomes and are able to pay.  There is no sounder method of 
raising money than getting it from the people who have it, and not 
from the people whose small incomes are insufficient to enable them 
to live up to decent standards of comfort.647   
While Labour’s position could be perceived as supporting free trade, the New Zealand Labour 
Party was reasonably pragmatic when it came to the issue.  This was apparent from Holland’s 
remark in 1921, that while socialists were theoretically “Free-traders,” the Party was 
supportive of neither option but would consider each separate issue on its merits.648  Holland 
restated this position again in 1927.649 It was this pragmatic attitude which eventually led the 
party to support the call for a protective duty on sugar in 1924 despite the inclinations of its 
MPs.   
That the Refinery required a duty to ensure its monopolistic status also partially lay behind 
Labour’s advocacy of nationalisation.  Once the refinery was nationalised, the duty would no 
longer be required as it was only currently required by the company’s private directors and 
shareholders as a means of maintaining their own profit.  However, this conviction was 
contested by Reform parliamentarians and by workers at the refinery.  As one worker, H 
Stewart, commented at the meeting for refinery workers;  
... as a professed socialist and supporter of the Labour Party [my] first 
idea was that they should take any opportunity for pin-pricking trusts 
or combines. But there was no use biting off their noses to spite their 
faces.  If the company were driven out of New Zealand, not only 
would, they have lost their jobs; but they would still have to fight 
trusts outside the country, which could not be controlled.650 
Downie Stewart had made similar observations in response to Labour’s assertions that a duty 
would not be required if the refinery was state owned.  Stewart observed that not only would 
the state be responsible for the domestic costs of maintaining a refinery but, additionally, the 
refinery would still need to compete against other competitors with lower production and 
wage costs.  Consequently, in order to ensure the refinery’s economic viability, a duty would 
still be required.651  It appears that these arguments did have some effect on the Labour 
caucus. When he was moving Labour’s amendment seeking the nationalisation of the 
refinery, Fraser expressed his personal belief that such a move would render a tariff 
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unnecessary.  He then proceeded to admit that such a duty might be needed and that he (and 
one would assume, Labour) “would be open to conviction on that point”.652 
Labour and Nationalisation 
Regardless of the duty and its implications, Labour supported the nationalisation of the 
Refinery due to its belief that state ownership of the means of production and distribution 
was economically and socially superior to private ownership.  As discussed previously this 
belief formed a central part of the Party’s programme and had done so since its formation.  
The rationale given by Labour and democratic socialists generally about supporting state 
ownership was that private ownership was undemocratic and socially exclusive653 and, in 
addition, it was economically inefficient and ineffective.654 The solution to the disorder of the 
private market was the introduction of planned or scientific production overseen by the state.  
Such a method would ensure a more just and equitable means by which economic and social 
goods could be produced and then distributed.655   
This latter point was consistently argued by the NZLP in parliamentary debates, meetings, 
articles and conversations.  Labour constantly asserted that private firms promoted private 
greed and graft and that private markets were economically inefficient in terms of production 
and distribution of goods.656 From Labour’s perspective, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
was merely the latest representative of the fallacies which existed within the private 
enterprise system. The private ownership of the refinery had resulted in corruption, graft and 
despair due to it being a private concern under the directions of the CSRC directors and 
shareholders.  Once the refinery was placed into public hands it could be managed 
responsibly.  Labour justified such claims by comparing the various management efficiencies 
of state owned companies in New South Wales and similar privately owned concerns.657  
Holland particularly noted that a number of such enterprises had been previously owned by 
private shareholders who had brought the firms to the brink of bankruptcy before the State 
had taken them over and put them on an economically stable footing.658 Labour speakers 
informed the House that the New South Wales Government owned a number of 
establishments including brick works, timber yards, clothing factories, trawlers, meat shops 
and a state bakery.659 All of these, it was claimed, were profitable enterprises. As Holland 
noted; 
In almost every case they were showing profits, they were giving 
higher wages and comparably better conditions to the employees, 
and [they] were supplying the public at much lower rates than other 
concerns.660  
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Given this evidence, Labour would have seen little wrong with the state assuming ownership 
of a sugar refinery.  
Administration of State Agencies 
Despite the pre-eminence which Labour gave to state ownership, existing state agencies were 
not perfect, a point which Labour speakers admitted.  State departments could be as hostile 
and indifferent toward workers as private concerns.  The NZLP contended that this was 
because the current administration of State run services was operated by capitalist 
governments in a capitalist system.661  Existing state enterprises, such as the state coal mines, 
were criticised as lacking “sympathetic management”.662   
How would Labour administer state departments to ensure that they would cater for the 
interests of workers while being economically efficient?  A possible answer to this question 
might be provided in a dispute which involved the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 
and the New Zealand Railways Department.  In early 1924, railway workers, distressed about 
low wages and poor conditions, threatened strike action.663 The strike lasted several weeks 
before being unexpectedly terminated in May.664 While the strike was limited to the railways, 
the general situation was perceived by Labour as being symptomatic of the conditions within 
the wider public sector.  In a speech titled ‘The Crisis in the Public Service,’ Holland took issue 
with the wages and conditions of public servants and the crisis of management in the public 
sector and the Railway Department generally.  Labour’s solution, Holland stated, was to 
improve wages and conditions and radically reform the governance of the Department.  A 
board would be established to run the Department, comprising men of both “expert and 
practical” knowledge.665 Railway workers, through their own organisations, would elect their 
own representatives.666  As a result, Holland perceived a situation in which workers would be 
able to more fully participate in state organisations and departments, such as New Zealand 
Railways. Subsequently, he was “... confident that such a system would result in a far greater 
degree of efficiency and would make for economy with penalising other railway workers or 
the users of the railways”.667   
Nationalisation as a step toward Socialism 
Despite the contention by conservatives and liberals, Labour did not perceive nationalisation 
and state ownership as socialism.  It was, as Holland remarked during a debate about the 
customs duty, merely an inevitable part of the capitalist transition toward socialism.668  
Holland informed Parliament during the debate on the Imprest Supply Bill (No.2) in 1921 that; 
I want to make the point that the State ownership and control of 
industries is an inevitability in the transition from capitalist production 
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to socialist production.  It does not matter whether this House is in 
favour of it or not, sooner or later that development must take place; 
the very stress of economic circumstances will force us in that 
direction, just as we were forced in that direction for our own 
protection throughout the war period.669     
As has been previously mentioned, to the NZLP state ownership was socialist as it removed 
individualistic private ownership and provided an element of collective democratic control 
over institutions. Such control would be exercised through both parliamentary regulation and 
prescription as well as through the use of radically constituted and elected state boards who 
would administer the various state departments and agencies.  Labour alleged that such a 
model also allowed for prudent economic management.  However, as the situation of the 
Chelsea Refinery proved, there were still a number of factors in Labour’s statist solutions 
which were unknown or uncertain.  Fraser had been forced to concede such a point in the 
sugar debate in 1924, when he did not rule out the use of a tariff if the refinery was 
nationalised to ensure it remaining profitable. Consequently, the Party’s position regarding 
nationalisation can be perceived as both a means of progressing toward socialism and also as 
a means for the Party to avoid various economic issues within the existing capitalist economy.  
As, despite the brave comments about state boards and worker representation, the Party still 
had no definitive programme as to how a Labour government would operate state owned 
firms if it was elected.      
Conclusion: The Withering of Socialism  
The debate over the Chelsea Sugar Refinery should not be seen merely as a simple and 
prolonged parliamentary argument over a mere protective duty or tariff.  It went much 
further than that.  The Chelsea Refinery debate offers a window on the Labour Party’s position 
and attitude toward state ownership, protectionism, worker employment and its relationship 
with and perception of, capitalism in the early and mid-1920s.  For the Labour Party, the 
Refinery was amongst the first of many other similar issues with which it was confronted. 
Each new issue meant that the Party had to develop more sophisticated methods and 
programmes to respond to them. The Labour party needed to develop a cohesive ‘socialist’ 
economic policy which a future Labour government would implement.  
The Party’s own economic development meant that it could no longer placate both sides in 
the free trade and protectionist debate.  The Labour Party had established a Trade Committee 
to examine the issue of trade and it reported back at the 1928 Labour Party Conference.  The 
Committee was of the opinion that trade should be managed and that duties and tariffs had 
a role to play in domestic economic development.  However, it also proposed that the Party 
should be opposed to those tariffs and duties when used as revenue gathering entities.670  
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Such a position was in line with Holland’s earlier 1921 statements on the issue.  Both the 
Report and Holland’s introductory statements to it dispelled any lingering belief that the 
Labour Party was an advocate for free trade.   
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Labour’s managed trade positions became an integral part 
of its developing economic agenda.  The Party began to promote reciprocal trade agreements, 
principally with the United Kingdom, but with other countries as necessary.  Reciprocal trade 
agreements underwrote Labour’s new policy of guaranteed prices and the Party’s emphasis 
on industrial development.  By pursuing reciprocal trade deals, Labour had moved from a 
position of pragmatism about trade to one of formally opting for a managed, protectionist, 
position - to protect New Zealand’s economic situation.  The Chelsea Sugar Refinery issue had 
been an important part of that policy development.   
Further, the Party started to formulate more sophisticated positions on the issue of state 
ownership and control.  Although state ownership remained a centrepiece of Labour’s overall 
programme in the 1920s, the Chelsea case had proven that it was simplistic to suggest that 
state ownership in itself would resolve the problems of private ownership and production. As 
Massey and Downie Stewart had both observed to Holland, it was not enough to simply state 
that the Labour Party would nationalise industry as a whole-scale solution to economic and 
industrial problems.  Although state ownership could remove the graft and individualistic 
profit motives nationalisation, could not, eliminate all the issues that plagued New Zealand 
production.  This required a substantive and coherent economic programme being 
implemented as well.  Labour’s economic programme in the latter 1920s recognised that 
sentiment.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, Labour increasingly discussed more 
elaborate economic strategies which it could implement when it was elected.  In doing so, 
references to state ownership and socialism were slowly removed from Labour’s economic 
and ideological narrative, and in it its place was, what James McCombs described as, 
‘enlightened capitalism.’ 
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Chapter Nine: Enlightened Capitalism: Labour’s Economic Platform 
Introduction 
The latter 1920s and 1930s was a period of economic instability both nationally and 
internationally.  The changing political and economic circumstances which occurred during 
this period prompted a significant political and economic re-alignment for the NZLP.  While, 
previous chapters have described how the Party had changed its image as a consequence of 
various political and economic factors, such as electoral acceptability and advancement, the 
central objective of the Party – socialisation- remained intact.  While the Party substantially 
modified its socialisation objective and its platform in the latter 1920s, as it adopted and 
developed more sophisticated economic programmes, it remained a socialist Party dedicated 
to the achievement of a socialist society.   
This situation changed with the advent of economic depression in 1929/1930.  The 1930s 
Depression caused the NZLP considerable ideological and economic distress with the Party 
becoming increasingly aware of its policy shortcomings.  While Labour was opposed to 
conventional economic ‘capitalist’ strategies, the Party had no definitive comprehensive 
economic or social programme to replace them with.  Consequently, there was a growing 
doubt as to whether Labour’s platform could provide sustained economic and social relief if 
the Party was elected to Government.  While the Party publicly railed against the excesses of 
capitalism, it was actively engaged on developing a programme to resolve the immediate 
economic crisis rather than develop a socialist alternative.  Instead of socialism, the party 
became dedicated to achieving "enlightened capitalism”.  
Political Flux: New Zealand’s Shifting Political Situation 
The outcome of the 1928 election gave no Party an absolute majority in parliament.  
Consequently, the Labour Party decided to provide confidence and supply to the United Party 
(a reformed Liberal Party) on the basis that the Reform Party was a reactionary party with a 
reactionary programme.671  However, the newly elected minority United Government was 
quickly perceived by Labour as an administration which appeared to be politically and 
economically inept.672  Prime Minister Ward was known to be sick and his illness appeared to 
be reflective of the actions of the Government as a whole.673  The Government appeared 
helpless in the face of the economic catastrophe that was sweeping New Zealand and the rest 
of the World.  It merely adopted punitive economic measures which cut government spending 
and wages to balance the budget and alleviate the crisis.674  Consequently, by 1930 while the 
Labour Party was still committed to providing the United Government with confidence and 
supply votes in the House of Representatives, by 1930 there was considerable enmity by the 
NZLP and its supporters towards it.675 
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Unemployment: Labour’s Principal Area of Discontent 
The new political relationship did not get off to a good start.  One of the principal areas of 
discontent between the United Party administration and the NZLP was hot to tackle 
unemployment. Employment had been a key issue for the NZLP since its formation and, in the 
first 1929 session of the new Parliament, Labour made unemployment the focus of its 
programme.676  During the debate over the Imprest Supply Bill, the Party made it clear to 
United that it wanted something done about the matter.677  Savage, the first Labour speaker 
in the debate, commented that the actions of the United Government had failed to ‘come up 
to the mark’ in resolving the problem of unemployment;   
The Reform Government failed to come up to expectations when they 
had the Treasury benches, and analysing the position as it is today, 
one is entitled to say that it appears as if the United Government is 
following in its footsteps. 678 
The NZLP had been supportive of the idea of unemployment insurance which would be 
provided to unemployed workers to alleviate their economic distress.679  After 1928, the 
implementation of such insurance became top priority for the Party, with Labour pressing for 
its immediate introduction as the numbers of unemployment rose.680  United were 
consistently criticised by Labour MPs for failing to implement the policy and deliver on their 
election policies to create employment.681   
This led to heated and testy exchanges between the two parties in parliament.  It also resulted 
in some reckless behaviour by Ward to deal with the increasing Labour criticisms.  Taunted 
by Labour MP’s over the employment issue, Ward promised that he would introduce 
programmes which would quickly solve the unemployment problem in New Zealand.682  “I 
will undertake to say this.  That in five weeks there will be no unemployment in New Zealand.  
I say that whole of the unemployed will be absorbed”.  683 
A sceptical Holland pledged the “solid support and assistance” of the Labour Party and the 
Labour movement in helping Ward achieve this goal.684  However, the goal was never 
achieved.  By the time that Ward died in July 1930, Labour was alleging that government 
inaction was starving unemployed people.685  Ward’s replacement was George Forbes who 
did not inspire hope for the NZLP in this area.  Forbes proved to have a single-minded 
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dedication to cost cutting and retrenchment which translated to lower wages and more 
unemployed.686   
Labour’s Political Departure 
By the beginning of 1931 Labour had wearied of supporting the United Party.  The United 
Government was perceived by Labour as being unimaginative and of pursuing orthodox and 
restrictive economic practices.687  Its actions were delivering no tangible economic results and 
were causing harm to working people.688  Labour parliamentarians and publications openly 
mocked and criticised the United Government and its programmes.  Increasingly United was 
forced to rely on the support of the Reform opposition to pass measures against an openly 
hostile Labour presence.689  The end of the political agreement between the two parties could 
not be long in coming.   
In September 1931 the Government convened a parliamentary Economic Committee to 
discuss the worsening economic conditions and to seek a common economic direction.690  As 
Holland explained to the subsequent Labour Party Conference, in reality the Committee was 
pretence and the meeting was about forming a coalition ‘National’ Government: 
Early in the proceedings of the Committee, efforts were made to 
secure an agreement for the postponement of the 1931 Elections and 
the formation of a National Government.  The Labour members 
insisted that the Committee’s business was to undertake economic 
investigation and not to enter upon political bargaining.  When the 
Committee met the next morning, Mr Forbes issued an ultimatum to 
the effect that unless an agreement were [sic] at once made to 
postpone the elections and form a ‘National’ Government, he would 
not permit the Committee to proceed further with its work.  Of course 
the Labour members refused Mr Forbes proposal and the Committee 
was peremptorily adjourned and not permitted to meet thereafter.691    
The Reform Party agreed to support United and the NZLP became the official Opposition.  
Gordon Coates, the Reform Party leader wrote to Reform Party members in September 1931 
explaining the new political arrangement;  
It should be made clear that the form of Government into which we 
have entered is an emergency arrangement for the purpose of 
meeting immediate difficulties and re-establishing upon a sound basis 
the finances of the State and the economic life of the Dominion.692 
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Now is the not the time for striking one’s breast: Labour’s Economic Crisis 
Despite the reactionary nature of the Coalition programme, at least it had a programme.  As 
William Barnard, the Labour MP for Napier, lamented to Nash; 
… as the difficulties of New Zealand intensify one may find it necessary 
to say something about the general situation.  I confess to 
considerable perplexity and see no clear light ahead.  Our opponents 
aided by such visitors as Lord Barnby … are putting forward definite 
proposals for the amelioration of the country. 693 
The principal issue for Labour was that it did not have a coherent or comprehensive economic 
platform to counter the Coalition programme.694  The clauses in the NZLP’s policy platform 
had not substantially changed since the Party’s formation in 1916.  Much of the platform and 
the clauses committing the NZLP to the creation of a state bank, the introduction of graduated 
taxes, the extension of public ownership of national utilities, the ‘national control’ of the food 
supply of the people, state funded education and health care and, the key plank of ‘jobs for 
all’, had been inherited from its various predecessors.  Aside from the contentious debate 
within the Party over its land policy in 1925 and 1926, alterations to the platform tended to 
be made gradually.695  This was a point which the Labour MP Henry Greathead “Rex” Mason, 
noted in his letter to Nash on the subject.  Mason wrote that the NZLP platform never seemed, 
“… to get a general revision and consolidating.  [It] has altered a word or two at a time. No 
notion is made of the events which bear on it.”696  
While there had been protracted debate and discussion on the Party’s economic programme 
throughout the 1920s, there was a concern that the New Zealand Labour Party did not 
elaborate on how its platform might be practically implemented.  The lack of substantial 
detailed policy was to cause MPs and the senior NZLP leadership to query if Labour was 
actually able to govern if it was elected.697  Dunedin South Labour MP Fred Jones observed in 
a letter to Nash, which he also related to Savage, that he had recently attended a large 
meeting in Dunedin, at which Holland spoke, but that Holland had been unable to say what 
Labour would do if it was elected to power.698   
That Savage shared the anxieties of his follow MPs in this matter is evident from letters which 
he wrote to Nash on the topic.699 Savage was frustrated with the lack of action from the 
Government, which merely repeated conservative appeals to economic sacrifice, 
retrenchment and fiscal rectitude.  As he commented to Nash, he wanted to tell the 
Government to “do something, or get out.”700  However, he was also aware of the comments 
from NZLP members and branches about imposing socialism or monetary reform as an 
alternative to the evils of capitalism.701  Observing that Labour’s platform lacked a practical 
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thought out alternative, Savage remarked that; “Now is the not the time for striking one’s 
breast and repeating well-worn phrases.  The present desperate situation demands well 
thought out proposals, and not too many of them”.702  
The Development of Labour’s Enlightened Capitalist Economic Programme 
Savage was well placed to make such an observation.  Both Savage and McCombs, who was 
Labour’s other economic spokesperson in the 1920s, kept themselves abreast of changes in 
economic and business theories and practices.703  Their actions proved pivotal in ensuring 
that Labour began to develop an alternative economic strategy, which can be loosely defined 
as rational or enlightened capitalism.  Certainly, McCombs’ financial speeches came to 
repeatedly accentuate the need to transform the system through the restoration of effective 
demand and productivity.   
Speaking to the second reading of the Minimum Wage Bill in 1927, McCombs justified the 
economic reasoning for increasing wages by referring to a book by the economists William 
Trufant Foster and Willard Catching and the work of the Pollak Foundation for Economic 
Research.  McCombs observed that Foster and Catching claimed;  
... that sustained economic progress requires an increased flow of 
money to consumers ... the theory stresses again and again in page 
after page ... that if money is permitted to flow freely by removing 
restrictions the increased demand created will increase production.704 
McCombs notes that the authors do not advocate socialism at all in their work.  The book 
“...claims only to be an exposition of enlightened capitalism”.705  Savage makes a similar 
argument later in the same debate observing that; “… the economic principle underlying the 
whole question brings us to the economic fact that the purchasing power of our own people 
must be the basis of our own prosperity…”. 706 
What both McCombs and Savage, and by default the Labour Party, were suggesting was that 
economic difficulties were the result of under-consumption.  Under-consumption was a belief 
that the economy did not over produce products, rather that people under-consumed due to 
their lack of buying power.  Policies which resulted in higher wages or salaries for working 
people would have the effect of lifting domestic demand by allowing people to buy goods 
that they normally would not be able to purchase.  A flow-on effect of increased demand 
would be increased production and increased employment.707   
McCombs and Savage became convinced that recessions were created because of under-
consumption by workers.  When the new Coalition Government moved to reduce public 
sector wages and salaries by ten percent as a cost saving measure in 1931, McCombs 
compared its actions to that of those of Henry Ford and even the conservative US President, 
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Herbert Hoover.  McCombs observed that Ford and Hoover had, “…agreed not to reduce 
wages during the present financial readjustments”.  However, Ford went further than Hoover, 
McCombs said, “…. [he] said wages must go up. That was his solution”.708 
McCombs asserted that the answer to this issue was for Government to stimulate 
employment and consumption through maintaining or increasing wages to workers and by 
the use of state investment in public works to develop infrastructure.709  As Holland informed 
a rural audience, such works could be financed by the establishment of a state bank.710  This 
would allow the Government to borrow money or raise loans at low rates of interest and 
through the introduction of a system of graduated taxation.711 
Economic Faddism: Douglas Credit  
Doubtless one of the schemes which Savage had in mind when he made the remark about 
Labour lacking well thought-out proposals was the flirtation that members of the Party were 
having with Douglas (Social) Credit.  Douglas Credit was the creation of a former British Army 
Officer, “Major” Clifford Hugh Douglas.712  Douglas agreed with the notion of under-
consumption.  He believed that the cause of economic recessions and depressions were the 
result of a difference between consumption and production.713   
Douglas alleged that this difference or “gap” was the result of a lack of available credit and, 
that this was the consequence of the banks which created money and then loaned that money 
to borrowers at a rate of interest decided by the banks themselves.714  The answer to this 
problem, Douglas observed, was very simple.  The state would nationalize the banking system 
and create the required amount of credit which was necessary for people to spend.715  This 
would allow people to consume what was being produced, effectively ending the Depression.  
Douglas encapsulated this idea in his ‘A + B Theorem’.  People would be directly supplied with 
the necessary credit directly through the receipt of a ‘national dividend’ administered by a 
National Credit Agency.716  
The appeal of Douglas Credit and its apparent similarity with elements of Labour’s monetary 
programme led a number of Labour MPs in the early 1930s - such as John A Lee, Langstone, 
Lee Martin, and Mason to publicly support elements of Douglas Credit within the Party and 
at public forums.717  Writing to Thorn, who had replaced Nash as Labour’s General Secretary, 
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Lee observed that; “It seems to me that the Douglas Credit supporters’ criticism of the private 
control of the financial mechanism is identical with that of the Labour Party...”. 
Thorn replied that Labour’s policy was “... certainly closer to them than that of any other 
Party.”718  Yet, while the NZLP was committed to using credit as a means by which to fund 
some of its programmes, it was not, as some of the Douglas Crediters tried to imply, a closet 
advocate for Douglas Credit and the A+B Theorem.  This position was spelt out very clearly by 
Savage in 1935, prior to the General Election of that year.719  Referring to the monetary 
policies of both organisations, Savage clarified the situation by stating that there was no 
agreement between either organisation regarding policy.720   
The Douglas Credit Problem  
Douglas Credit was of concern to Labour, because of its possible effects on rural voters as it 
had gathered a significant following amongst the farming community.  Mason observed that 
Douglas Credit enthusiasm was going through his own electorate “like the plague.”721 The 
endorsement of Douglas Credit by the New Zealand Farmers Union (NZFU) and by the Country 
Party’s sole MP, Harold Rushworth,722 finally convinced the Labour Party that it needed to 
discuss and resolve the Douglas Credit issue.  In 1932, there was a joint meeting between the 
Labour Party and the NZFU chaired by the leader of the New Zealand’s Douglas Credit 
Association, Col. S.J.E. Closey.723   
If the advocates of Douglas Credit had hoped that because of this meeting the NZLP would 
openly endorse Douglas Credit’s brand of monetary reform, then they were to be 
disappointed.  The meeting resolved that those people;  
… who are engaged in productive employment and those who have 
registered themselves as willing to work, should be provided with the 
necessary money facilities to ensure an adequate standard of living.  
This resolution implies an increased return to the farmer, employed 
and unemployed and an increased payment to the workers. 724 
The only commitment that both sides agreed upon in relation to monetary reform was to 
prepare and present a petition to parliament which called for the “... public control of banking, 
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currency and credit.”725  This fitted nicely within Labour’s existing platform and committed it 
to nothing more than implementing those clauses when it was elected.   
Doctors at the Sick Bed of Capitalism: The Great Depression and the Failure of Parliamentary 
Socialism 
In 1931, western socialist and labour movements were faced with a dilemma.  In theory, they 
wanted an end to capitalism and its replacement by socialism.  But Social Democratic and 
Labour governments faced with that very prospect actually moved to help stabilise the system 
that they opposed. Indeed, all Governments, regardless, of whether they were conservative, 
liberal or socialist, adopted similar economic techniques and perspectives and in the pre-1935 
period.  This approach meant a three-prong commitment to “... maintaining low inflation 
[“the soundness of money”], balancing the budget, and free trade [at least within the British 
Empire]”.726   
The dichotomy between eliminating capitalism, but being responsible for its maintenance and 
continuance moved the German trade union leader, Fitz Tarnow to bemoan the situation at 
a German SDP Congress in 1931;  
Are we standing at the sickbed of capitalism not only as doctors who 
wish to heal the patient, but also as prospective heirs who can’t wait 
for the end and would gladly help the process along with a little 
poison? … We are damned, I think, to be doctors who seriously want 
to cure, and yet we have to maintain the feeling that we are heirs who 
wish to receive the entire legacy of the Capitalist system today rather 
than tomorrow.  This double role, doctor and heir, is a damned 
difficult task.727  
Despite the radical commitments of their platforms, which were largely ignored during this 
period, Social Democratic and Labour Parties proceeded to pursue and implement 
“responsible” economic measures which were little different from the conservative parties 
they opposed.728   
However, economic discussion was more advanced in the NZLP than it was in many of its 
international Labour Party counterparts.  Both the UK and Australian Labour Parties were in 
Government at this point of time and, had adopted classical economic programmes to deal 
with the effects of the Depression. Both parties rejected any alternative proposals to counter 
the economic crisis. This led to increasing disharmony within the parties as the Depression’s 
effects impoverished their working class supporters.  In comparison, the New Zealand Labour 
Party was engaged in more studied examination of the various economic alternatives.  Unlike, 
the UK Labour MP and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden,  Savage, McCombs and, 
later, Nash were avid readers of economic literature.  Further, they were not prepared to 
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reject ideas because they conflicted with existing economic orthodoxy.729  But, it would be a 
mistake to assume that as a consequence of their discussions and reading that they had 
formulated a coherent alternative economic programme for the party.  The NZLP’s economic 
policy remained a series of distinct economic platforms. There was no underlying, developed 
economic programme to bring it together. 
However, this situation was rapidly changing.  A series of counter arguments or proposals to 
deal with the economic crisis and additionally preserve labour and social democratic 
principles started to emerge in the early 1930s.  These proposals tended to be more 
sophisticated models of the under-consumption theory, which had earlier entranced Savage 
and McCombs.  The new theories had a common theme of deficit funding and the use of 
public financing as a means of lifting demand and effectively countering the cyclical nature of 
the Depression.   
Labour’s Economic Savours: Keynes and Ford 
The British economist, John Maynard Keynes, was a prominent critic of classical economic 
programme.  He was also a critic familiar to the NZLP’s financial spokespeople.730  Keynes had 
written a number of economic texts and had previously been involved in providing advice to 
the UK Liberal Party and the UK Labour Government.731  Growing ever more sceptical of the 
orthodox economic and political approach to the Depression’s effects, Keynes increasingly 
advocated using the political and economic resources of the state to fund public works as a 
means of ensuring employment and lifting demand.732  Keynes argued that such state 
spending could be achieved through deficit financing in the face of Depression.  He 
increasingly inferred that government’s use of balanced budgets and the adherence to the 
Gold Standard was anachronistic.  This approach, Keynes argued, only aggravated the 
Depression by cutting demand and investment.733   
Keynes’s theories, although not widely publicly known at the time, did attract attention 
amongst labour and socialist politicians and thinkers.  People within the NZLP recognised the 
virtues and advantages of Keynes’ proposals.  This is made clear in an article titled, “JM Keynes 
– the Economic Consequences of Ignoring Him” in the March 9 1932 edition of the New 
Zealand Worker by Lloyd Ross.734  Waxing lyrical about Keynes and his economic theories, 
Ross informs readers that; 
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No one has a better right to discuss the unemployment problem than 
J M Keynes of Cambridge University, author of “The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace,” for he has been right so often.  Looking 
back over the events since the war, we find he has been correct in his 
prophecies, when statesmen, financiers, voters and many economists 
have been proven wrong. 735 
It was not only Keynes whom Labour appears to have become increasingly preoccupied with 
during this period.  The New Zealand Worker had run a number of articles written by Ross 
about the US industrialist Henry Ford and the administration of his company.736  Henry Ford, 
who was hardly a convert to or advocate of socialism, was of the opinion that the 
conventional business approach of retrenchment was not the correct course to take given the 
perilous economic situation.737  In an interview which was printed in the ‘Nation’s Business’ 
(USA) and later reported in the New Zealand Worker, Ford observed that; 
The wisdom of paying high wages has been made apparent by the new 
value that is set out on home markets...For a long time, manufacturing 
countries sent their produce to outside markets and used their own 
people as production machinery.  All that was required was to pay 
those people enough to keep body and soul together and work them 
16 hours a day. Now these production people are the customers of 
industry.  There is not enough trade in the wealthy classes to keep any 
industry running.  Industry depends on the plain people entirely – the 
wage earners.  They can buy only if they have money.  They can only 
have money if they earn it.738 
Ford argued that paying workers more, especially during a Recession, was good for business.  
Modern business, he concluded, needed to continue to invest in the economy during 
recessions.  This meant increasing wages and production which would restore demand and 
economic prosperity.739  This was the practical foundation of “Enlightened Capitalism”.   
Labour’s New Programme 
Increasingly Labour’s economic platform became more focussed on restoring domestic 
demand and productivity to all sectors of the New Zealand community.  The Party had 
opposed the Coalition Government’s decision to impose ten percent wage and salary cuts on 
public servants and to cut pensions and public expenditure.740  Labour’s position in this matter 
was based not only on the immediate practical distress which such cuts caused people with 
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little real immediate economic purpose.  But, because such reductions only further decreased 
purchasing power and, therefore prolonged and furthered the effects of the Depression.741   
The key policy requirement of Labour’s new economic direction was the need to ensure a 
high level of domestic consumption and demand.  In the 1931 Address in Reply speech, Nash 
outlined the Labour Party’s commitment to undertake that task while simultaneously 
criticising the Government over the issue; 
I know that the Government has a fairly difficult task to face. I know 
that that what it has to face is two major problems.  The first is to 
arrest the decline in income by stimulating production and to 
eliminate waste in production and in marketing.  The second problem 
is how to distribute that income in such a manner as to obtain a 
legitimate return for the various parties associated with production, 
primary and secondary production and distribution.742 
Nash contended that the Government had continued to pursue policies which would “... 
curtail production and reduce consumption”.743  Labour argued that the remedy to the 
Depression lay in the need to maintain a high level of consumption.  This level of consumption 
would be achieved through minimum wages, internal marketing, the fostering of secondary, 
in addition to primary, industries and productive and development work, which utilised 
‘mechanical inventions’ and the introduction of the 40 hour week.744   
The Way Out of the Labyrinth: The NZLP’s 1931 Election Platform 
By 1931 the Party had condensed its statements in this area into a concise economic agenda 
which committed Labour to an expansionary proto-Keynesian programme.  The programme 
formed part of Holland’s Address in Reply Debate in that year.745 That address was 
subsequently reprinted as a pamphlet in 1932 titled, “The Way out of the Labyrinth”.  There 
were eight platform planks to the new programme and these were provided to voters at the 
1931 Election campaign.  Briefly, the programme proposed that an incoming Labour 
Government would legislate for the following provisions;  
 Credit – The establishment of a Central Bank responsible for note 
issue and credit; 
 Primary production – Planned production of Primary industry; 
 Overseas marketing – Promotion of reciprocal trade agreements 
with Great Britain and other countries; 
 Secondary Industries – Maximum support of secondary industries; 
 Roading and Transport – Construction, maintenance and metalling 
of backblocks and other roads; 
 Interest and Rent Charges – Reduction of interest and rent 
charges; 
 Unemployment – Immediate provision of productive work to 
enable unemployed to earn sufficient to sustain themselves and 
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their dependants, with ultimate transference to ordinary 
productive employment; 
 Expansion of Industry – The call to all electors is for the expansion 
of industry, so that those at present unemployed may be once 
more absorbed industry, earn their own livings and make their 
own homes.746 
While, the State still had a considerable role in the policy as a regulator of the economy, gone 
were the previous commitments to nationalisation.747   
The State’s other primary role was to ensure that the funding was available to maintain 
demand and consumption and production through active public works and development.748  
Labour’s platform placed importance on increasing and maintaining domestic demand 
through consistently high rates of employment, with rates of pay and conditions being 
determined by negotiation between employers and unions through a national system of 
arbitration.749   
The Party attracted significant numbers at its election rallies at which candidates outlined 
Labour’s new proposals.  The New Zealand Worker reported that there was a “magnificent 
number” of attendees in the Wellington Town Hall to hear Holland open the NZLP’s election 
campaign and some hundred listened to Holland’s speech from outside.750  Labour’s 
candidates thundered from their election stages that not only was the Government’s policy 
leading to the poverty of New Zealanders, but it was bad economics.  Labour alleged that the 
Coalition Government had the economic means at its disposal to alleviate the distress of the 
Depression, but it was in thrall to business and banking interests.  Savage told the audience 
at his 1931 campaign launch in Auckland West that Labour’s programme was the only means 
by which the Country could be economically restored; 
Labour realises that the present hand-to-mouth policy cannot go on 
indefinitely-reproductive work must be found for all willing workers… 
Men and women must be got to work at permanent, reproductive 
employment, and that means organisation and money. The money 
can be raised within New Zealand. The existing banking laws give all 
the power that is necessary to enable industry to get going.751  
However, despite a vigorous campaign by the Party and an increased showing at the 
December Poll, Labour lost the election to the Coalition.  Labour’s overall seat total increased 
by 4 seats.  The Party now had 24 MPs and had gained 35 percent of the vote an increase of 
8 percent over the 1928 election results.752 Despite the poll results Holland informed the 
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election night audience that Labour was now the alternative Government and it would be in 
power in less than three years.753 
The nation’s editorial writers celebrated the Party’s defeat and emphasised that this defeat 
had saved New Zealand from Labour’s reckless economic policy.754  The Christchurch Press 
informed its readers that: 
The first thing to be said about yesterday's polling is that it securely 
re-established the Government in control of the Dominion's affairs 
and dispelled the danger of reckless finance and failing credit. The 
relief which will be felt throughout the country at this result, though 
it was never in any doubt, will be even greater than is suggested by 
the state of the Parties….755 
Despite the assurances of the NZLP that its programme would work, Labour’s proposals 
remained in the realms of economic theory.  However, by the end of 1934 the NZLP had 
explicit and practical examples to refer to. In particular the Party could draw upon the success 
of two countries that had rejected classic economic prescriptions.756  In the United States, the 
New Deal had been in operation since 1933, and although it was not as comprehensive as 
Labour’s programme it had, nonetheless, restored employment and demand to the US 
economy through its use of deficit financing and public works.757  In Sweden, the Swedish 
Social Democrats (SAP) had been in government since 1932.  The SAP Government had 
introduced a comprehensive and expansionist programme which was designed to foster 
economic growth and productivity as a response to the Depression.  The effects of its 
programme in reducing unemployment and promoting productivity and consumption were 
recognised by left parties outside of Sweden.758  By the time of the 1935 election, Labour 
Party candidates would refer to Sweden as offering a practical example of the beneficial 
effects of Labour’s intended policy.759    
Labour’s Plan: Implementing Enlightened Capitalism 
In 1935 the Party revealed an updated version of the “Labyrinth” for the upcoming election.  
The new Labour Party manifesto built on the previous policy and included most of the Party’s 
existing 1931 platform.  However, specific new clauses were included, such as the guaranteed 
price, health care, education and national superannuation.760   
The new progamme retained the Party’s 1931 commitment to alleviate the immediate 
suffering of the majority of people by increasing their purchasing power.  Economic distress 
would be resolved through creating employment through public investment.  However, it was 
distinct from the previous platform in that social provision was a key policy; 
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The remedy is to provide incomes in return for service sufficient to 
ensure that every man and every woman can purchase for themselves 
and their dependents all the things necessary for a decent standard of 
living.761 
The inclusion of social security as a platform appears to have been based on both economic 
and humane reasons.  Economically, the policy provided people with purchasing ability while 
they were unemployed or afflicted.  Socially, it allowed people to retain their dignity and to 
be well kept having been “deprived of essentials for the past five years”.762  Social security, 
education and health care, although included in past NZLP platforms, had not played a 
substantive part in the NZLP’s previous campaigns.   
The policy also retained the previous platform of Government control over the financial 
sector.  If Labour wanted to pursue its expansionist policies, then it needed to have control 
over aspects of the banking system.763  Prior to the 1935 Election, Savage had asked an 
audience in Invercargill whether private banking corporations should continue to have control 
of currency and credit or should the state assume control of the banking system.  He noted 
that such control had occurred in Canada as a means of ensuring the financing of economic 
growth and stability. 764  He affirmed that Labour’s intention was to nationalise the Reserve 
Bank, so as to ensure that the state would have control over its currency and access to credit.  
This would allow the Government to “finance economic growth and stability” without 
resorting to debt or borrowing.765  He also noted that private banks would be subjected to 
regulation, not nationalisation.  Otherwise, they would continue to operate as they did 
previously.766  Savage later reiterated this point to the New Zealand Herald informing the 
paper’s readers that Labour had no immediate intention to impose legislative reform on 
banking institutions or their practices.767  
The Party’s socialisation objective was not to be found in the new platform and there was no 
mention of it by the Party leadership.  Nor did the platform, advocate nationalisation, aside 
from the creation of a state bank.  As the Christchurch Press commented, “… [the] Labour 
programme, with the possible exception of a vague promise to make the Reserve Bank into a 
"national credit authority," is not socialistic”.768 
Instead, Labour’s policy was a mixture of idealism and pragmatic state-led intervention.  Its 
primary purpose was to resolve issues within the capitalist economy and improve the 
conditions of workers and the poor. As Savage observed the day after Labour’s election 
victory in 1935; 
I do not want to discuss capitalism, socialism or any other “ism’.  There 
are problems waiting on our doormat and our aim must be to weld 
the policy of Labour into existing institutions and see that they 
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function in a manner to meet all requirements.  We will keep in touch 
with realities – we could not do otherwise – and in our efforts to shape 
the country’s destiny we cannot do better than try to begin where 
Seddon’s life labour ended. 769   
The Attainment of Enlightened Capitalism 
The basis of the Labour ‘revolution’ in the 1930s was not its 1919 platform which advocated 
widespread nationalisation.  Rather, it was one of ensuring effective demand and 
productivity.  In the 1930s, the Labour Party and the First Labour Government set out not to 
replace the capitalist system, but rather to reform it – to make it economically and socially 
fairer to the mass of people through the implementation of a programme of social security.   
NZLP Left criticism of the Party’s new platform was that the programme failed to deal with 
the distribution aspect of a capitalist economy.  As one of Labour’s prominent left members, 
Lloyd Ross complained; 
Distribution was the essential sphere to be tackled and that the 
direction of any socialisation was that of exchange. To the Socialist, 
this was an evasion of the root cause – capitalist ownership of the 
means of production.770  
Ross observed that there was no justification for Labour’s new policy in socialist philosophy 
or economics.  He concluded that the economic problems could only be solved by the ‘social 
control of production and distribution.’771  However, in making such a statement Ross appears 
to have overlooked his own previous endorsement of Keynes, who had broadly 
recommended Labour’s new strategy in his economic writing. 
While Ross and the Party’s left asserted that Labour had departed from its socialist ethos, 
they had overlooked the changes that the NZLP had undertaken in the 1920s to redefine its 
conception of socialisation and its corresponding programme.  The simple reality was that the 
Party did not have a rigid route to socialism.  This was apparent as early as 1920 when Fraser 
declared that; 
It did not matter in what form a platform was constructed so long as 
it was in the proper direction and there was trust in its promoters ... 
Both Marx and Engels along with Lenin had indicated that their 
theories were not to be regarded as rigid dogma, but simply projecting 
a line of action for the general benefit of the working class.772 
Such comments are a tacit acknowledgement that Labour reserved the right to develop 
alternative economic programmes if necessary and that the Party would not be held ‘hostage’ 
to a particular ideological theory or practice.   
The debate over the Chelsea Sugar refinery in the previous chapter was a case in point. The 
Party modified its opposition to protective duties and trade as a consequence.  It was forced 
to face up to the fact that its simple position of state ownership did not necessarily resolve 
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the issues of sugar production, supply and distribution.  The Party had to move from its 
original position in order to protect workers’ conditions and employment.   
When Labour won the General Election in 1935, its policy was an extension of Fraser’s earlier 
line of argument.  Despite the scaremongering of the conservative press and politicians prior 
to the Election, Labour’s election programme was only ‘revolutionary’ in the way it challenged 
existing economic orthodoxy.  As an alternative to the market, it offered a more managed 
form of capitalism as a means of alleviating economic and social conditions and ensuring 
economic growth and stability.  Capitalism still dominated the economy and private concerns 
still owned the means of production, distribution and exchange.  In the aftermath of the 
Election, realising that they were still in control, the business or banking community, at least 
publicly, did not appear unduly worried.  To them it was business as usual.773 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion: The Elusive Red Dawn  
In 1920, Peter Fraser assured a mass meeting of Labour Party activists and supporters that 
the New Zealand Labour Party was as “extreme as any other socialist Party”.774  This thesis 
has set itself to explore the relationship between the New Zealand Labour Party and socialism 
in the early part of its political development.  Of course, Fraser has not been alone in making 
such an assertion.  The history of the Labour Party has seen similar claims as to its 
commitment to socialism emerge.  There was an assertion amongst some of the Labour Left, 
which became common in the 1980s, that the Labour Party was a socialist party until the 
changes undertaken by the fourth Labour Government turned it into a capitalist organisation.  
This interpretation alleged that the Party had effectively been kidnapped and taken over, at 
which point it then proceeded to turn its back on its history and traditions.  In the 1940s, after 
his expulsion from the Party and later in his books and public comments, John A Lee asserted 
that the NZLP had turned its back on socialism in the 1930s and that the Party was a Party of 
careerists and reformists. 
Today the Labour movement is educated, it is respectable. Its 
supporters belong to the establishment both economically and in 
their religious affiliations. The Labour movement the world over in 
those days was mainly self-educated. Moreover to be known as a 
labour advocate did not aid in job hunting. Labour now is recruited in 
Parliament not from the ranks of the unadapted but from amongst 
school teachers, lawyers, journalists, small businessmen, and from the 
trade union secretary class.775   
It might be perceived that the NZLP ceased to be a socialist party with the death of the militant 
socialist Harry Holland in 1933 and the ascension of the more moderate and avuncular 
Michael Joseph Savage to the Party’s leadership. For their part, the various extreme left 
groups, such as the anarchists, the syndicalists and the CPNZ had asserted as far back as the 
1920s that the party was not socialist.  To them, the NZLP was a capitalist instrument: the 
Party’s fundamental function was to deceive workers into supporting a more benign version 
of capitalism.   
While the Labour Party lacked a single or ‘true’ definition of socialism, in comparison to its 
Communist or European counterparts, this did not mean that the NZLP was not a socialist 
party in the widest sense of the term.  The objectives and the programmes of the Party was 
the result of the different socialist perspectives that resided within the labour movement.  
Socialism was a mixture of different progressive concepts such as romantic socialism, 
Christian socialism, progressive liberalism, labourism, Fabianism and diluted versions of 
Marxism. Some of these concepts were socialistic, in that they emerged from the socialist 
movement or were, as in the case of Marxism and Fabianism associated with it.  Some of them 
were merely progressive or had emerged from other political ideologies, Christian socialism 
and radical liberalism, which had emerged from the Liberal Parties.  Finally some, such as 
labourism, were the result of the practical concerns of the trade unions, which sought to 
directly influence the political agenda and gain improvements in terms and conditions for 
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their members.  People or groups which subscribed to Labour Party ‘socialism’ could identify 
with one or more of these concepts.  They did not necessarily need to accept all of them. 
It was the variation and number of these different philosophical approaches within the Party 
which had the effect of ensuring that Labour was never an ‘ideologically pure’ party in New 
Zealand.  It was never a convert to Marxism or Marxist thought, as were some of its European 
counterparts.  This is reflected in the use of the name, ‘Labour’, which signified a Party which 
is broadly representative of the wide beliefs within the movement and its ability to embrace 
all workers, rather than the singular term, ‘social democratic,’ which was, at that period, 
commonly associated with radical Marxist thought.  The New Zealand Labour Party was not 
alone in this conception and is one of the connections between the New Zealand, Australian 
and British Labour Parties and which differentiates them from their Social Democratic Party 
brethren in Europe.   
The European social democratic parties emerged from more radical traditions.  Many 
countries in Europe at the end of the nineteenth and even the early twentieth centuries were 
monarchies or had very limited democracies, and often had dictatorial overtones, such as 
Germany under Bismarck.  Even France, which arguably launched the first modern republican 
democracy upon the world in 1789 under the concepts of “liberté, égalité and fraternité,” saw 
the Republic succumb firstly to The Terror and, then to the Empire of Napoleon.  
Consequently, the trade union movement and working class and socialist groups which 
emerged in Europe tended to have more radical and militant characteristics that those of the 
United Kingdom and, later New Zealand, with the political philosophies of anarchism and 
communism vigorously contesting each other for control of the wider movement.  Eventually, 
Marxism, or rather a variant of Marx’s thought, emerged victorious and became the guiding 
objective of most of the European socialist parties.  Subsequently, in Europe the notion of 
socialism became increasingly associated with the concept of radical working class 
democracy.  As was discussed in Chapter two the notion of socialism and socialisation was 
perceived as a more inclusive and flexible concept by the New Zealand Labour Party.  To the 
NZLP, socialisation could mean public ownership, co-operatism or workers control.  In Europe, 
as was previously discussed, Social Democratic Parties adopted a strictly Marxist analysis in 
which workers control and ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange 
was the means by which socialism could be achieved.  
In the first chapters we discussed the completely different political situation between what 
existed in the United Kingdom and in some, of its Dominions, such as New Zealand and 
Australia.  Democracy in the United Kingdom, although limited in scope, was perceived as 
being ‘progressive’ by European standards.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
electoral franchise was limited to mostly wealthy, male landowners.  But this changed as a 
result of both direct and indirect popular pressure.  This pressure resulted in the passage of 
various electoral reform bills in the British parliament, which progressively enlarged the 
voting population. In New Zealand, a broad electoral franchise was achieved much more 
quickly, with universal electoral suffrage for men and women both Pakeha and Maori, being 
achieved by 1893.  That enfranchisement affected the growth and direction of the labour and 
socialist movement, as it doubtless helped to blunt and, later, co-opt working class and 
socialist unrest.   
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The political labour movement in New Zealand was largely conservative.  This was both a 
reflection of the political tendencies’ resident within the larger population and the nature of 
New Zealand’s political thought.  The British historian, A.N. Wilson implies that socialism was 
unpopular amongst the working class in the nineteenth century.776  Although his observation 
was made in relation to the support received by socialists and the ILP in the United Kingdom, 
it was, nonetheless applicable to the New Zealand situation.  The low votes received by 
candidates standing for the SP, the first Labour Party, the ULP and later the SDP before 1919, 
highlighted the suspicion in which socialism and its fellow travellers were held in the minds 
of workers.  New Zealand politics was not directed by distinct ideological differences.  What 
actually governed the practice of New Zealand politics was pragmatism.  New Zealand had a 
state-centred approach because it was seen as the best pragmatic and comprehensive 
response to the difficulties of infrastructure creation in a newly developed nation.    
The lack of a radical ideology is revealed in Labour’s political formation.  The Party evolved 
because of the failure of previous political organisations such as the Independent Political 
Labour Leagues, the first New Zealand Labour Party/United Labour Party, the New Zealand 
Socialist Party and, finally, the Social Democratic Party, to achieve a significant popular 
following.  This was due to a number of factors such as the internal organisations of the 
Parties, the cohesiveness and dominance of the Liberal Party and the lack of support amongst 
the various labour organisations for separate labour parties. But, importantly, it was also a 
suspicion of, or hostility to, the concept of socialism amongst the wider population. Aside 
from the Socialist Party and, later the Social Democratic Party, Labour’s predecessors were 
conservative organisations.   
It is in this light that the nature of socialism adopted by the Labour Party was to be viewed 
and that terms such as the ‘socialisation of the means of production, distribution and 
exchange’ need to be examined.  One cannot assume that because the New Zealand Labour 
Party accepted the object of ‘socialisation,’ it was, therefore a committed socialist party.  
Socialisation needs to be defined as a concept and the means by which it can be defined lies 
in the electoral platform of the New Zealand Labour Party and, in the writings and utterances 
of Labour’s politicians and its official publications such as the New Zealand Worker.   
The platform of the Labour Party and its definition of ‘socialisation’ was little more than an 
expanded version of new Liberalism.  There was a commitment to more social provision in 
the form of increased pensions and benefits, a commitment to land taxes, and to a graduated 
taxation system.  The Party dropped its controversial land policy, which had promoted the 
idea of state ownership, to endorse a more conventional policy which cemented into place 
the private ownership of land.  The Party also advocated more state ownership of the financial 
area such as banks and of credit control, which would be directed through the creation and 
ownership of a state bank.   
Socialism for European social democrats was a desire and commitment to increase the 
workers franchise into and over the private sector.  European social democrats and socialists 
wanted workers control of industry and society. In comparison, Labour embraced 
parliamentarism.  Its programmes would be achieved through parliamentary and 
constitutional reform.  The Initiative, the Referenda, Recall and Proportional Representation, 
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combined with the abolition of the Legislative Council, would provide workers with 
democratic participation. 
Given this rationale, the Labour Party’s conversion to Keynesianism in the early 1930s is not 
unsurprising.  As was discussed in the previous chapter, until the 1930s, the Labour Party did 
not have a coherent or comprehensive economic policy. The Party certainly had nothing 
which could deal with the economic slump which eventuated at the end of the 1920s and 
continued on through most of the most of the 1930s.  It had a number of platform planks, 
and although these became more complex throughout the 1920s, there was no overall 
strategy as to how the New Zealand economy would function under a Labour Government.   
Evidence of how an economy did function under a Labour administration had been provided 
with the elections of Labour or Labor administrations in the United Kingdom and at the state 
and federal levels in Australia.  In both these countries, Labour tended to adopt a similar, yet 
slightly more comprehensive and state-led approach, to that followed by the Liberal or 
Conservative parties they replaced.  Labour regimes placed greater emphasis on social 
provision than their Liberal and Conservative counterparts.  When the British Labour Party 
finally formed a minority Government in 1923, Philip Snowden who became the new 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was determined not to pursue alternative economic and fiscal 
policies which could cause economic unrest and uncertainty.  Snowden’s adherence to 
financial orthodoxy caused Churchill, who had previously held the position of Chancellor, to 
remark that the Snowden mind and the Treasury mind, “… embraced each other with the 
fervour of two long separated lizards”.777 
In Australia, Labor Governments at both a state and federal level remained committed to the 
pursuit and implementation of classical economic policy. Labor established the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia and it extended state influence and provision in the 
economic and social sphere. But, it did so without largely upsetting established economic 
conventions.   Thus, there was no real desire to depart from tried and trusted economic 
pathways and especially so in the aftermath of the 1929 economic collapse.  Both the British 
Labour Party under MacDonald and the Australian Labor Party under Scullin had the 
misfortune to be in government when the Depression began, and they quickly adopted 
conventional classical economic policies and practices as a means of economic response.  
Consequently, Labour voters in the United Kingdom and Australia were subjected to Labour 
Governments preaching labour objectives and values while, at the same time, experiencing 
dramatically reduced state spending and programmes as a means to balance the budget.  
Wages and spending fell, unemployment and poverty increased and the British and Australian 
Labour parties suffered bitter splits and catastrophic election defeats.   While Labour and 
Social Democratic parties might be able to analyse the various misfortunes of the capitalist 
system, few of them had a developed practical alternative to its various crises in the pre-
Keynesian period.   
As Skidelsky ruefully observes the 1929 – 1931 British Labour Government appeared to spend 
much of its time treading economic water and vainly hoping that socialism would come over 
the hill to rescue it; 
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Basically, it believed that socialism was the cure for poverty, of which 
unemployment was the most vivid manifestation. It thought in terms 
of the total solution: but socialism would clearly take a very long time, 
for it would not be established until the majority of people were ready 
for it.  In the meantime, the Labour Party simply did not know what to 
do.778   
The New Zealand Labour Party was no exception and if it had been elected into Government, 
as it had hoped in 1928, then it would have faced a similar economic situation to its sister 
Parties and probably shared a similar fate.  Throughout the 1920s, Labour had developed and 
then refined its economic position.  But, despite this, it remained a Party with no definite 
comprehensive policy, merely a number of economic policy platforms.  Within the NZLP this 
lack of a comprehensive programme was acknowledged, and it caused the party’s leadership 
increasing concern as the Depression wore on and the failure of conventional policies to 
resolve it became increasingly obvious.  Consequently, Labour was left to develop its own 
alternatives.  To this end, it flirted with monetary reform and the quackery of Social Credit, 
before finally adopting in 1931, a proto-Keynesian economic approach, similar to that 
adopted by the SAP in Sweden.  
Keynesianism was certainly a radical departure from the existing classical economic policies 
of balanced budgets and fiscal retrenchment, which were being practised by the 
Forbes/Coates Nationalist Government and by most other Governments throughout the 
world.  Instead, it advocated deficit spending and the greater use of credit as a means of 
increasing and maintaining domestic demand and overcoming the Depression.  For its part, 
Keynesianism meant that the New Zealand Labour Party was finally able to present a 
comprehensive strategy to the New Zealand public.  Further, it allowed the Party to have its 
“cake and eat it too.”  The basis of Keynesian economics was a central role for the State to 
undertake economic planning and direction, which was in line with Labour’s state-centred 
economic platform.  It had, as a central focus, a commitment to full employment, which had 
been a central part of Labour’s platform since its formation, as a means to ensure domestic 
demand.  It allowed Labour, as well, to further develop its policies of social provision which 
cumulated in the 1938 Social Security Act.   
As we have discussed previously in Chapter Two and earlier in this conclusion, while Labour 
adopted the objective of socialism at its formation, it was an objective which was largely 
undefined. The Party had adopted ethical socialism.  This approach was contrary to the 
Marxist approach of the European Social Democrats where capitalism and capitalists were 
rigidly defined as the “private owners of the means of production, distribution and exchange”.  
From the ethical socialist perspective, socialism and capitalism were viewed for the most part 
as imprecise terms.  Capitalism was often used as a byword for greed, graft and individualism.  
Socialism was perceived as the opposite.  It promised a society which was governed 
collectively, in which people played an active role in the decision-making process.  It was a 
society which espoused selflessness and virtue.  Socialism, for the Labour Party, tended to 
reflect that flexible and imprecise description.  Labour’s vision of socialism was never a 
doctrinaire vision.  It was always a reformist party, but it was never reformist in a Marxist 
sense, because it never adhered to Marxism as a guiding principle. It was never as extreme as 
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its European Social Democratic counterparts, as it was never guided by the same principles or 
beliefs.   
Another way to look at the manner in which Labour perceived its relationship with Socialism 
is to examine its relationship to capitalism.  At its formation in 1916, the NZLP argued that 
capitalism was responsible for the causes of poverty. In the late 1920s and 30s, in the 
aftermath of the 1929 Slump and the emergence of Depression, it argued that it was 
unfettered capitalism which was responsible.  By 1935, the Party was not publicly referring to 
capitalism or socialism in its propaganda.  Instead, its policies touted increased state-led 
development and regulation, industrialisation, guaranteed prices, full employment and 
greater social provision.  Labour argued that the way out of the Depression was for people to 
have access to greater spending power and credit as a means of creating and maintaining 
domestic demand.  Its public political lineage was not socialist, but liberal.  The Party 
emphasised the progressive policies pursued and implemented by the Ballance and Seddon 
Liberal Governments and it placed itself alongside them. In his response to Nationalist 
criticism in 1938 that Labour was implementing socialist policy, Labour’s leader, Michael 
Joseph Savage asserted that it was ‘applied Christianity.’779   
By 1949, when the Labour Government was defeated at the polls, New Zealand had 
undergone dramatic changes.  Labour’s 1919 platform had largely been implemented, except 
for the defence and land policies which were dropped, as were those dealing with electoral 
reform.  As a consequence of Labour’s policies and the Second World War, the state played a 
central role in economic policy. The Labour Government used the state to pursue economic 
and social objectives which would have been unlikely twenty years earlier.  Yet, during its 14 
years in government, capitalism remained in place, if now reformed, regulated and 
restrained.  This new focus had prompted one of its principle opponents, Martin Nestor, who 
was the private secretary to National Leader Sidney Holland, to note in his book review on 
the role and history of the Canadian CCCP (Canadian Commonwealth Cooperative Party) in 
1944, that; 
.. after 9 years of Socialist Government, private enterprise is still 
paramount, nor does there appear to be any likelihood that within the 
near future, at any rate, State enterprise will operate in more than a 
fraction of our industrial life. 780  
Nestor’s observations recognise that the NZLP had implemented a substantial change in New 
Zealand economic framework and in the nation’s political direction.  Further, in the 
intervening period, Labour’s policy directions had also been accepted by the National Party in 
New Zealand and by other Labour, Social Democratic and Conservative Parties internationally.  
However, if we understand socialism as the “public ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange”, as it had increasingly come to be recognised by the NZLP, or as a 
transition phrase toward communism, then Labour in 1949 had failed to develop a pathway 
to a socialist society.  On those rare occasions when Labour did speak of its socialist objective 
(which remained as the NZLP’s objective until 1979), it was now associated with full 
employment, economic regulation and the welfare state.  But, the Labour Party never really 
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sought to implement such an objective to begin with, at least, not in the European sense of 
the term.  Such a narrow vision of socialism was not part of Labour’s political tradition.  Its 
tradition and understanding of socialism was always much more inclusive and pragmatic and, 
therefore, inevitably more reactionary than progressive, up until Keynesianism gave its 
pragmatism a coherent forward-looking programme which distinguished the Party from its 
Conservative opponents.    
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